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ABSTRACT
The influence of eight commodity groups on international economic integration in 
five Central American Countries are analyzed. The commodity groups are rice, beans, 
com, sorghum, bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef. The countries are Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. A game theory framework is used to find a Nash 
equilibrium solution to a set of trade negotiation scenarios. The payoffs of the Political 
Preference Function (PPF) are used for the trade liberalization scenarios under analysis. 
These PPF payoffs are estimated using the MISS model.
The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) is used as the main criterion for trade 
liberalization. Status quo (SQ) or no reduction in protection, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% 
reductions in protection or free trade (FT), are the scenarios under analysis. Four games 
are modeled. In game one all PPF weights equal one, which means that all commodities 
groups have the same importance in the government’s view. In game two, all PPF weights 
are different from one, i.e., the government assigns different degrees of importance to some 
sectors relative to other sectors and to itself. Game three and four include the PPF weights 
of game one and two but with a reduction of five percent in the exchange rate.
The results show that any individual country will agree to free trade when the rest 
of countries, as a bloc, reduces protection by 50%. This indicates that Central American 
countries will be likely to agree on a partial trade liberalization rather than to a more 
involved form of economic integration. Commodity groups do not affect trade liberalization 
adversely. The study suggests that the use o f game theory is an appropriate approach to 
analyze economic integration in Central America.
xiii
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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION 
Introduction
In June 1990, the Central American presidents signed an accord calling for the 
creation of a stronger regional common market in an effort to end the poverty that has 
contributed to regional instability. In 1992, the presidents ofthe Central American Countries 
met to restart the process of economic integration one more time. This was a second 
attempt to deepen economic integration of the area, hi the new scheme of economic 
integration the objective is to promote the socioeconomic development of the region 
through an increase in exports and the participation of the countries in international markets 
as a bloc. With this objective in mind, the agreement of 1992 included a more open trade 
relationship with the rest of the world and the re-elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
in intra-regional trade. This time the agreement did not look forward to achieve the creation 
of the Central American Republic. The main objective was to alleviate the external debt 
burden through the creation of a greater export supply of commodities produced in the 
region, the modernization of the productive infrastructure, and the increase of income and 
employment
The agreement of 1992 indicates that each country will have to completely eliminate 
tariff and non-tariff measures applied to trading partners in Central America. This implies 
a reduction of 3% for Guatemala, 5% for El Salvador, 10% for Honduras, 8% for 
Nicaragua, and 2% for Costa Rica. It is reasonable to expect that the countries with the 
higher level of duty levied will suffer the most dramatic reductions in government revenue. 
Will this agreement really improve the welfare of all countries or only that of a few? A clear 
answer to this question is the determinant for the success o f the implementation of the
1
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2
agreement Therefore, a formal analysis is needed to measure the change in welfare from 
such changes in trade policy. Little work has been done to analyze the effects of these 
changes. It seems important to assess trade liberalization in Central America from different 
perspectives and using various empirical approach. More research on this topic is 
recommended because, for example, commodity groups may be very influential in shaping 
domestic policies towards a trade liberalization agreement Among few studies on this issue, 
De Franco (1996) found that a total elimination of the intra-regional trade barriers and the 
adoption of a common external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world, i.e., the formation 
of a customs union, is harmful for the welfare of Honduras and Nicaragua. However, the 
influence of commodity groups on the domestic policy-making process is not captured in 
the study of De Franco but it could be crucial for countries as how and when to enter the 
trade liberalization agreement
Overview of Central America 
Geographical Overview of Central America
Central America consists of seven small nations: Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. They are strung along the narrow isthmus 
that links North America (Mexico) with South America (Colombia), with the Caribbean Sea 
to the north and east and the Pacific Ocean to the west and south. This strategic location has 
helped shape the region's history, culture, and economy. Central America has an area of 
some 522,000 sq km (202,000 sq mi), and its population in 1992 was estimated at about 31 
million. Its geography varies from towering volcanoes to some of the world's densest 
jungles. The volcanoes are the most spectacular feature, forming a nearly 1,300-km-long 
(800-mi) chain from the Mexican border into central Costa Rica and reaching heights of
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
over 3,650 m (about 12,000 ft). Many of these peaks are still active, contributing to both 
the richness of the soil and the dangers of life in the area. Central America is also prone to 
earthquakes. There is a major break in the chain of volcanoes and mountains in southern 
Nicaragua, and the chain ends in central Panama. This has made these two areas particularly 
attractive for trade routes between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and as possible canal 
sites.
Economic Overview of Central American Countries
The economic development of Central American countries has been slower than in 
other American Countries. By present standards, Central American countries are poor and 
in developing stages. Table 1 presents data on key macroeconomic indicators. The total 
economy of the countries is very small when compared with, for example, Louisiana
Table 1.1. Key Economic Indicators of Five Central American Countries ( 1997)
Item Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica
Pop, mill 11.2 6.0 6.3 4.6 3.5
GDP, USS 
billion
17.8 11.4 4.7 2.0 9.5
Infiation,% 9.2 4.6 20.2 9.2 13.3
GDP
growth, %
5.0 5.0 5.3 5.8 3.6
Agriculture* 23.6 13.2 22.6 33.8 15.1
Industry* 20.2 26.7 30.2 21.7 23.2
Services* 56.4 60.1 47.1 44.6 61.7
Exports** 3187 2049 2007 936 4328
Imports** 4193 3256 2216 1482 4571
Debt** 3914 3182 3998 5887 3548
Debt/GDP 22.0 27.8 85.1 291.7 37.2
Source: World Bank, 1999. *-As > percentage of GDP, ***mcludes good and services, USS millions
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which had a GSP of about $120 billion and a population of 4.4 millions in 1996 (Mindscape 
US Atlas, 1996). All the countries in Table 1 present a negative balance of payments and 
a high level of debt This is one of the main reasons why accelerated improvement of the 
productive sector is needed.
Table 1 shows the structure of the economies of the countries under the agreement. 
Although the largest sectors are industry and services, it is clear that agriculture plays an 
important role in the economies of these countries. Therefore, the impacts of the agreement 
on economic integration will affect the agricultural sector of each country.
Historical Overview of Economic Integration
In earlier decades, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica 
tried to deepen the economic integration of the area. This task proved to be difficult There 
were many obstacles in the way of integration and this caused many delays and nearly 
caused the disintegration of the Common Market created in the sixties. The objective ofthe 
economic integration of that time reflected the fact that the terms of trade of the agricultural 
commodities produced in the area were worsening. Therefore, a fast way to industrialization 
was envisaged in the agreement of the Central American Common Market (CACM). There 
were four main elements of this economic integration agreement First, free intra-regional 
trade among the country members of the CACM. Secondly, a unified duty was levied on 
imports from countries not member. Third, the CACM included the creation of the Central 
American Peso, a common currency for the country-members. Finally, the creation of 
institutions, such as the General Secretary of the Treaty of Economic Integration, the 
Central American Monetary Council and the Central American Bank of Economic 
Integration, were included in the agreement (De Franco, 1996).
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The Central American Common Market (CACM) formed in 1960 spurred some 
industrial growth. Economic development produced better communications and more 
education. The growing middle class began to demand more democratic and efficient 
governments. At the same time, the new export crops took the best land away from the rural 
poor, leading many to move to the cities. As pressures for change mounted, large 
landowners combined with conservative military leaders to use increasing force to defend 
their power. Elections were controlled, and the path to peaceful change seemed closed. This 
prompted many to support radical-left violence as means of social and political changes. In 
Nicaragua the long dictatorship of the Somoza family fell before the Sandinista guerrilla 
campaign in 1979. Violence also spread to El Salvador and increased in Guatemala. The 
CACM, already weakened by a 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras, virtually 
disintegrated as the fighting spread. Tourism and investments declined sharply and debts 
rose. High interest rates and low crop prices contributed to near economic collapse, and 
U.S. efforts to restore stability via military and economic aid met with little success.
Conflict and economic decline continued despite efforts of the Contadora group 
(Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) to find a solution acceptable to both 
U.S.-supported forces and others aided by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 1987, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua signed a peace plan that helped bring 
about elections in Nicaragua in February 1990, which the Sandinistas lost, and the 
disbanding ofthe U.S.-supported rebel forces (the contras) there. Negotiations between the 
central government and rebel forces in El Salvador were concluded in a cease-fire in January 
1992.
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International Economic Integration
Robson (1984) defines economic integration “to denote a state of affairs or a process 
involving the combination of separate economies into larger economic regions.” In addition, 
economic integration is concerned with efficiency in the use of resources. Robson (1984) 
distinguishes three levels of economic integration: 1) national; 2) international; 3) 
worldwide. In addition, at each level there may be sectoral integration. For example, there 
can be integration in the agriculture sector or in industry. In this study, the second level of 
integration is the relevant one.
International economic integration may take different forms and it depends on the 
intended degree of economic integration (Robson, 1984). Depending on the degree of 
integration, there are free trade areas, custom unions, common markets and economic 
unions. A free trade area involves the free movement of product in the area, i.e, it involves 
elimination of trade barriers between the members of the free trade. In addition, each 
member retains it own tariff with respect of the rest of the world. By contrast, a custom 
union agreement involves not only the free movement of products in the area, but also a 
common external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world. A common market is a deeper 
form of integration. A common market contains the elements of a custom union and 
additionally allows for free labor and capital flow in the area. Thus, in a common market, 
factor and product markets are integrated. Presently, the deepest form of international 
integration is represented by an economic union. An economic union contains all the 
elements of a common market and a high degree of unification of monetary, fiscal and other 
policies, hi this case, depending on the degree of integration, a wide spectrum of forms of 
integration can be seen. The degree of integration will depend mostly on the degree of
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harmonization policies among the members. In general, most agreements on international 
integration are focused on the suppression of discrimination among members, the 
maintenance of discrimination against the rest of the world and, the lasting character of the 
agreements which limits the use of certain instruments of economic policy.
According to Robson (1984), there are important motives for the existence of 
economic integration, such as gains in welfare for the group as a whole. The gains that may 
be derived from the integration can be expressed in terms of increased production according 
to comparative advantage, increased output arising from economies of scale, improvement 
in the terms of trade with the rest of the world, changes in efficiency due to increased 
competition among members, and integration-induced changes affecting the quantity and 
quality of factor inputs.
On the other hand, economic integration is not a panacea for economic problems. 
In real life, for example, a custom union (CU) agreement often has both trade-creating and 
trade-diverting effect The success of the agreement is based on the net trade-creating 
effect, i.e., by how much the trade-creating effect is greater than the trade-diverting effect 
If trade creation is greater than trade diversion, then countries can expect to gain from the 
agreement The reverse is true if trade diversion is greater than trade creation. Thus, the CU 
agreement may well be beneficial or detrimental for the group involved.
International Economic Integration in Practice
Starting from the second half of the present century one can find many examples of 
economic integration across the world. Some of them have been successful and others have 
stagnated or completely disintegrated. Most of the agreements are made by countries that 
are located close to each other or that share similar cultural, educational and political views.
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The most successful example of an agreement of economic integration is perhaps the 
European Union (EU). The EU started as a common market in the late fifties and initially 
included Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg as 
members. In later years, the common market became what is now known as the European 
Union (EU). Presently, there are IS country-members. As described earlier, since the EU 
is an economic union, it involves free trade among members, the determination of a common 
external tariff (CET), factor and capital mobility and the creation of a common currency for 
all die members of the union besides fiscal and monetary policies. Although many problems 
have been present which have caused delays along the way to the realization of the 
objectives of economic integration, this union can be said to be a success from both 
theoretical and empirical points of view.
Other less successful examples are found around the globe in all continents. For 
example, Robson (1984) found that six groups of economic integration have been set up in 
Africa in the present century. The Custom and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) 
was setup by the francophone People’s Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and the 
Central African Republic. These countries were also linked by a monetary union. The 
Economic Community of East Africa (CEAO) was formed in 1974 by Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. The CEAO is a second francophone grouping 
and is also grouped in a monetary union with Benin and Togo. Liberia and Sierra Leone 
established the Mano River Union (MRU) in 1973, the latter involving a custom union and 
other forms of cooperation. In 1980, Guinea joined the union. The Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) was setup in 1975 by fifteen countries in Lagos. This 
union included both francophone and anglophone countries and countries already linked in
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the CEAO and MRU. In 1969, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and the Republic of South 
Africa signed a custom union agreement on foundations dating back to 1910. In 1976, 
Zaire, Burundi and Ruanda formed the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL). 
Finally, the East African Community formed by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania broke up in 
1978 although there was evident effectiveness during its existence.
In Latin America, there are also various examples of economic integration besides 
the 1960 common market of Central America. The Treaty of Montevideo (1980) set up the 
Latin America Integration Association (LAIA). This treaty included all Latin American 
Countries with the exception of Guyana, Surinam and French Guiana. The LAIA is the 
successor of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The Cartagena 
agreement of 1969 established the Andean Group which included Chile, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. The Caribbean Common Market was established 
in 1973 by Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and others.
In Asia, besides the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), formed by 
Singapore, Malaysia, the Phillippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, there are no other schemes 
of international integration. There are, however, arrangements for sectoral integration 
between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in the group known as Regional Cooperation for 
Development (RCD).
Problem Definition 
At this moment, there is little information available to each Central American 
country’s decision-makers to foresee the effects of an economic integration agreement at 
the national, regional and international levels, and specifically in the agricultural sector. This 
study will analyze the consequences of the customs union agreement on the welfare of 
several important agricultural commodities ofthe participating countries.
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
Problem Jnstification
Since little information is available, Central American decision-makers have no clear 
idea of the effects the economic integration system may bring to each country. In addition, 
little research has been done on the long term effects of the customs union agreement on the 
five central American countries, which can be a serious obstacle for the successful 
development of the 1992 accords. For example, De Franco(1996) argues that in the short 
and middle term Guatemala and Costa Rica will gain and Honduras and Nicaragua will lose 
form the agreement. This outcome may persuade policy-makers of the latter countries to 
be skeptical about the agreement However, the long term effects (S-10 years) are not 
discussed anywhere. In addition, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used by De Franco 
(1996) to estimate the effects of the custom union in the Computable General Equilibrium 
Model (CGE)only included capitalists (owner) and workers without a sectoral analysis of 
the impacts of the agreement In general, international trade theory suggests that trade 
liberalization brings positive changes in welfare for all parties (Krugman, 1994). This is the 
reason why countries are willing to negotiate and liberalize trade. If there is not a feasible 
gain from die agreement then it is reasonable to expect that the status quo situation will 
prevail. Likewise, for the agreement to be acceptable, it is important to show how long it 
will take for the benefits to show up for all countries. Finally, this study is important for the 
agricultural sector of all countries within and outside the agreement in terms of trade 
creation and diversion effects. So, this analysis is important for the US because it is the main 
trading partner of the Central American countries.
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Objectives
Main Objective
The main goal of this research is to provide an analysis of the possible effects of the 
economic integration efforts on the agricultural sub-sector of the five Central American 
Countries and their repercussions on the successful implementation of the integration 
agreement of 1992.
Specific Objectives
1.- To identify and evaluate recent relevant national and international trends in 
economic integration and the outcomes of such trends.
2.- To hypothesize aplausible economic model useful in explaining the long term effects 
of economic integration at country and sectoral levels.
3.- To empirically estimate and test the hypothesized economic model, and
4.- To draw conclusions from the model and provide recommendations to policy- and 
decision-makers which can be used in further development of the economic 
integration of the Central American region at the sectoral level.
Procedures
Objective One
The first objective of this research will be accomplished by a review of the relevant 
literature in order to develop a thorough background on the relevant areas of the present 
research. Therefore, empirical evidence of international economic integration will be 
assessed. Moreover, the conceptual and empirical approach to evaluate economic 
integration agreements will be reviewed. This literature review should generate relevant 
information to understand recent trends in economic integration around the world and give 
some hints as to what direction this present research should take.
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Objective Two
To achieve objective two of this research, based on the information obtained in 
accomplishing objective one, an economic model will be conceptualized. This model will 
relate the implementation of economic integration in Central American countries through 
various economic policies (trade, fiscal, monetary) and the effects of such integration on the 
agriculture sector. Since the objective of economic integration i? the improvement of the 
welfare standard of the populations of the members of the integration scheme, the benefits 
or losses derived from the scheme of integration changes in welfare will be estimated. Thus, 
changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total welfare changes will be estimated 
to assess the impact of the agreement on the welfare of each country. As in a cost-benefit 
analysis, it is believed that if benefits outweighs costs, then the chances of successful 
integration are increased and the agreement is more likely to last On the other hand, if 
country members believe that the agreement is detrimental to welfare, the agreement is likely 
-to fail.
It is worthwhile to recognize that the effects of the integration agreements are to 
be spread over the whole economy. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this study, agriculture 
is a very important economic sector in Central American countries. So, the focus of this 
research is to investigate the effects of economic integration on the agricultural sector. Thus, 
the conceptual model will be developed in a partial equilibrium framework because any 
change in welfare in this sector is a representative situation of the whole economy. 
Therefore, the use o f a partial equilibrium framework to analyze the effects of economic 
integration on the agriculture sector will contribute toward this assessment of the impact of 
this economic agreement on the whole economy.
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Objective Three
This objective will be achieved through the empirical modeling of the relationships 
established in objective two. Until recently, Central American countries continued defining 
the timetable and the extent of a new economic integration agreement. Therefore, several 
integration scenarios are likely to be present in the table of negotiations. Most of these 
scenarios have to deal with the coordination of national policies. This coordination is a 
crucial condition in order for each country to start benefitting from the reduction of trade 
barriers and increased size markets. At the same time, integration efforts convey costs in 
terms of sovereignty, welfare trade-offs and trade diversion as a whole and from the 
perspective of specific domestic sectors. Therefore, some scenarios may bring positive or 
negative benefits for all or some of the members. Thus, it is important to assess what 
scenarios are the most relevant to achieve the stated goal of standard of living improvement 
of the populations of Central American countries.
Since it was stated that the theoretical framework will involve the use of a partial 
equilibrium model, the use a Political Payoff or Preference Function (PPF) is proposed as 
one o f the most appropriate techniques in this kind of analysis. The approach of the PPF 
used in this research is based on the one used by Kennedy (1995), previously developed by 
Gardner, Rauser and Freebaim and also similar to the approach developed by Stigler and 
Peltzman, Magee, and Hillman. Thus, the PPF used in this research is a weighted, additive 
function of money metric welfare measures for various societal groups. The PPF is the 
objective function that policy-makers seek to maximize through the selection of specific 
policy actions.
The discussion above indicates that societal groups enter as arguments in the PPF 
and economic integration affects their welfare. Therefore, producers, consumers, lobbyists,
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and politicians will seek to influence the decisions of the government as to how to enter the 
economic integration agreement Through this influence, each group seeks to minimize 
adverse effects or to maximize gains when entering the agreement Thus, the 
appropriateness of the PPF to analyze economic integration in Central America derives from 
the extent that the political influence of various societal groups can be modeled. In addition, 
the numerical estimate of each group’s influence will probably indicate what integration 
scheme is the most likely to be considered as the best scheme for each country, given the 
solution of the PPF maximization problem.
Objective Four
The final objective of this study will be achieved through a generalization of findings 
resulting from empirical estimation of the partial equilibrium model proposed in objective 
three. Results will be interpreted in the context of information needs of the policy makers, 
consumers, and producers of Central American and foreign countries affected by the 
agreement of economic integration in Central America.
Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter one will present the introduction, problem statement, justification, 
objectives, and procedures for the research. Chapter two will present an exhaustive 
literature review on the trends of economic integration in the Central American region, 
empirical studies using various techniques and methods to analyze international economic 
integration. Trade issues will also be reviewed. Chapter three will present a review of the 
relevant literature on partial equilibrium analysis and the derivation of the theoretical model 
to estimate the effects of the scheme of economic integration chosen by the Central 
American countries on welfare inside and outside the economic bloc. Chapter four deals
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with the estimation of elasticities of supply and demand which are required for the empirical 
estimation of the conceptual model of Chapter three. Chapter five includes data collection, 
assessment of the quality of the data and the empirical results of the model conceptualized 
in chapter three. Chapter six will summarize the results and present the implications, 
conclusions, and recommendations for policy-makers inside and outside Central America.
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CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW
An exhaustive exercise is developed in this chapter. Therefore, the chapter is 
divided into four sections. First, reviews of Central American agriculture and the main 
policies that affect performance of agriculture are included. Second, relevant literature to 
the Central American Common Market and its system of economic integration is examined. 
Third, relevant literature to the issues of economic integration is reviewed in the light of 
the developing countries context. Fourth, since the new philosophy of economic integration 
in Central America is based on the idea of export promoting policies, empirical evidence 
on Export Promotion (EP) Policies is reviewed. Finally, empirical applications analyzing 
economic integration based on a game theoretical approach using a Political Preference 
Function (PPF) are reviewed.
Central American Agriculture and Policies 
Central American Agriculture
Climatic conditions are favorable to grow a wide variety of tropical crops in Central 
America (Table 2.1). However, rice, beans, com, sorghum, cotton, coffee, sugar cane, 
bananas, African palm, cattle, and shrimp are the main agricultural activities in Central 
American countries. Central American Agriculture has historically had a dual nature. On 
one hand, the domestic consumption sector has been neglected. Therefore, little attention 
has been devoted to its technological development and productivity in this sector is very 
low. The domestic consumption group is composed of beans, sorghum, com and rice. On 
the other hand, the group of crops devoted to the export sector has received most of the 
efforts devoted to the development of agriculture in Central America. The agricultural 
export sector consists of cotton, bananas, coffee, sugar cane, and beef.
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Table 2.1. Production of Main Agricultural Products in Central American Countries, 1998.
Item Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Total
Area* Output6 Area Output Area Output Area Output Area Output Area Output
Rice 64.7 276.9 8.8 52.4 13.3 40.7 10.9 13.8 57.9 215.9 156 599.7
Beans 38 13.4 63.1 55.4 124.6 84.4 78.9 72.7 145.7 97.8 450 323.7
Com 17 32 250 582 589 1021 447 471 229 451 1532 2557
Sorghum 0 0 101.9 170.8 42.3 51.6 82.3 90.2 21.8 40.6 248 353.2
Cotton 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.7 3.6 4.7
Coffee 106 148.9 163.9 119.6 273 223.1 199.7 155.1 89.1 64.7 832 .711.4
Sugar C. 49 3682 81 5546 182 19845 45 4113 46 3261 403 36447
Banana 51.3 2443 0 0 17.0 710 22.4 862 1.8 88 92.5 4103
A. Palm 26.5 444 0 0 19 289 33.4 522 2 53 80.9 1308
Cattle 1527* 82“ 1038 35 1769 54 5400 138 1688 48 11422 357
Shrimp N/A 2.4 N/A 7.9 N/A 4.0 N/A 17.4 N/A 8.6 N/A 40.3

















Table 2.2. Self-sufficiency Ratios of Main Agricultural Products in Central American Countries, 1997
Item Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Average
Rice 82.2 56.3 50.89 33.84 62.38 57.12
Beans 38.63 93.5 100.52 106.50 116.46 91.12
Com 3.23 55.61 82.88 75.54 99.72 63.39
Sorghum 0 97.38 101.91 56.54 111.23 73.41
Beef 116.78 76.86 95.46 103.96 178.11 114.23
Source: ECLAC, 1999.
Item Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Total
volume* Value6 volume Value volume Value volume Value volume Value volume Value
Cotton 0 0 1.4 1526 0 0 0 0 0.9 1274 2.3 2800
Sugar 106.1 39.2 243.9 66.5 1364.5 315.8 21 10.2 186.5 44.6 1922 476.3
Banana 2013.5 616.1 0 0 650.2 177.0 513.3 175.7 74.3 19.5 3251.3 988.3
Coffee 129 405 100.7 322 212.7 585 139.8 430 55.1 171 637.3 1913
Beef 12100 22700 2 2 437 N/A 1792 4000 19036 34551 33367 61253
Shrimp 4889 61289 4510 32785 7516 27494 9513 128800 5167 86665 31595 337033
Source: ECLAC, 1999. For all countries: (a) Cotton, Sugar, Bananas, and Coffee in 1000 TM; Beef and Shrimp in TM; (b) Sugar, Bananas, 


















Table 2.4. Imports of Main Agricultural Products of Central American Countries, 1997
Item Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Total
volume* Value6 volume Value volume Value volume Value volume Value volume Value
Rice 65.2 25565 34.3 11332 26.6 8692 58.0 28061 81.2 34382 265.3 108032
Beans 19.6 11499 6.2 5312 0.1 31 1.1 437 1.8 803 28.8 18082
Com 568.5 93749 325.9 55670 251.2 38272 116.1 25364 16.3 2836 1278 215891
Sorghum 0 36 5.1 1038 0.1 144 70.5 10561 0.9 629 76.6 12408
Wheat 309.2 62624 173.2 33576 262.8 51972 154.8 44341 65.2 14621 965.2 207134
Source: ECLAC, 1999. For all countries: (a) volume in 1000TM; (b) value in 1000 US$
SO
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To get a better idea about food self-sufficiency in Central America, self-sufficiency 
ratios are included in Table 2.2. It is clear that in all agricultural products for domestic 
consumption, such as rice, beans, sorghum, and com, domestic consumption has to rely on 
imports. This situation implies that countries have to earn foreign exchange to satisfy needs 
of main food staples. Thus, other crops devoted to exports are helpful in coping with this 
situation.
Agricultural exports are very important for the Central American countries. As was 
shown in Table 1.1 in Chapter one, agricultural exports made up 52.52% of Central 
American total exports in 1997. This important contribution to exchange earnings came 
from exports of coffee, cotton, sugar, bananas, and beef. Historically, these crops have 
represented the main source of foreign exchange (Table 2.3). However, in recent years, 
exports of shrimp have been increasing steadily and lately shrimp exports have made up 
a good share of agricultural exports.
Central American Agricultural Policies
There are many obstacles to production and trade in Central American countries. 
Various measures, such as licenses, permits, import and exports taxes are widely applied 
in all countries. On the contrary, it seems that little policy efforts in food production are 
directed to promote production of agricultural commodities in Central America when 
compared to other countries outside the region. Table 2.5 shows export restrictions 
effective in Central America in 1999. Permits and licenses are required to export in all 
countries with the exception of Honduras. In addition, the degree of restrictiveness varies 
across countries. Nicaragua is the most restrictive country among those imposing 
restrictions. Export quotas are only imposed in El Salvador on exports of textiles to the
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US. This is probably related to the activity of the export processing zones (EPZ) or 
"maquilas" present in the country.
As in the case of exports, there are restrictions to imports in Central America. 
According to Table 2.6, with the exception of Costa Rica and Honduras, permits and 
licenses are widely used in Central America. Nicaragua is the extreme case of import 
control since licenses are required for all imports. However, there were no quantitative 
restrictions such as quotas in Central American countries in 1999.
As in many other developing countries, export taxes are present in Central 
American countries. Coffee, bananas, sugar, and beef are affected by this type of tax (Table 
2.7). Exports are more heavily taxed in Costa Rica when compared to the rest of Central 
American countries. On the contrary, there were no export taxes in effect in El Salvador 
or Nicaragua in 1999. In Guatemala, export taxes are applied to all commodities. In 
Honduras, only the export of bananas is taxed.
The application of an import tax or tariff is another kind of restriction to trade 
commonly used in Central America, hi general, there has been a tendency to tax imports 
of final goods more heavily than imports of capital goods and raw materials. This is 
consistent with data reported in Table 2.8. Accordingly, all countries impose taxes with a 
maximum level between 15-18% and minimum level of 0%. This is in agreement with the 
new economic integration negotiations developed during the nineties.
On the other hand, some producer support policies are implemented in Central 
American countries. However, in developing countries it is more common to find taxes 
than measures o f support In the case of Central America, the most common measure of 
support to agriculture is the implementation of subsidy programs for exportable 
commodities, taxes and import duties exemptions for agricultural inputs (fertilizers,

















Table 2.5. Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999, Export Restrictions.
Item \ Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Licenses/Permits Permits are 
required for 
products of vegetal, 












Permits for diesel, 
liquified gas, 
cement, animal 






to export to Central 
America, except 
Costa Rica when 
payment is made in 
US currency. 
Licenses are 
required to export 
to the rest of die 
world.
Not required Permit for: metal 
for recycling, 
capital goods, 













Precious metal can 
be exported only 
with authorization 
of the Central Bank




















Table 2.6. Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999, Import Restrictions.
Item \ Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Licenses/Permits Only for petroleum 
products
License to import 
endangered species. 



















None Licenses are 
required for all 
imports.


















Table 2.7. Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999: Export Taxes
Item \ Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Coffee
a)l .5% of the exported value in 
US $ at all prices
b)An additional 1% of the price 
FOB if the price of a 46 Kg sac 
is above US $92.00.
None 1.0% of the price 
FOB
None None
Bananas 1.0% of the FOB price, $0.18 
and 1.5 colones for each 
exported box
None None $0.18 per 40 
Lb. box.
None
Sugar 1.0% if FOB price is below 
US$18.00,5% when price is 
between US$18.00 and 
US$23.00,13% if price is 
between US$28.00 and 
US$33.00, and 18% if price is 
above US$35.00
None None None None
Other Beef: 1.0% of the FOB price 
Cattle: Pure breed: 1.0%, 
Mixed breeds: 6.0%
























Table 2.8. Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999: Import Taxes
Item \ Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Various 18% of value of 
final goods 
1.0% of the value 
of raw materials 
and capital goods
15.0% of the value 
o f final goods. 
Between 5% and 
10% for
intermediate goods. 
0% for raw material 
and capital goods.
17% for final goods 
7.0% of value of 
intermediate goods. 
0.0% for raw 
material and capital 
goods.
18.0% of the value 
of final goods. 
Between 5% and 
10.0% of the value 
of intermediate 
goods.
1.0% of the value 
of capital goods 







between 0.0% and 
15.0%. In general 
higher rates are 
applied to sugar, 
sucrose, rice, beans, 



















Table 2.9. Support Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999: Subsidies
Item \ Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua





to the rest of the 
world. 8% 
minimum and 20% 
maximum of the 
FOB value. A 15% 
tax is applied to the 
total amount of the 
CAT.
A subsidy is given 
to diesel for public 
transportation and 
gas for domestic 
use.
A marginal subsidy 
is given to public 
transportation






consumption is less 
the 300 kWh.
1.5% of the FOB 
value of export is 
given to exporters 
in concept of 
compensation for 




pesticides, capital goods). Table 2.9 shows that some export subsidies are given to 
agricultural commodiy exporters in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. No measures of direct 
support were reported in the rest of the countries.
Central American Common Market (CACM)
The CACM was first established in 1960. A number of problems of various nature 
caused its virtual disintegration in the eighties, hi 1992, an effort to revive the CACM was 
in vogue and a series of steps were taken to do so. In this section, a review of the nature of 
the agreement of 1960, the objectives, achievements and problems are discussed. Then, a 
review of the direction of economic integration in the nineties is presented and compared 
to that of the sixties and seventies.
CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
Economic integration in Central America apparently started a long time ago. 
According to Quiros-Guardia (1973), after World War II there was a favorable international 
market situation for many Central American export products, such as coffee, bananas and 
other agricultural products. This situation led to a network of bilateral agreements among 
Central American countries in the 1950s. The changing situation in the international 
economic environment and the European Common Market in that period became the 
inspiration for Central American countries to sign the "Central American Treaty on Tariff 
Equalization” of 1959 and the General “Treaty o f Central American Economic 
Integration" o f1960 (SIECA, 1999). Forabetterunderstandingofthesetreaties, their main 
objectives are presented here.
Walter et al (1967) mentioned five main objectives of the Central American 
Economic Integration Treaty of 1960. First, the most important objective was to establish
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a regional free trade area. Secondly, an equalization of external tariffs was envisaged. 
Third, the harmonization of measures to promote industrialization was another objective 
included in the agreement Free mobility of capital and labor was the fourth objective. 
Finally, the last objective was the encouragement of industries to produce and supply for 
the regional market So, the main objective of the CACM was to create a customs union for 
the goods being produced in Central America.
For the purpose of achieving the objectives mentioned above several organizational 
structures were created (McClelland, 1972). The economic council, made up of the five 
ministers of economy, was among the highest authority in the system. The executive 
council, made of the five vice-ministers of economy, was responsible for the direct 
execution of the agreements. The Permanent Secretariat (SIECA), made up of international 
officers highly trained and competent (Business International Corporation, 1969), was 
responsible for the technical matters of the integration process. The Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration (CABEI) was the financial institution through which important 
projects for the economic integration of the area were to be financed. The monetary council 
formed by the presidents of the central banks of the countries had the tasks of the 
stabilization of the exchange rate and, in the long run, the creation of the Central American 
currency unit
It is important to mention that the scheme of integration of the sixties not only 
pursued economic but also political integration of the region. Therefore, several structures 
of political objectives were established. The Central American Court of Justice was created 
as a supreme court at the regional level. The Education Council, the Central American 
Legislative Council and the Central American Defense Council were established to 
promote political integration in the region (Business International Corporation, 1969).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
Along with the objectives and organizational structures o f economic and political 
integration, the “rules of the game” of integration were created and established. For this 
purpose several protocols were signed and brought into effect In 1958, the "Multilateral 
Treaty o f Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration ” was signed in 
Honduras. This treaty was supplemented with a treaty on integration industries (Walter, 
1967). The former was the first document defining the integration process. The latter 
defined what industries would be given a status of regional development importance and 
would enjoy free access to the markets of all countries, hi 1959, the “Central American 
Agreement on Equalization o f Import Duties” was signed. This agreement defined a five- 
year schedule to equalize external tariffs.
The “General Treaty o f Central American Integration”, signed in 1960 in 
Nicaragua, is probably the most important document related to the economic integration 
in the area. This treaty formally established the creation of a customs union over a five-year 
period. At the same time, the protocol of the agreement on the equalization of import duties 
and the agreement establishing the Central American Bank of Economic Integration 
(CABEI) were ratified (Walter, 1967). According to this general treaty the CABEI was 
envisaged as an institution with a high degree of independence although its capital was 
created with funds from each country member and with funds provided by the U.S. In 
addition to these agreements, many other protocols were signed in the same period to 
regulate the activities of the CACM (SIECA, 1999).
Organization Structure of the CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
Implementation of the CACM in the way it was planned required an adequate 
structure to be successful. The structure of the CACM in the sixties is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. Organization of the Central American Common Market of the Sixties
Since one of the main objective of the economic union was to achieve political union, the 
formation of the CACM brought about the formation of the Court of Justice and the 
Legislative Council or Central American Parliament. The structure of the integration 
scheme in Central America was greatly dependent on the economic, education, monetary, 
and the defense council which were of great relevance in the implementation of the CACM 
agreements. All matters related to economic development were under the responsibility of 
the economic council and the direct execution under the responsibility of the executive 
council.
The CABEI and the Central American Research Institute of Industrial Technology 
(ICATTI from the name in Spanish), given status of institutions, were very important in the 
development of the CACM. Various projects directed to strengthen integration in the area 
were to be primarily financed by the CABEI. The CABEI was the main source for large 
projects such as the international Pan-American highway and other large projects in the area 
for public and private industries. Finally, the ICATTI was the main industrial research 
institution of the CACM. The IC ATTI was instrumental in developing feasibility studies in 
several industrial sectors of the Central American economies. The SIECA, the Permanent 
Secretariat of Central American Integration, strongly relied upon the advice of the IC ATTI 
in deciding on what was convenient or undesirable for the CACM economy. 
Performance of Central American Countries under the CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
In general, there is a common consensus that the implementation of the CACM 
brought many positive changes to the economies of the Central American countries 
(Wardlaw, 1966;Walter, 1967; Business International Corporation, 1969; McClelland, 
1972; Alonso, 1994). Moreover, in many cases the CACM experience has been presented
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as an example of success of integration in less developed countries (Robson, 1984). 
However, for some analysts, the fast changes during the period 1960-80 are not only a 
result of the implementation of the CACM but also of the favorable international terms of 
trade for agricultural products (Alonso, 1994). Since it is somewhat difficult to measure the 
impact of the CACM on the development of the region, analysts have different opinions on 
this point.
However, under the CACM, countries began to grow at a fast rate. For example, 
between 1960 and 1970, the real GDP of Central American countries grew at 6% on 
average. This rate was above the S.6 % average growth rate for all Latin American 
countries (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). This situation favored 
intra-regional and international trade in the area. For example, between 1960 and 1965 
exports increased in the area by 316% to a total of $ 132 million and total exports in the area 
reached $772 million (Table 2.1) (Wardlaw, 1966; Institute of Latin American Studies, 
1988). Thus, as a result of the elimination of internal tariffs, intra-regional trade grew in the 
first three years from 3.5% to 27% of total trade. In addition, by 1968, manufactured 
commodities were two-thirds of intra-regional exports (Washington Institute for Values in 
Public Policy, 1983).
The impressive picture of the sixties contrasted with that of the seventies. During 
the first half of the seventies, real economic growth in the region declined to 5.2% whereas 
the total growth rate in Latin America averaged 6.5%. However, the worst was yet to come, 
hi the second half of the decade real GDP in Honduras grew at a rate of 6.6% but in 
Nicaragua it declined by 1.8% in 1978, causing the region's growth to decline to 1% on 
average (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983).
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In addition, die fast population growth rate observed in the area during the years 
1960-80 caused per capita economic performance remain below the average for all Latin 
American Countries (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). For example, 
measured in 1980 US$, per capita income in 1960 averaged $692 in Central America 
against an average of $842 for Latin America as a whole. By 1970 per capita income of the 
CACM ($991) was still below the average for Latin America ($1106). Thus, during the 
period 1960-80 the average population growth rate for CACM was 2.8% while the average 
economic growth rate was 5.12%. Per capita income growth rate was 1.8% during the same 
period which was below the average for Latin America as a whole.
Although the implementation of the CACM expanded trade in the region, the 
balance of trade of the CACM countries worsened relative to the rest of the world during 
the same period (Table 2.10). From 1960 to 1980, the value of imports of the CACM 
increased 18% while exports increased 11.9% per year on average. This is one of the main 
reasons for the negative trade balance of the CACM relative to the rest of the world during 
Table 2.10 Trade Balance of CACM Countries in Selected Years (US$ Million).
Years Imports Exports Trade Balance
Total Regional Total Regional Total Regional
1960 468 33 444 30 -24 -3
1965 806 121 772 132 -34 +11
1970 1133 310 1113 299 -20 -11
1975 2704 520 2352 519 -352 -I
1980 5657 1160 4775 1160 -882 0
Source; Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988.
the analyzed period. At the regional level, both imports and exports grew 18.24% per year 
on average during the same period. So, it seems that the trade balance worsening was
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mainly caused by the slow growth in exports to rest o f the world relative to the growth in 
imports.
Another perspective of CACM performance can be obtained from the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. It appears that industries related to consumer goods (foodstuff, shoes, 
textiles, etc) and others with historical tradition were the most dynamic industries during 
the first decade ofthe CACM (Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988). In addition, some 
intermediate goods industries expanded in those years (paper, tires, petrochemicals and 
metal-mechanic). This pattern of development, known as Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI), caused industrial production share in the GDP to increase from 
12.3% in I960 to 17% in 1970 (Institute ofLatin American Studies, 1988) and then decline 
to 14% between 1970 and 1980 (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983).
Agriculture has been the main source of foreign exchange earnings for Central 
American countries. Bananas, coffee, cotton, beef and sugar have been historically the 
primary export products accounting for about 80% of foreign exchange earnings. By 
contrast, intra-regional exports have consisted mainly of manufactured commodities 
(Alonso, 1994). As of 1980, agriculture continued to be the most important source of 
exchange rate revenue of the economy despite the integration process. However, 
agricultural share in the GDP decreased from 29% in 1960 to 25% in 1970 and to about 
23% in 1980 (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). In addition, food 
self-sufficiency notably decreased in the seventies and enormous shortages in the food 
supplies became increasingly apparent. Also, there still exists backwardness in storage 
, infra-structure and food preservation (Institute ofLatin American Studies, 1988).
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Factors Affecting Performance of the CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
As was mentioned before, the Central American experience with the CACM has 
been presented as an example o f successful economic integration among LDC. However, 
despite the initial great success, the CACM had practically disintegrated by the beginning 
of the eighties. Analysts mention many factors that worked for the initial success and later 
failure of the CACM from 1960 to 1980.
A.- Input Substitution Industrialization (ISI) Scheme as the Philosophy of Growth 
Ballance et al (1982) defined Input Substitution Industrialization as a long term 
process. Initially, a country following this scheme should discourage consumer goods 
imports through imposition of tariffs to protect and enhance conditions for domestic 
production. Secondly, expansion of production of supplies and intermediate goods is 
achieved. Finally, production of capital goods is expanded. The immediate objective of this 
process is to initially encourage consumer goods industries followed by an expansion of 
industries supplying inputs to reduce dependence on external sources of inputs. Thus, 
import substitution should create an industrial sector able to rely on domestic sources of 
inputs and capital goods. Once the industrial sector has developed enough to become 
competitive relative to international suppliers of manufactures, tariffs were to be reduced 
to create a competitive environment as an incentive to further industrial growth.
There is an accepted concept that ISI has not been implemented as initially 
suggested in most LDC including those of the CACM and therefore many problems have 
arisen (Ballance et al, 1982). For example, once tariffs were imposed, their levels were 
never reduced and this became a permanent feature of industrial policy. In addition, the 
structure of the economy has been affected by two types of bias. The “home market” bias
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caused resources to be reallocated out o f agriculture and mining into the import-competing 
industries due to discrimination against exporters. The “consumer good” bias caused a shift 
of resources out ofless favored manufacturers to import-competing industries. Thus, as can 
be expected under the ISI scheme, agriculture was the main loser in most of countries that 
followed this model o f industrial development. In addition, this protectionism often led to 
very high profits, inefficient use of resources and has been crucial in discouraging the 
establishment of industries providing inputs. The reason for the discouragement in 
establishing industries providing inputs is that final goods producers did not want to have 
any competition for the benefits of protection they enjoyed and they knew that producers 
of intermediate products could eventually also be protected and become competitors for 
those benefits.
hi brief, it has been stated that the good industrial performance of the CACM in the 
sixties was a consequence of the first stage of the ISI scheme and the poor performance in 
the seventies was a consequence of the end of this stage (Institute o f Latin American 
Studies, 1988) and the incorrect implementation ofthe ISI scheme. Because ofthe incorrect 
implementation of the ISI scheme, protection remained at high levels for consumer goods 
industries. In addition, only a small number of intermediate industries was established 
between 1960 and 1980. This situation led to a growing dependence on external sources of 
oil and raw materials. Since prices of oil and raw materials increased greatly in the first half 
of the seventies, the share of manufactures in the GDP during the seventies decreased 
considerably.
B.- Dual Economy
The economies of the Central American countries historically have consisted of a 
subsistence domestic sector and a strong exporting sector (Alonso, 1994; Institute of Latin
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American Studies, 1988). The export sector is mainly characterized by large size properties, 
high concentration ratios and the control of export of agricultural products (coffee, bananas, 
sugar cane and cotton). The subsistence sector consists o f small farms with low 
productivity, low income and high levels of unemployment The subsistence sector 
produces mainly beans, rice, com and sorghum. In addition to this division of the 
agriculture sector, there is a lack of productive infrastructure (irrigation sources, means of 
transportation and communications, shortage of financial credit, etc.). Few efforts have 
been directed to remedy this situation and the export sector has been the main beneficiary. 
The declining growth in agriculture during the seventies was caused by a decline in the 
world price of the export products. This situation led to large shortages of food and 
exchange earnings to purchase food abroad. In addition to the worsening terms of trade, 
trade balance got almost out of control by the end of the seventies.
C.- Industrial Integration Process
In the fifties, Central American countries lagged in industrial development relative 
to leading Latin American countries. Therefore, to accelerate industrial development in 
Central America, the “System o f Integration Industries ’’ agreement was signed in 1958. 
The program was intended to promote and coordinate development through the creation of 
free internal trade for designated products of chosen companies (Walter et al, 1967). The 
idea was that chosen companies would receive exclusive “common market rights” for a 
period up to ten years. Other companies selling the same product would be forced to trade 
in the CACM with the same tariffs applied to imports from outside of CACM. However, 
these barriers were to be gradually decreased in a period of ten years. As can be inferred, 
the purpose was to facilitate the establishment o f important industries that otherwise could
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have not survived under the ongoing market conditions. One of the major concerns of the 
program was to prevent concentration of industries and therefore a second integration 
industry could not be granted to any CACM country until every member nation has been 
awarded one.
hi practice, problems with this system of industries became apparent soon after its 
creation and therefore it did not have the expected results. First, a provision of the general 
treaty signed in 1960 granting immediate internal free trade in all products supplied within 
the CACM practically nullified the system (Walter et al, 1967). Secondly, there was 
opposition form external sources of financing, particularly the AID, which saw in this 
program a monopolistic nature discouraging the free trade and enterprise that were the very 
nature of the economic integration treaty of 1960 (Cochrane, 1964). Thirdly, economic 
theory suggests that it is more economically feasible to create large industrial centers than 
a distribution of industries over a large geographical area (Krugman, 1994).
D.- Fiscal Policy for Industrial Development
Fiscal incentives as a means to attract foreign investment for rapid industrial 
development became a two-edge sword for countries using them. For example, CACM 
countries that have used a wide variety of incentives to attract investors have found that in 
the long run the effect of such policies has not been as positive as expected (McClelland, 
1972). This happens because competing countries are likely to offer better incentives 
relative to these countries in order to secure investment Once the offer is made, other 
countries competing for investment will offer a better deal to investors than the initial offer 
they received. This process may continue until a point at which a country could be made 
worse off with the establishment of industries than without them. This may happen because
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
of losses in government revenue due to offered tax breaks, subsidies, monopoly rights, and 
so forth. So, in the end, competing countries would be better off by agreeing on the level 
of fiscal incentives to be given to investors instead of competing against each other. This 
seemed to be a strong incentive to unify fiscal policies within the CACM.
It seemed that Central American countries seriously intended to implement uniform 
fiscal policies to attract investment. Article 19 of the general treaty stated the intention to 
reach an agreement which would substitute the existing programs of each country on fiscal 
incentives for industries. In July 1962, an agreement to unify fiscal incentives was signed 
by all CACM countries. The harmonization of laws of the respective member countries to 
provide the greatest possible incentives and the correction ofthe disparities that contributed 
to imbalances in regional development were two important objectives of this agreement. 
In addition, the agreement was very detailed in specifying various types of incentives to be 
granted to industries according to their importance in CACM countries’ industrial 
development. Finally, the agreement was to be completely enforced by 1970.
However, practical implementation of this agreement proved to be an impossible 
task leading to negative repercussions for the economies of CACM countries. For example, 
in 1969, when Honduras withdrew from the CACM, this agreement had not been ratified 
by several member countries and it was never enforced. In the meantime, each country had 
resumed implementing a wide variety of fiscal incentives to attract investors. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that investors looked at other factors, such as location of natural 
resources , labor, weather, local financial institutions and so forth, in addition to fiscal 
incentives, to make a decision on what and where to invest in Central America (Business 
International Corporation, 1969). Therefore, as each country resumed offering its own fiscal
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incentives to attract capital, results showed a wasteful use of these policy instruments, 
resulting in welfare losses for CACM members (McClelland, 1972).
E.- Political-military Problems
Political and military instability in the Central American region has been another 
negative factor for economic development Political instability in the region began to be 
more notorious after it received independence from Spain in 1821. Local political forces 
were not educated enough to run the countries in a stable way and therefore political 
turmoil was often the way to solve economic and social problems. Turmoil scared away 
many potential national and foreign investors, hi addition, foreign powers tried to “re­
conquer’' the region several times. This compelled countries to exert great efforts into 
building armies and defending themselves from foreign re-colonization attempts.
In the last few decades, the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, civil 
unrest during the seventies in Guatemala and El Salvador, the Sandinista revolution of 
Nicaragua in 1979 which led to a change of government in Nicaragua, the re-militarization 
ofthe area; the continuous US intervention in the area (Institute of Latin American Studies, 
1988), and beliefs of interventions from other Central American Countries (Schmitter, 
1972) may be mentioned as some of the negative political and military conditions 
surrounding achieving the goals of the CACM agreements. Thus, these conditions created 
an endogenous problem that negatively impacted economic development in the area. For 
example, it is assumed that the failure of the CACM agreement is due partly to political 
instability, which led to disinvestment and dis-industrialization in the area (Institute of 
Latin American Studies, 1988). For example, in the sixties, gross domestic investment 
(GDI) grew faster than the average for Latin America 7.3%. However, in the seventies, GDI
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growth rate slowed down and in some countries there was no growth at all. This can be 
explained by capital flight, reduced access to international capital markets, lower saving 
rates and chronic trade and budget deficits. All these conditions were effects of the political 
instability in the region (Alonso, 1994).
F.- Social-economic Problems
Social-economic conditions in Central American countries may be seen as a cause 
and at the same time as an effect of failed attempts to develop the region. On the one hand, 
poor economic conditions have led to inability to adequately satisfy social needs. Generally 
speaking, social conditions, such as nutrition, health, employment, education, and housing, 
have been historically less satisfactory in Central America than in other Latin American 
countries (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). On the other hand, the 
very existence of such conditions have made it impossible to develop the region rapidly. 
Thus, attempts to implement various programs in the region have failed because the region 
lacked the necessary physical infrastructures, skilled and educated labor, and other 
important pre-conditions for an fortunate end to such efforts.
G.- Terms of Trade
Worsening terms of trade for agricultural products over time have led to worsening 
trade balances and, in turn, deficits in balances of payments. This has had the consequence 
of causing lags in industrial development in the CACM (Alonso et al, 1994). The center- 
periphery development upon which Latin America has built its international economic 
relations is blamed for the many problems the region faces today and the CACM is not an 
exception (Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988). It is argued that this scheme of 
relationships led to unequal exchange due to worsening terms of trade. The CACM exports
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consist mainly of agricultural products for which terms of trade have declined considerably 
and productivity growth has not kept the pace to offset the decline in terms of trade of 
agricultural commodities in the last few decades. This situation has led to an increase in the 
negative trade balance for this area (Table 2.10). In addition, the small sizes of national 
markets worked against the possibility of selling greater shares of agricultural product 
domestically at higher than international prices.
H.- Budget Deficit
Budget deficits have been a chronic problem long before Central American 
countries entered the common market. The situation did not improve under the CACM 
(Alonso, 1994). The competition among countries in using fiscal incentives to promote 
domestic investment domestically may well have reduced government revenues even more 
and, in turn, led to increases in budget deficits (McClelland, 1972; Institute of Latin 
American Studies, 1988). hi addition, low or negative savings, defined as current revenues 
minus current expenditures, may cause a decline in capital expenditures and become an 
obstacle for the overall development of the region. This situation was one more problem 
faced by the CACM, which, without adequate infrastructure had little chance of succeeding.
I..- Natural Disasters
Central American countries probably have suffered the fury of nature more than any 
other part of the world. The geographical location ofthe region makes it a target for a wide 
variety of natural disasters that have negative impacts on social and economic development 
Hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and tsunamis are among the most 
common disasters in the area. To name a few cases, in the sixties Guatemala City was 
completely destroyed by an earthquake. In 1968 one volcanic eruption almost completely
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destroyed Ledn, one of the most important cities of Nicaragua. In the seventies, an 
earthquake destroyed Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, killing 15,000 people. In 1976, 
Hurricane Fifi completely devastated Honduras. Floods are present in all countries almost 
every year during the rainy season. In 1998, Hurricane “Mitch” devastated Honduras and 
caused many human and material losses in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala. So, mother nature has also slowed down economic growth in Central American 
countries by sending to this region many unfortunate catastrophes (Institute of Latin 
American Studies, 1988). This catastrophes have provoked human and material losses by 
order of many billions of dollars for the region during the period of study.
CACM in the 1980-1990 Period
As Alonso et al (1994) put it, the economic performance of Central American 
countries during the eighties was disastrous. Moreover, the CACM had almost 
disintegrated by 1981. Armed conflict broke out in several countries of the region and 
economic problems inherited from the seventies increased. Alonso et al (1994) argued that 
the decade can be divided in three periods. The period form 1981 to 1983 was a period of 
recession and all Central American countries experienced negative growth rates. This was 
caused mainly by a world-wide recession and a further deterioration of export prices of 
agricultural commodities. The second period, extending from 1984 to 1986 witnessed a 
modest recovery was present in all countries with the exception of Nicaragua. The last 
period was from 1986 to 1989. During this period, economic growth slowed due to poor 
performance of exports. So, the eighties was one of the saddest period in the history of 
Central American countries (Lizano, 1989).
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A General Evaluation of the CACM in the 1960-1990 Period
Since the CACM appeared to have vanished in the decade of the eighties in 
comparison to what was initially planned, it is desirable to evaluate the positive and 
negative consequences of regional integration and what future perspective the market had 
at the end of the eighties. In evaluating the general performance of the CACM in its first 
era of existence it is important to compare the achievements with the initial objectives of 
the CACM agreements, hi addition, an assessment of what conditions made the CACM to 
enter such an acute crisis is in order to avoid these mistakes in the present second era of the 
CACM. The evaluation of the CACM is developed in three subsections. The first 
subsection gives a brief introduction of the historical nature of the CACM, what was gone 
and what remained at the end of the eighties. The second subsection consists of what could 
be thought as positive consequences of the CACM during that period. The third section 
evaluate the obstacles to the CACM. Finally, final thoughts on the integration scheme 
during these 30 years are given in the last subsection.
Historical Background for the CACM (1960-19901
To understand the particular nature of the CACM as an economic integration 
scheme, a brief historical prelude can be of considerable help. During the fifties, it became 
increasingly apparent that there was an urgent need to raise living standards of the 
populations of Central American countries. Governments as well as national and 
international institutions undertook the task of assessing the best way to do so. This task 
was not easy. Economically and socially speaking, Central American countries were already 
long behind more developed countries. Without a developed productive sector, many 
necessary products were imported from abroad. Therefore, there was a need for foreign
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exchange. To obtain foreign exchange, countries had to heavily rely on international trade 
and terms of trade were not always favorable. This situation brought about the need to 
decide whether to export more to gain more foreign exchange or to produce normally 
imported products domestically. However, the possibility o f developing and establishing 
a strong agricultural and industrial domestic sector to fulfill domestic needs was 
impossible, given the small size of each country taken alone. On the other hand, given 
resources endowment of each country, no country sought to follow an export-led economic 
growth scheme. This situation was probably one of the strongest reasons why the CACM 
as an economic integration scheme was planned initially using the ISI model discussed 
earlier.
The CACM had general and specific objectives. Lizano (1989) stated that there 
were two main objectives of economic integration: increasing the size of the Central 
American market by removing barriers to regional trade, and enabling the region to 
participate more fully in the world economy. These two objectives appear to have been 
fulfilled in the first 10 years of existence of the CACM. However, its performance during 
the following two decades showed that the process o f trade liberalization was reversible, 
as countries re-established protectionist barriers in the 70 and 80s. In spite of this situation, 
there is a consensus that the success of the CACM in promoting intra-regional trade was 
overwhelming. The value of intra-regional trade reached one billion dollars in 1980 and 
represented 20% of the CACM total external trade up from 6.5% in 1960 (Lizano, 1989). 
However, several adverse conditions made the CACM intra-regional trade fall to 9.0% of 
total trade in 1987. Increases in trade barriers were present among these conditions.
The second main objective is difficult to evaluate because the structure of trade of 
the CACM with the rest of the world did not change much from 1960 to 1990 (Alonso,
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1994). Coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar, and meat continued to be the main export 
commodities of the CACM. Imports continued to be represented by manufacture, fuels and 
consumer goods. Lizano (1989) mentioned that the Central American area could be 
characterized by its openness to international trade during the fifties before the CACM 
agreements were reached. However, had the agreements not been signed, countries 
probably would have increased the level of protection anyway. So, in Lizano’s opinion, the 
CACM served as an alternative to prohibitive levels of protection by Central American 
countries. From this point of view, the CACM may be said to have fostered a better 
participation of Central American countries in the world economy.
Several specific objectives were pursued under the CACM. In the economic sector, 
an economic union was envisaged. In the political arena, a Central American republic was 
foreseen. With a Central American republic in mind, the defense council was established. 
The equalization of education standards was pursued and the education council created. To 
save foreign exchange, which would be devoted to more urgent needs, the Central 
American Clearing House was created. Moreover, the monetary union was also one long 
run specific objective. However, none of these specific objectives was completely fulfilled. 
Since each country has other economic and political problems to solve, too little attention 
was given to the compromises within the CACM agreements, hi addition, Central 
American countries have historically lacked a true commitment to unity and this was a big 
obstacle to achieve the specific objectives mentioned above.
Positive Effects ofthe CACM (1960-199(ft
Lizano (1989) mentioned several positive consequences of the CACM besides the 
considerable increase in regional trade. First, although the CACM had almost disintegrated
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by 1981, some institutions remained. The permanent secretariat ofthe treaties (SIECA), the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Central American Institute 
ofPublic Administration (ICAP), the Central American Institute for Research and Industrial 
Technology (ICAITI), and the Central American Clearing House (CACH) have proven 
flexible and resilient in adapting to changing circumstances. These institutions were a 
signal that the CACM was not completely dead and they continued to operate under the 
uncertain environment of the eighties when the future of the CACM seemed to be ominous. 
Second, the CACM fostered growth in the manufacturing sector, which has had important 
effects, such as the acceleration of the urbanization process and the formation of an 
industrial proletariat. Third, countries have learned from the experience within the CACM 
to deal with conflicts and disputes related to trade in a more educated and efficient manner. 
Fourth, member countries learned to save foreign exchange by using the Clearing House. 
Obstacles to Successful Regional Integration in the 1960-1990 Period
There are various factors that badly affected the implementation of the CACM 
during this period (Lizano, 1989). First, costs and benefits were not adequately distributed 
among countries. Thus, although technical analyses show that the whole area benefitted 
from integration, Honduras and Nicaragua complained that they could have been harmed 
by the agreement The possible negative effects are related to the consumption of regionally 
produced goods at prices higher than international prices and geographical concentration 
of industrial output in countries that enjoyed a greater degree of industrial development. 
This was mainly caused by two factors. First there was a lack of agreement on fiscal 
incentives to new industrial companies. The agreement signed in 1962 was never enforced.
Secondly, the System oflntegration Industries agreement signed in 1960, was never 
fully implemented and caused disparities in industrial development among countries. In
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addition, there was a lack of coordination o f national economic policies. In Lizano’s 
opinion (1989), countries were not able to properly perceive that the participation in the 
CACM implied in part modifications in their own national economic policies. Moreover, 
countries never coordinated agricultural policies and this represented a major failure of the 
CACM. This generated some contradictions. For example, Honduras showed comparative 
advantage in the production of certain agricultural products. However, while this country 
had to import industrial goods from other Central American countries, it was not allowed 
to export its agricultural products to these countries.
Monetary policies also were not coordinated and this generated several problems. 
For example, too little attention was given to the effects of each country's monetary 
policies on regional trade flows and the regional payments agreement Thus, if a country 
expanded the money supply, the volume of imports would increase and exports decrease 
generating a deficit in its regional trade.
So, regional integration faced many dilemmas that could not be solved effectively 
and, therefore, this integration attempt essentially failed after the first 10 years of its 
implementation. This failure could be related to mistrust among countries and lack of 
complete commitment to regional integration. This could mean that although all the 
economic instruments to secure success were drawn, countries were always politically 
reluctant to enter a situation that they probably thought could be too compromising to 
national sovereignty. For example, there was a lack of will to rationally distribute the 
benefits and costs of integration because this implied changes in national policies. This is 
probably why the location ofkey industrial companies, the agreement on fiscal incentives, 
and the coordination of national economic policies were never agreed upon.
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The CACM from 1990-Present Period
To analyze the CACM during the present decade, this section is divided into three 
sub-sections. First, a review of the background for the agreement during the nineties is 
developed and the agreement for the reinstallment of the CACM is analyzed in the context 
of past decades of experiences. Secondly, the new organizational structure is analyzed. 
Finally, the performance of the CACM in the present decade is evaluated.
Background for the Integration of the Nineties
Although the eighties witnessed the near disintegration of the CACM, several steps 
taken in the region brought hope of a renewed effort to revive the CACM. In 1987 and 
1988, several peace accords were signed by fighting groups in which fighting parties agreed 
that armed struggle was no longer a viable alternative to solve the region’s problems 
(Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988). With a clear possibility of entering a peaceful 
period, governments agreed to discuss the acute economic crisis of the region. Thus, in 
1987, the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development 
concluded that the region should start to diversify and expand exports to generate foreign 
exchange and employment (Alonso et al, 1994).
The nineties brought many positive changes to the region. First, armed conflicts 
were officially ended in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. This opened the possibility 
of a faster economic recovery. Second, Central American governments agreed to reestablish 
the CACM to foster economic development. Thus, in 1991, the Tegucigalpa protocol was 
signed. This protocol reformed the Organization of Central American States (ODECA, 
from the name in Spanish), created in 1962, into the Central American System of 
Integration (SICA, from the name in Spanish) as the new organization responsible for
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overall development of the area (SIECA (a), 1999). Another important document, the 
Guatemala protocol, which substantially reformed the 1960 “General Treaty o f Central 
American Integration”, was signed in 1993. The Guatemala protocol became the new 
general treaty for economic integration in the region (SIECA(b), 1999).
It is worthwhile to discuss the Guatemala protocol because it defines the general 
new rules of the economic integration. This protocol consists of sixty three articles 
contained in six titles. Title I conceptualizes the process of economic integration as a means 
to maximize development options for the contracting countries and their insertion in the 
world economy. According to this protocol, economic integration is a gradual, 
complementary and flexible process to enhance the convergence of intention and policies.
Title II defines the objectives and principles of economic integration. The main 
objective of economic integration is the achievement of equitable, sustainable social, and 
economic development of the Central American countries. This objective is to be reached 
by means of a process to transform and modernize the social, technological and productive 
structure which should bring an increase in competitiveness. This process should help in 
reaching the efficient and dynamic reinsertion of Central American countries in the 
international economy.
Title in of the Guatemala protocol refers to the proposed achievements of the 
process of economic integration in this new period. Chapter I defines the steps to accelerate 
the transformation of the present free trade zone of Central America into the Central 
American customs union, hi addition, this chapter identifies the need for a uniform external 
trade relation with the rest of the world. Finally, the free mobility of production factors and 
monetary policy is addressed. Chapter II addresses the improvement and harmonization
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of policies across countries. Chapter m  states that all sectors o f the economy should be 
developed in a integrated fashion.Titles IV, V, and VI are the last but not least important 
titles of the protocol. Title IV describes the institutional organization of the economic 
integration subsystem which is discussed in more detail in the following subsection. Title 
V consists of the final disposition of the protocol and title VI describes transitory 
dispositions of the protocol.
There are not many differences between the treaty of 1960 and the Guatemala 
protocol. In general, both documents show the intention for a deep integration of the region. 
Both documents are very general and mostly they state the global objectives of integration. 
Both documents are very specific in describing the institutional structure of the integration 
scheme. By contrast, one major difference of the Guatemala protocol is that it eliminated 
the “System o f Integration Industries” signed in 1958, the treaty of fiscal incentives of 
1962, and the special protocol for grain products (protocol o f El Lim6n). Another major 
difference is that the Guatemala protocol included Panama and the possibility of Belize to 
join the CACM.
Structure of the CACM in the Nineties
The organizational structure of Central American integration in the nineties is 
somewhat larger than that of the sixties. This new structure probably represents the new 
context o f integration. Article 12 of the Tegucigalpa protocol describes the organs of 
Central American Integration within the Integration System of Central America (SICA) 
which is shown in Figure 2.2. The highest level of decision within the system consists of 
the presidential meetings, vice-presidential meetings, the Central American Parliament, the 
Central American Supreme Court of Justice, and the Consultive Committee. The latter, as
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its name implies, is only a consultation organ whose members are representatives of the 
private sector of the region.
A deep degree o f integration seems to be sought this time through the Tegucigalpa 
protocol. The Tegucigalpa protocol breaks down the integration system into the economic, 
political, social, and cultural integration subsystem (Figure 2.2). The ministers council is 
responsible for the implementation of the strategies developed in each subsystem. At the 
same time, the ministers council relies heavily on the council of foreign relations ministers 
to implement such policies. The foreign relations ministers council is responsible for the 
coordination of the sectoral ministers council, hi addition, the foreign relations ministers 
council through the executive committee is responsible for the correct and timely 
implementation of all agreements, guidelines and policies that are designed by all the 
subsystems. Finally, the General Secretary of the SICA is the administrative agency of the 
system. One of the objectives of the SICA is to foster development in all sectors of society 
in an integrated way.
For purposes of the present research, a detailed description of the economic 
subsystem is in order. As was mentioned earlier, the Guatemala protocol, signed in 1993, 
is the juridical framework for economic integration in the region. According to this 
protocol, the subsystem of economic integration consists of organs, techno-administrative 
organs, and institutions. This organizational structure is included in Figure 2.3. The 
Economic Integration Ministers Council is responsible for the coordination, harmonization, 
convergence or unification of economic policies across countries. The sectoral ministers 
council of economic integration is composed of die ministers by sector. Mostly these 
meetings will be held by the ministers of Agriculture, Finance, Economy, Trade, Industry,






































Figure 2.3 Organizational Structure of the Economic Subs-system of the SICA According to the Guatemala Protocol of 1993
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Tourism, and the Monetary Council, the latter composed by the presidents o f the Central 
Banks of each country. The inter-sectoral council meetings are to be held when there is a 
common issue to be addressed by two or more ministries. The CABEI, ICAP, and ICAITI 
are institutions of the economic subsystem. Given the importance of agriculture and 
monetary issues to the region, both the Central American Agriculture Council and the 
Monetary Council have their own specific secretaries. These are the Secretary of the 
Agriculture Council (SCA) and the Secretary of the Central American Monetary Council 
(SCMCA). Finally, the Permanent Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration 
(SIECA) is the techno-administrative organ of the economic subsystem. In addition, the 
SIECA coordinates the operations of both the SCA and the SCMCA.
Performance of Central American Countries in the Nineties
After 40 years, the process of integration in Central American remains between a 
free trade zone and a customs union (SIECA(c), 1999). There is free trade for almost all 
goods originated in the region but some tariffs and non-tariff barriers still remain. On the 
other hand, there are some elements of a customs union. Thus, the countries have already 
agreed on the Common External Tariff (CET) and the Common Custom Normative. 
However, these measures are not applied equally in all countries. As of the present, 
countries have a wide percent range in the application of duties. For example, countries 
agreed in 1993 to apply a duty rate to imports from outside the region between 5% and 
15%. hi addition, duties are still levied on imported goods produced in the region and other 
non-tariff barriers, such as licenses, permission, and others still exist in the region (De 
Franco, 1996; SIECA (e), 1999).
There are several achievements ofthe integration efforts in the recent past First, all 
countries, with die exception o f Panama, ratified the Tegucigalpa Protocol in 1996. In
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addition, the Guatemala Protocol was also ratified by all countries. As an immediate 
consequence of the changes in the last few years, the GDP has been growing at an 
optimistic rate (Table 2.11). However, there are still big oscillations in the rate of growth 
of Central American countries. This fact reveals the sensibility and fragility of these 
economies when faced with adverse conditions.
Table 2.11. GDP Growth Rate of Central American Countries, (%)
Year Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica
1991 3.7 3.6 3.3 -4.8 2.3
1992 4.8 7.5 5.6 0.4 7.7
1993 3.9 7.4 6.2 -0.4 6.3
1994 4.0 6.0 -1.4 3.3 4.5
1995 4.9 6.3 4.3 4.3 2.4
1996 3.0 2.2 3.7 4.5 -0.6
1997 4.1 4.0 4.9 5.0 3.2
Source: SECA (e), 1999.
On the other hand, the changes in the last few years have had a considerable positive 
impact on trade. For example, the volume of intra-regional trade increased from US$650 
million in 1990 to US$2200 million in 1998 (SIECA (d), 1999). hi addition, Table 2.12 
shows trends in intra-regional and extra-regional trade for several years of the present 
decade. Intra-regional trade, measured as the share of Central American exports to the 
region, has steadily represented about 21% of total exports. However, Central America 
represents about 16% of the total trade volume.
The trade balance situation seems to a chronic problem in Central America. During 
the period from 1992 to 1997, in both intra-regional and total, Central America has shown 
a negative trade balance. This is explained by the fact that during this period both intra-
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regional and total imports and exports have increased at a rate of about 12%. Imports from 
outside the region have increased at a rate close to 11%. Thus, in nominal terms both 
imports and exports have almost doubled from 1992 to 1997. However, the trade balance 
deficit has remained stable representing almost 30% of total trade volume (imports plus 
exports).
The stable composition of export products over time is another interesting feature 
of Central American trade. As in the sixties, today’s exports are predominantly represented 
by bananas, coffee, meat products, and sugar (SIECA (e), 1999). Thus, in 1996, coffee 
represented 20.67% of the total value of exports, bananas represented 12.70%, and sugar 
represented 4.23%. In addition, in 1996, the main markets for Central American exports 
products were the United States (38%), European Union (25%), CACM (21 %) and the G-3 
group (3%), composed of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Table 2.12. Central American Intra-regional, extra-regional, and Total Nominal Trade
Yen Exports Imports Trade Balance
Central
America











1992 997.25 3654.36 4652 1067JO 7485.41 8552.61 -69.95 -3831.05 -3901
1993 1108.20 38422)3 4951.13 1133.14 8606.80 9739.94 -24.94 -4763.87 -4788.81
1994 1233.63 4320.25 5553.88 1275.88 8808.82 10084.7 -4225 -448827 •4530.82
1995 1456.06 5360.59 6816.65 1490.82 10625.54 12116.36 -34.76 -5264.95 -5299.71
1996 1662.83 5890.37 7553.2 1665.33 10736.73 12402.06 -25 -4846.36 -4848.86
1997 1833.71 6716.48 8550.19 1959.70 12790.83 t4750.53 -125.99 -607425 -6200
Sourer. SIECA (e). 1999.
As in the case of exports, there have not been many changes in the structure of 
Central American imports. Capital goods, intermediate goods, and primary raw materials 
remain the main bulk of imports. Thus, in 1996 oil and oil products (10.34%), work 
vehicles (3.60%), pharmaceutical products (2.37%), hard wheat (1.42%), and yellow com
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(1.25%) were among the 10 most important imported products in the region. The United 
States (45.5%), the G-3 group (13%), the CACM (12.7%), the European Union (9.9%), and 
Japan (4.2%) were the main sources of Central American imports in 1996 (SIECA (e), 
1999). Thus, this pattern of trade shows that both the United States, the CACM countries, 
the G-3 countries, and the European Union are the most important trading partners for 
Central America.
General Evaluation of Central American Countries Integration in the Nineties
As the analysis in the preceding sections shows, conditions for integration during 
the nineties are more troubling than those of the sixties. This becomes clear when several 
facts are taken into account First, countries have already experienced a scheme of 
integration that in terms of a rising living standards of the population is less than 
satisfactory. The final outcome of the scheme of the sixties was the poor economic 
performance of each country. This is probably a result of an inadequate design of the 
integration scheme (Lizano, 1989). This is shown by the fact that it was impossible to 
enforce several agreements because they did not satisfy all country members. Secondly, the 
increase in population, the budget deficit, trade deficit, unfavorable terms of trade, political 
changes, and social and infra-structural backwardness caused the poor economic 
performance ofthe 1960-1990 period. Therefore, the conditions for the implementation of 
a new integration scheme call for greater efforts than those of the sixties. Third, because 
of the unfavorable outcome of the integration attempt of the sixties, policy makers are 
looking for a more adequate scheme than that of the sixties to secure success this second 
time.
This time the objective of the integration scheme is more pragmatic. In short and 
medium terms, the goal is to alleviate the pressure on the external sector through the
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increaseofexport supply, modernization oftheproductive sector, the creation of more jobs, 
and the increase in income. This situation seems to be somewhat paradoxical relative to the 
objectives o f the Tegucigalpa and Guatemala Protocol. Thus, the organization structure of 
the integration scheme ofthe nineties covers far more sectors than that of the sixties but the 
essence of the integration scheme is the same. Countries are still looking for economic, 
social, cultural, and political union.
It seems that countries know what they should do to secure the success of the 
integration ofthe nineties but how to do it is still an open question. At the present countries 
seem to understand that integration means giving up a part of their sovereignty. This means 
harmonization of national policies under a regional scheme. However, it seems that national 
leaders do not completely trust the leaders of other countries. For example, there are several 
border delimitation problems between Honduras and Nicaragua, and Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua (La Prensa, 1999) and this has caused political frictions between them. This can 
mean that although the process may be successful, it will take longer than under an 
atmosphere of greater confidence. On the other hand, if leaders of the countries spend much 
time looking for trust, the process can be greatly eroded and under risk of failure.
The strategy of this new integration is based on export promotion policies (De 
Franco, 1996). Countries want to abandon the Import Substitution strategy (ISI) of the 
sixties and embrace an outward oriented strategy or Export Promotion strategy (EP) offered 
as a better choice for development than the former. Resource allocation efficiency, 
elimination of direct unproductive profit and rent seeking activities (DUP), efficient 
allocation o f investment, and dynamic effects on saving and innovations have been 
mentioned as advantages of the latter over ISI strategy (Bagwhati, 1990).
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As policymakers embraced the ISI strategy in the sixties, Central American policy 
makers moved in the nineties toward outward oriented strategies in the search for economic 
growth. This time the idea is to foster economic growth through a growth in exports. 
However, several studies reveal that although there is a high correlation between exports 
and economic growth, it has been difficult to establish the direction of causality (Bhagwati, 
1990). In addition, there are still some open question about how to promote exports (Nam, 
1990). Thus, export subsidies without reduction of tariffs and tariff reductions with 
adjustments in the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of the price of non-traded goods 
to the price of importable goods, have been proposed as two viable routes to promote 
export expansion.
So, although some economic recovery is under way in Central America, several 
questions still remain open to further analysis in this new wave of integration. As was 
shown in the preceding subsections, Central American countries still need to find the best 
strategy to foster economic development in the area in a balanced manner. In addition, how 
to implement export promotion programs is a problem that countries are facing now. 
Finally, harmonization of objectives instead ofharmonization ofpolicies could be a smooth 
way to achieve the objectives of economic integration this time (De Franco, 1996).
Empirical Studies on Economic Integration
This section includes an exhaustive exercise. This section is divided into two 
subsections. The first subsection includes a review of empirical studies analyzing 
economic integration around the world. The second subsection includes studies analyzing 
economic integration in Central America. The objective here is to identify the main 
objectives o f these empirical studies. This will help to identify what are the main points of
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evaluation when economic integration is under scrutiny. It is important to look at previous 
studies to understand the variety of empirical models (general and partial equilibrium) used, 
the focus of the analysis (one crop, one sector, or the whole economy), and the time frame 
of analysis. Thus, some studies are descriptive and validate trade theory while other are pro­
active and make an ex-ante analysis of the effects of economic integration.
Economic Integration Around the World
Brada et al (1988) analyzed the dynamic effects of economic integration of six 
economic integration schemes. The European Economic Community (ECC), the European 
Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), the Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA), the 
CACM, the East African Common Market (EACM), and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) were the schemes analyzed. The analysis was based on the idea that 
economic integration should bring about faster factor productivity and higher investment 
levels than without integration. Thus, one equation was estimated relating the ratio of 
investment over real GDP to the growth of real GDP, real foreign capital inflow, a dummy 
to account for membership in an economic integration scheme. A second equation was 
estimated relating the growth rate of real GDP to the growth rate capital, labor, and the 
dummy to account for membership in an economic integration scheme. The estimation 
covered 19S1 to 1977. The results showed that economic integration has had a positive 
impact on the growth rate of GDP due to higher investment and higher rate of growth in 
factor productivity. Based on the examination of the six integration schemes, the results 
showed that while there, in fact, exist dynamic effects due to economic integration, the 
impact o f the effects on economic growth is small. Therefore, it was concluded that 
dynamic effects can not explain the rapid growth of west European countries in the sixties.
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In addition, dynamic economic effects of integration are not enough evidence to encourage 
countries to join existing ones or create new economic schemes.
Testas (1997) analyzed the effects o f economic integration in the case of African 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) from the perspective of Algeria. The study used the supply- 
demand approach proposed by Verdoon, Janssen, and Clague. Import price, export supply, 
and substitution are the three main elasticities to estimate the model, hi addition, tariff rates 
applied in 1989 were obtained for 96 groups of commodities. The analysis was done under 
two scenarios. First, a complete elimination of tariffs (unilateral trade liberalization). 
Secondly, a customs union with Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Lybia, i.e., the actual 
agreement of AMU, was analyzed. The results showed that the impact of non- 
discriminatory trade liberalization will cause no trade diversion and only trade expansion 
both with respect to the world and the rest of AMU countries. The customs union situation 
generates trade diversion but also creates it. So, net trade is created. This should imply that 
there are trade gains from entering the agreement. The problem here is that the welfare 
impact of the two scenarios cannot be assessed.
Roland et al. (1997) reviewed the socioeconomic implications of NAFTA on 
Mexico, the US and Canada. The main objective of the study was to analyze the impact on 
trade and welfare o f the complete elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) to 
trade. Initially, an analysis of the economy of each country is developed to assess the size 
and the level of technological development across countries. For this purpose, data for 
1988 were used to build a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) model in which the economies 
of the analyzed countries were divided into 26 productive sectors.
The analysis revealed that the US represents the greatest economy and Mexico the 
smallest However, Canada is more dependent on international trade than the US or
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Mexico. In addition, the analysis showed that bilateral US-Canada trade links are of 
considerable size. Thus, the US is the main trading partner of Canada in for both imports 
and exports, hi addition, the analysis shows that tariff protection levels are low in North 
American countries by world standards.
Then, the authors made use of a general equilibrium model approach to assess the 
effects of the removal o f the trade barriers on the economy of each country. Initially, six 
flows ofexports and six of imports are analyzed: US-Canada, US-Mexico, Mexico-Canada, 
Table 2.13. Simulations of the CGE model for North America. ___
Experiment Prices Protection Markets RTS
1 Homogeneous Tariffs only — Constant
2 PPP Tariffs only — Constant
3 Homogeneous All protection — Constant
4 PPP All protection — Constant
5 Homogeneous — Cournot Increasing
6 PPP — Cournot Increasing
7 Homogeneous — Contestable Increasing
8 PPP - - Contestable Increasing
US-Rest of World (ROW), Canada-ROW and Mexico ROW. The model uses a non-nested 
CES specification for demand and non-nested CET for supply. The model is used to run 
eight experiments summarized in table 2.13. The results indicate that the US gains the least 
because it is the largest and the least trade dependent country. Canada gains as much as 
three times in terms of the GDP and Mexico is in between. However, economic integration 
will make Mexico experience up to 5 times the amount of structural adjustment as the US. 
Canadian adjustments are somewhere in between. This situation raises the question about
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feasibility of the adjustment in Mexico. The article shows that a CGE model is a good tool 
to analyze the impacts of economic integration of a region. It is important to observe the 
assumption made in order to estimate the model. CES demand functions and CET supply 
functions are assumed. On the other hand, markets are assumed to price competitively or 
in a Cournot fashion with zero profits because free entry is assumed. In addition, the model 
is tested under the assumptions of both constant and increasing returns to scale. The model 
is estimated under increasing returns because trade liberalization may lead to the realization 
of potential increasing returns to scale. This is true in the case of Mexico and Canada. At 
the same time, the model tested the elimination of tariffs alone and then the elimination of 
all protection. The implication is that in an international trade framework, not only the 
elimination of tariffs should be addressed but also the elimination of all forms of trade 
barriers. The sectoral analysis showed that the structure of trade changes for each country 
because economic integration creates trade diversion and makes each sector expand with 
the exception of agriculture in Mexico. This issue was important because agriculture is a 
large sector in Mexico and economic integration can make agricultural producers worse off. 
Finally, the results showed that all countries gain from economic integration but specific 
forecasts are given cautiously because of data limitations and the need for more extensive 
research in the field.
Sorbazo (1997) addressed the impact of NAFTA on the economy of Mexico. For 
this purpose, an applied general equilibrium model (AGE) is estimated. The main objective 
was to measure the impact of the removal of all kinds of protection in the process of 
integration. The model included 27 production sectors. Domestically and internationally 
mobile capital and domestically mobile labor were assumed as the two factors of
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production. Although trade flows between Mexico and North America (NA) and Mexico 
and the rest o f the world (ROW) are assumed, only the Mexican economy is explicitly 
modeled. A Cobb-Douglas specification was assumed in production and consumption. To 
model the economy, competitive, regulated and imperfectly competitive industries are 
assumed to exist Then, constant returns to scale (CRTS) are assumed in the competitive 
industries and increasing returns to scale are assumed in the case of the imperfectly 
competitive industry. To calibrate the model Armington elasticities of substitution, exports 
demand elasticities and scale of size are either estimated or assumed (taken from other 
sources).
The results showed that with the exception of agriculture, all other sectors expand 
their production, particularly in construction, non-electrical machinery, iron and steel, 
mining transport equipment, and electrical machinery. In addition, if GDP were to increase, 
then a large reallocation of labor would take place. This reallocation of labor would 
produce very high adjustment costs. The results also show that exports to NA increase in 
nearly every sector, and in particular, in wearing apparel, rubber, leather, tobacco, and 
textiles. On the other hand, services experience a contraction in exports to NA. Exports to 
ROW increase modestly and in some sectors exports decrease. Economic integration leads 
to a very large increase in imports from NA and, in particular, in the agriculture, food, and 
beverages sector. Imports from ROW also increase but the increase is smaller than imports 
from NA. Finally, the author warned about the reliability of the outcome since some 
elasticities were assumed or taken from other sources and there is no empirical evidence 
about the correctness in doing so.
The analysis o f the impact ofNAFTA on Mexico was made under very simplifying 
assumptions. For example, the use of Cobb-Douglas function in production and
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consumption. Also, the exchange rate was assumed to be fixed. These assumptions restrict 
the analysis to an easy but unrealistic framework to analyze the economy of Mexico. 
However, even under this simplistic framework, a good assessment of the impact of 
NAFTA on Mexico can be made. The results showed that the outcome of the economic 
integration of Mexico within NAFTA poses some question of feasibility. First, agriculture, 
an important sector for the Mexican economy, contracts in size under NAFTA. Secondly, 
the adjustment process to new economic conditions may result in a net loss in the short run 
although it is not clear if the long run outcome is a net positive gain from integration. Third, 
the results show that under the realization of the economies of scale capital will become 
scarce and it is not certain how the Mexican economy might deal with that situation.
Cox (1997) analyzed the impact o f a trade agreement on the Canadian economy 
under three scenarios. The first scenario includes a bilateral trade agreement between the 
US and Canada which is known as the CAFTA. The second scenario is the NAFTA. The 
third scenario includes the CAFTA and a US-Mexico trade agreement. The last scenario 
is called the hub and two spokes (HASP) agreement. First, CAFTA is analyzed and then 
used as a benchmark to analyze the other scenarios, the NAFTA and HASP scenarios. A 
general equilibrium model (CGE) is used to develop the analysis. The model assumes that 
the commodities produced in each region are perceived as close substitutes. Canada is 
viewed as an “almost” open small economy that faces perfectly elastic import supply 
functions from the foreign regions but in export markets faces a set of downward-sloping 
export demand functions, hi addition, labor and capital are assumed to be the two primary 
factors of production. Capital is assumed to be mobile domestically and internationally but 
labor only domestically. Industries were divided into competitive constant returns to scale
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and noncompetitive increasing returns to scale. The pricing decision was made taking the 
average ofvalues generated from die two hypotheses. The first is based on the notion of the 
perceived demand curve and the second is based on the collusive model of pricing by 
Eastman-Stykolt. The production technology is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas 
specification and the demand side is characterized by a two-stage utility maximization 
process. First, the individual utility function is a CES specification and on the aggregate a 
Cobb-Douglas formulation is assumed. The model is calibrated based on the elasticities of 
substitution, inverse elasticities of scale and import demand elasticities.
The results show that CAFTA has a significant impact on the economy of Canada. 
Real GDP increases by 4.5 % and trade volume by 25%. On the other hand, using CAFTA 
as a benchmark, the implementation ofNAFTA or HASP scenarios resulted in insignificant 
changes for the Canadian economy. Under NAFTA, there is a significant 57 % increase in 
trade volume between Mexico and Canada but the initial share of Mexico in Canadian trade 
is just one percent This means that in absolute terms the increase in trade volume is small.
The results showed that once CAFTA is implemented, NAFTA will have a very 
small impact on the Canadian economy. However, the paper does not give any information 
of the stage of the implementation of CAFTA at the moment NAFTA went into effect. On 
the contrary the paper assumed a complete implementation of CAFTA and then the 
implementation ofNAFTA. But this situation does not reflect reality. The truth is that 
CAFTA had not been completely implemented when NAFTA went into effect So, the 
results o f this paper are somewhat misleading. Also, it is not clear what happens to CAFTA 
once NAFTA is implemented. So, die results reflect an unrealistic situation and therefore 
the results are not reliable.
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Levy et al. (1997) analyzed the effects ofNAFTA on Mexican agriculture and, 
specifically, on the maize producer. The main objective is to analyze the distributional 
effects of liberalizing maize in Mexico, the policies that may be implemented to alleviate 
them and the incentive problems that can arise by the presence of such policies. 
International trade theory suggests that the NAFTA agreement should result in efficiency 
gains and net welfare gains for the US, Canada and Mexico. However, when such policies 
are implemented, there is not a clear answer on how the losers should be compensated. This 
is a major problem in Mexico where state institutions are not transparent in their job and 
therefore are not reliable in implementing programs. For this purpose, the authors 
implemented a general equilibrium model (CGE). The model divided the economy into 
rural and urban sectors. The urban sector produces only a tradeable industrial good and a 
non-tradable services good. Both goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology with 
fixed intermediate inputs for urban labor and sector-specific capital. Maize, other basic 
grains, fruits and vegetables, other agricultural goods and livestock are produced by land 
and rural labor. In addition, the model distinguished six types of households, four in rural 
areas and 2 in urban areas according to ownership of assets. The results show that a gradual 
liberalization with a longer adjustment period is more adequate than a shorter one. The 
results also showed that a gradual liberalization accompanied by investment in an irrigation 
program would result in a better situation than using other type of programs.
The authors showed a very real side ofNAFTA: the losers. Previous studies on 
NAFTA have shown that agriculture in Mexico contracts as a result ofNAFTA. Therefore, 
rural labor should be reallocated in the industrial and service sectors. However, this 
reallocation is not costless in financial and cultural terms. First, maize producers lose
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because their land loses value (if rain-fed) and they do not have any support from the 
government to survive. Secondly, migration of rural population to urban areas implies a 
need of change in skills and behavior because there are big differences between rural and 
urban life. This adjustment is painful and requires financial support from the government. 
Finally, in order to deal with this problem, the government should start a quick 
implementation of the program directed to make agricultural producers more competitive 
and productive. This requires infra-structural changes and educational programs. Also, a 
greater access to credit and extension programs must be made available.
Economic Integration In Central America
Wilford (1970) analyzed the CACM and its effects on trade creation and trade 
diversion. The model proposed by Balasa (1966) was used for this purpose. Thus, income 
elasticities of import demand were estimated for the pre-integration period and for the post­
integration period. If income elasticities of intra-regional import demand under integration 
were greater than those prior to integration, then “gross trade creation” occurred. In 
addition, an increase in income elasticity of total import demand (extra- and intra-regional) 
would indicate the presence of “net trade creation”. On the other hand, a fall in extra- 
regional income elasticity of import demand indicates “gross trade diversion”. Moreover, 
a fall in total income elasticity import demand will indicate “net trade diversion”. The 
results indicated that overall net trade creation occurred in the first seven years after 
integration. However, when analyzed by sectors some trade diversion was identified. Thus, 
there was trade diversion for fuel and lubricants and for fats and edible oils.
Flower et al (1994) estimated welfare effects of economic integration in Central 
America for the period from 1970 to 1984. A model proposed by Cline et al (1978) was
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used. For this purpose, propensities to import, estimated as the ratio of the value of imports 
to total domestic consumption, were obtained. Estimates o f net trade creation and trade 
diversion were obtained using the above estimated propensities. Finally, the output effect 
was estimated as the sum of net trade creation and net trade diversion. It is suggested that 
positive net trade creation is an indication o f welfare gain. Moreover, it is suggested that 
a positive output effect would imply a substantial degree ofnon-traditional welfare benefits. 
The results show that during the period from 1970 to 1982 both trade diversion and trade 
creation were present but declining in value. Thus, there were positive net trade creation 
and net output effects. After 1982, this situation changed drastically and negative output 
effect indicated that countries were losing in terms of welfare. However, the authors 
pointed out because of methodological problems, the reliability of the results was limited.
De Franco (1996) analyzed the effects of economic integration of the nineties using 
a General Equilibrium Model (CGE) based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
calibrated for 1992. In contrast with various studies using this approach, the SAM matrix 
for Central America was not disaggregated into economic sectors but included all countries 
separately. The SAM included activities, goods, capitalists, workers, government, capital 
account, and exports. Different scenarios were analyzed. Results were obtained for the 
effects of a free trade area (FTA) and a customs union (CU). The results showed that the 
formation of a customs union (CU) will benefit Guatemala and Costa Rica and could be 
harmful for Honduras and Nicaragua. An improvement in the level of real exchange rate 
to avoid overvaluation o f the currencies of Central American countries is given among the 
recommendations. This is required to improve competitiveness of commodities produced 
in the area.
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Caceres (1994) analyzed the costs and benefits of integration in Central America. 
Initially, a quantitative estimation of the possible benefits of integration was developed. 
Secondly, obstacles to reap the benefits of economic integration were measured. As a first 
task, possible sources of benefits were identified and quantified. Thus, domestic savings, 
trade creation, increased economic growth, stabilization of economic growth, increased 
intra-industry trade, and the increase of the market size were identified as possible benefits 
to be attained through integration. The quantitative assessment of saving revealed that since 
intra-regional trade is mainly made up of final goods which require the imports of 
intermediate goods, the possibilities of increasing savings were small. To measure trade 
creation, the approach proposed by Balasa (1967) was used. The results showed that in the 
period 1962-1969 integration did not lead to a significant change in resource allocation. 
This indicates that little trade was created. A further analysis to measure the possibilities 
of increased economic growth showed that distance between countries could be a 
determinant factor to propel economic growth in country members through a greater flow 
of trade. Based on previous studies and the estimation of the Grubel-Lloyd index for 
Central American countries, the results show that there is a good opportunity to benefit 
from intra-industry trade, hi addition, according to Gray (1988), intra-industry trade is 
greatest among countries with similar income levels. So, intra-industry trade could be very 
beneficial for Central America given this fact Finally, it is clear that broadening the market 
creates room to reap the benefits of increasing returns to scale in production and 
competition.
Transport costs and low levels of human capital have been mentioned as important 
obstacles to a successful economic integration. At this moment, the costs of transport and
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insurance for commodities in the region are really high in Honduras and Nicaragua relative 
to the rest of the Central American countries. According to Caceres(1994), levels ofhuman 
capital have a considerable impact on the export performance of a given country. Therefore, 
a model was estimated to determine the importance of the level ofhuman capital in the 
export sector performance of the CACM. The results showed that the role of human 
resources in intra-regional trade has been gaining importance as time passed. Thus, 
countries should make an effort to promote more activities to improve the pool ofhuman 
capital.
Empirical Evidence on Export Promoting fl£P) Policies1 
Very often export promoting policies are implemented under an export-promoting 
(EP) strategy. A country is said to follow an export-promoting strategy if the real exchange 
rate of exportable goods (EERJ is approximately equal to or greater than that of importable 
goods (EERJ (Baghwati, 1990). Performance of countries under an EP strategy is 
commonly contrasted with other countries following an import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) strategy. It has been argued that an export promoting strategy is superior to an ISI 
strategy in several aspects. First, EP strategy improves resource allocation efficiency 
relative to the ISI strategy. Secondly, directly unproductive profit-seeking and rent-seeking 
activities are commonly present under an IS strategy but less often in countries following 
an EP strategy. Thirdly, EP strategy tend to lead to a better use of foreign resources relative 
to an IS strategy. Finally, saving and innovation are more likely to be present under an EP 
strategy.
‘Note: This section relies on the work of Milner etal (1990), “Export Promotion 
Strategies: Theory and Evidence From Developing Countries ".
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There have been several alternative instruments proposed to promote exports. For 
example, import liberalization, exchange rate regimes, compensatory financial and fiscal 
incentives, and export processing zones have been used as such instruments. Milner (1990) 
analyzed import liberalization as an instrument in export promotion. The analysis is 
developed under a general equilibrium framework. The analysis showed that high rate of 
protection in many developing countries make the general lowering of import barriers a 
desirable and feasible means of relative export promotion. On the other hand, policy­
makers may choose to selectively import-protect and export-protect particular activities. 
However, past experience has shown that policy-makers often fail in adequately choosing 
the best commodity candidates for import protection or export promotion.
Falvey et al (1990) summarized the wide variety of export-promoting incentives 
used in developing countries. Accordingly, there are input related incentives, output related 
incentives, and externality-related incentives. Most of these incentives are given as tax 
exemptions, direct subsidies, lower interest rates than the ongoing rates, and monopoly 
rights in a given industry, hi addition, theoretical frameworks to analyze compensatory 
exports incentives are developed. This included final demand-related policies, direct- 
production related policies, factor market related policies, and externality-related policies.
Warr (1990) analyzed the impact of export processing zones (EPZ) on economic 
welfare. EPZ are described as “especial enclaves, outside a nation’s normal customs 
barriers, within which investing firms, mostly foreign, enjoy favored treatment with respect 
to imports of intermediate goods, company taxation, provision of infrastructure and 
freedom from industrial regulations applying elsewhere in the country" (Warr, 1990). In 
exchange, in general, these companies are required to hire local labor and to export most
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of production outside the country. This situation corresponds to several objective of the 
host county with respect to the presence of the EPZ. It has been stated that foreign exchange 
savings, employment and technology transfer are the objective of establishing EPZ in 
various countries.
A study of EPZ in four Asian countries is then developed. To do so, the “enclave 
approach” proposed by Corden (1974 and 1985) is used. The results showed that indirect 
labor export seems to be the main benefits from the EPZ for Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. The situation for Indonesia, the fourth country included in the analysis, was a 
little different. First, in contrast with the EPZ in other countries, an unusually high 
proportion of raw materials were purchased locally. Secondly, although taxes were low in 
the country, there has been a rent-seeking behavior by government officials which has 
diverted considerable sums of money into their hands. In addition, technology transfer has 
been a difficult task to carry out This is so because EPZ are not interested in developing 
local industries which in turn could become difficult competitors in local and foreign input 
and output markets. Thus, there is an opinion that the overall costs of the EPZ seem to 
outweigh the benefits derived from i t  hi conclusion, EPZs are not “engines of progress’ as 
they were initially thought to be but a temporary relief for labor surplus.
Nam (1990) investigated whether trade policy in Korea has been inward- or 
outward-oriented. For this purpose, relative incentive rates on exports and domestic sales 
for the Korean economy were estimated for 1978. Thus, the effective subsidy rate for 
export sales, the effective protection rate for domestic sales, and the effective incentive rate 
for total sales were estimated by the Balassa and Corden methods. The results showed that 
Korean trade incentives in 1978 were biased toward export activities. On the other hand,
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in the late seventies, it became apparent that the structure for domestic sales became 
increasingly complex and inefficient So, as it was pointed out the experience of Korea in 
removing “export bias” has been through the implementation of the so-called ‘export- 
subsidy’ route to outward orientation.
This way to encourage exports is somewhat similar to import liberalization with 
currency realignment (the ‘free-trade’ route to outward orientation). It is argued that there 
are several reasons why an ‘export-subsidy’ outward orientation has been implemented 
instead of the ‘free-trade’ route. First, political pressure made cutting import protection very 
difficult. Secondly, the currency devaluation that may have been required to reduce import 
barriers could cause some inflationary pressure. Third, import taxes have been a major 
source of government revenue. Fourth, there was an erroneous belief that both exports and 
import substitution can be better promoted by the scheme of export subsidies with import 
barriers. Finally, is should not be overlooked that an ‘export-subsidy’ outward orientation 
is costly relative to a ‘free-trade’ route and this makes ‘export-subsidy’ outward orientation 
a transitional instrument to a ‘free-trade’ outward orientation route.
Applications of Game Theory and the Political Preference Function (PPF1 
Framework in Economic Integration Analysis
Kennedy et al (1998) analyzed the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU) 
using a PPF analytical framework. To get an idea about how this process of accession may 
be carried out, the importance of various Turkish social and productive groups in policy 
making was established and compared to their counterparts in the United States (US) and 
the EU. The PPF is a partial equilibrium analysis framework in which it is assumed that the 
government maximizes an additive social utility function ofvarious sectors of society. Beef
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and veal, dairy products, com, wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and pork and 
poultry were the ten commodity groups included in the analysis. The budget sector 
(government) and consumers were also included in the estimation of the PPF. The MISS 
model was used to estimate weights of each sector in the PPF. These weights represent the 
political influence of consumer and producer sectors relative to the government budget in 
the formulation of agricultural policies. The results showed that the dairy and rice sectors 
are the most politically relevant groups in the US. hi the EU, the dairy sector along with 
wheat producers, beef and veal, and soybeans producers appear to be the most influential 
sectors. In Turkey, the rice sector along with com producers and consumers were the most 
influential groups. These results show that policies are influenced by different groups when 
a comparison is made between Turkey and either the US or the EU. By contrast, there are 
small differences in the importance of groups among the US and the EU.
Kennedy et al (1996) analyzed multilateral trade negotiations between the European 
Union (EU) and the United States (US) in light of recent GATT agreements. The Political 
Preference Function (PPF) framework was used to quantify the welfare implications of 
different trade liberalization scenarios. The estimates of changes in welfare were then used 
in agame theoretical framework to identify the most likely trade agreement between the US 
and EU under cooperative and non-cooperative games. Sugar, milk, cereals, oilseeds, beef, 
pork, and poultry are the seven commodity groups included in the study. In addition, 
consumer surplus and the budget sector are included in the analysis. Weights for each 
commodify sector, consumers, and government budget were estimated and then normalized 
by dividing by the budget deficit weight Thus, the budget sector is assumed to have a 
weight equal to unify and the rest of weights are analyzed relative to the budget sector.
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These weights are then used to estimate changes in welfare for each commodity group and 
get one estimate of the PPF under each action for the US and the EU.
Four scenarios were employed in the analysis of trade negotiations between the US
and the EU. Status quo (SQ), no export related subsidies (EX), partial free trade (PF), and
free trade (FT) were chosen as the relevant scenarios of analysis based on the latest GATT
negotiations and agreements. The non-cooperative and cooperative games are modeled. In
addition, simulations are run with a 9.4% depreciation and a 40.2% appreciation of the US
dollar. The results of the various scenarios used are shown in Table 2.14. These results
indicate that in the non-cooperative game the Nash equilibrium outcome is EX for
exchange rate is changed. Under the cooperative game, the outcome for the EU is again
Table 2.14. Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Games Based on Uruguay Round Options
the EU regardless of the exchange rate whereas for the US the outcome
US Actions EU Actions





Note game solutions for non-cooperative and cooperative gtmes are represented by Ns and CE respectively, E«A, R, D. where A«actual 
exchange rate, R-40.2 appreciation of the dollar, and I>9.4 depreciation of the dollar.
Source Kennedy et al (1996).
insensitive to exchange rate variations, hi this case, the Nash equilibrium is PF for the EU. 
Likewise, the outcome for the US under the cooperative game is sensitive to changes in 
exchange rate regimes. However, with no changes in the exchange rate (A) and exchange 
rate depreciation (D), the US optimal outcome turns out to be FT. Oehmke et al (1990) 
used a Political Preference Function (PPF) to analyze government intervention in the US
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wheat market. Changes in consumer welfare, changes in producers* welfare, and the budget 
sector were assumed to be the relevant variables in the PPF. The study analyzes two 
separate years, 1977 and 1985, to determine the dynamics ofpolitical environment in policy 
formulation. Since wheat is exported, excess demand was assumed to be represented by a 
constant elasticity equation. Likewise, domestic supply and demand are represented by a 
constant price elasticity equation. On the other hand, since government intervention is 
given through various policies the “policy-optimal” target price, research expenditures, and 
sales from government stocks were estimated. The results showed that in 1977 wheat 
producers were weighted more highly than taxpayers (government budget). Thus, the 
weight for producers in the PPF was 1.43 whereas consumers weight was 0.43. If the 
situation of 1985 is taken alone, the picture changes a little. In this case, producers are 
weighted at 1.25, which is lower than the weight of 1977. Consumers continue to be 
relatively less influential than both groups. However, the fact that producers were less 
influential in the PPF than in 1977 indicates that producers have lost some power in the 
policy making process. This outcome is consistent with the real behavior of policy-making 
in the US. hi conclusion, it is noteworthy that the PPF framework consistently described 
real life situations and it is useful as an analytical tool.
Gordon et al (1975) used a Political Preference Function (PPF) framework to 
analyze policy changes in the US cattle industry in the years 1959 to 1969. This time, 
consumer’s meat costs, margins to breeding cow-calf producers, margins to cattle feeders, 
and beef import quota level were assumed to be the arguments o f the function. Estimation 
of the PPF was made under a quadratic mathematical representation. One of the objectives 
of the study was to obtain various estimations of the PPF and to do so the PPF is estimated
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under various sets o f weights for each group. The results show that the PPF framework 
adequately described relative sectoral influence when there was a policy change. Thus, it 
was concluded that a trade-off of two to one between aggregate cattle producers and 
consumers was the most plausible scenario under which policy changes were made. For 
example, with a trade-off o f 2:1 producers weight relative to consumers was 1.62 during 
1959-63 (free trade), 5.06 during 1964 (quota imposition), 2.51 during 1965-67 (stable 
quotas), and 0.91 during 1968-69 (imports increase). This outcome is consistent with the 
observed situations under which policy changes were decided.
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CHAPTER THREE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter presents the theoretical considerations underlying the economic model 
used in this research. To obtain an adequate economic model to analyze economic 
integration in Central America, an extensive exercise is developed. First, a review of the 
most recent advancements in international trade theory is presented. Secondly, the theory 
underlying international economic integration is reviewed. Motivation to enter international 
economic agreements, expected benefits from economic integration, and the forms of 
economic integration are reviewed. Third, theoretical considerations underlying economic 
integration among developing countries, as is the case of Central American countries, are 
assessed. Fourth, since economic policies play a crucial role in determining the success of 
any integration agreement, a theoretical analysis of policies and their effects on income, 
prices, and consumers’ welfare is developed in the context of developing countries. Fifth, 
since this research will use a game theoretical framework to analyze economic integration 
in Central America, a review of game theory is included. Finally, since much of the 
research will be based on the use of the political preference function (PPF), its derivation 
is also presented in this chapter.
Current Situation In Internationa! Trade Theory 
The theory of international trade is crucially important in helping analysts and 
policy makers understand trade patterns. With the help of international trade theory it is 
possible to analyze the reasons for trade among countries in a concise manner. 
Traditionally, there has been a set of assumptions taken into account to make the analysis 
of international trade patterns clear and effective. Effective analysis refers to an appropriate 
prediction of trade patterns under specific conditions. The analysis o f international trade
80
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patterns is made by relaxing some assumptions required for a no trade or autarky situation. 
There are five main assumptions for no trade between countries. These assumptions are 
constant returns to scale, identical tastes and preferences, identical relative endowment of 
resources, identical production functions, and no distortions (Markusen et al, 1995). 
Mainstream International Trade Theory
Until recently, international trade theory analyzed trade patterns by relaxing some 
of the assumptions of no trade (Markusen, 1995). Classical or orthodox trade theory 
focused on trade patterns that arise from differences in production functions and differences 
in resource endowment Traditionally, three general equilibrium models have been used to 
analyze these differences. In addition, a partial equilibrium framework has been used to 
analyze the impact of distortions on international trade. Finally, the assumption of constant 
returns to scale is relaxed under what is known as the new international trade theory (NUT) 
(Krugman, 1986; Scherer et al, 1994).
The use of general equilibrium models has made a great contribution to the 
development of international trade theory. For example, under a general equilibrium 
framework, the Ricardian model deals with differences in technology and the Heckscher- 
Ohlin model deals with differences in resource endowment The very simplistic 
assumptions of the Ricardian model are used to predict that countries should specialize in 
production of goods based on productivity differences that lead to comparative advantage. 
By the same token, according to assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries 
should export goods that use more intensively resources that are relatively more abundant 
in a given country when compared to trade partners. Finally, the specific factor model has 
been used to analyze trade patterns that arise from assuming mobile and fixed factors of 
production. To some degree, this model is an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
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As was mentioned above, the assumption about distortions is relaxed and analyzed 
in a partial equilibrium framework. Thus, various governmental policies, such as taxes, 
subsidies, tariffs, and quotas, are widely used to shape international trade relations and their 
analysis is a very important subject in international trade theory (Markusen et al, 1995). 
New International Trade Theory (NUT)
The discussion above indicates that classical international trade theory relies on the 
assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale in production. However, 
as empirical evidence shows, the applicability of the classical theory to predict actual 
patterns of trade is limited (Krugman, 1986). For example, the Leontiefif paradox showed 
that the Heckscher-Ohlin model was inconsistent with patterns of trade it predicted when 
the model was tested empirically (Krugman, 1986). In addition, if the assumption of 
constant returns to scale is relaxed several complications for the use of the classical 
framework arise. For example, increasing returns to scale may lead to monopolistic 
competition in international markets and to the use of strategic behavior in trade relations. 
Under monopolistic assumptions firms are no longer price takers. Therefore, in deciding 
their actions, firms will take other firms’ actions into account as well. This situation has 
hardly been analyzed by classical theorists of international trade.
Recently, new developments in international trade theory have created the 
opportunity to analyze actual patterns of trade in a more adequate and realistic setting than 
under the classical view (Krugman, 1986). However, it seems that there is a division 
between supporters of the classical view and supporters of the newest ideas developed into 
the theory o f international trade. It is widely accepted that the analysis o f trade under 
perfect competitive markets leads to different conclusions from those obtained when the
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analysis is made under the assumption of imperfectly competitive markets. However, 
scientists are discussing whether the objective is to defend the theory that advocates free 
trade or a theory that acknowledges that free trade is not always possible and, therefore, it 
proposes some ideas about how to deal in a world of imperfect competition.
On the other hand, there is a confrontation, as often there is in economic theory, 
about what the central object of analysis in international trade theory should be. Should 
economic theory analyze what is really happening in the real world or what the situation 
ought to be? This is a struggle between the positive and normative views of economic 
theory.
This confrontation easily extends to international trade theory. If the objective is to 
analyze patterns of trade under ideal conditions, then the approach used in the last 100 years 
is probably appropriate. This approach is mainly based on what the patterns of trade ought 
be, given resources and initial comparative advantage. These models include the Ricardian 
model, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and the specific factor models. However, if the 
objective is to predict the patterns of international trade actually seen, then various factors 
of trade such as economies of scale, research and development (R&D), and imperfect 
competition should be analyzed using what is now referred to as “strategic trade policy” or 
NUT (Krugman, 1986).
At this point, it seems appropriate to describe Ni'lT in a detailed manner. Scherer 
et al (1994) mentioned that NTTT focused on five main features. These features are 
economies of scale, technology and R&D, the product life cycle, intra-industry trade, and 
oligopoly, hi addition, strategic behavior has an important place within this new theoretical 
framework.
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One of the differences in the assumptions made undo* NTTT is that comparative 
advantage can be shaped and is not static, as assumed by orthodox theory. This is directly 
related to technology and R&D. The relationship between comparative advantage and 
technology in international trade is not a novelty. However, the fact that the trade balance 
has been shown to be systematically correlated with intensities of technological innovations 
efforts, is a new discovery in international trade theory (Scherer et al, 1994).
The product life cycle theory is used to further the analysis of patterns of trade 
based on the assumption of a changing comparative advantage. Since it is assumed that 
comparative advantage is something that is fought for, product life cycle theory explains 
that developed countries have comparative advantage in the creation and development of 
new goods but later the comparative advantage in the production of the good is lost. One 
explanation is that as production gets standardized, developing countries gain comparative 
advantage in the production of the same goods. This gain in comparative advantage is due 
to cheap labor and raw materials. Therefore, developing countries end up being net 
exporters of goods for which they were initially net importers.
Intra-industry trade is another situation that has come to challenge the traditional 
views on international trade patterns. The Heckscher-Ohlin model became very popular 
after it was published in 1933 and for the following 30 years it became a fundamental 
model to analyze international trade. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries 
should specialize based on factor endowment Thus, in the early European Union (EU), 
economists expected Germany to specialize in exports of automobiles, Italy in the exports 
o f labor-intensive goods such as textiles and vegetables, and France in the exports of wine 
and haute couture. However, Germany, France and Italy resumed exporting automobiles,
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cheese and wine. This situation in the sixties and seventies indicated that the Heckscher- 
Ohlin model was limited in explaining patterns of trade. This is because a great deal of 
intra-industry trade arose during the sixties and seventies and countries exported various 
products close in technology to each other and the Heckscher-Ohlin model could not 
predict such a pattern of trade.
Analysts have started to consider economies of scale when looking for an 
explanation for the patterns o f trade actually observed. Economies of scale are present due 
to several reasons. First, the production of a given good may require very high initial costs 
or front-end commitment of resources. Then, unit cost will fall as output volume rises. 
Secondly, market size is important because the greater the market to be supplied, the lower 
the per unit costs of production will be. Third, “learning by doing” or the learning curve is 
likely to be present as the quantity produced increases. The learning curve helps to reduce 
costs as more units of the same good are produced because of the gains in experience and 
the fine-tuning of the process of production.
Finally, the presence of economies of scale may lead to a situation in which few 
suppliers of the good will exist When there are few suppliers of a given good then the 
question about oligopolistic competition arises. Oligopoly generates two difficulties in 
analyzing patterns o f trade. First, oligopoly means that perfect competition is no longer 
present and, therefore, traditional methods of analysis are no longer adequate. Secondly, 
under oligopolistic competition, comparative advantage depends on the strategies of R&D, 
plant location, pricing, product advertising, and so forth. This means that comparative 
advantage is no longer exogenous to the economic system but something that is fought for 
and won.
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In the NUT views, strategic trade policy seems to be an alternative to free trade 
given present international trade relations among countries. It is true that negotiations under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization 
(WTO), have led to countries reaching an agreement to lower tariffs. However, other kinds 
of barriers still remain. For example, hygienic standards, production standards and other 
regulations have come to replace tariff barriers. As a result, bureaucracy has increased, 
barriers to trade seem to be the same and, in some cases, the situation is worse than it was 
before reaching the agreements.
Thus, it is not a coincidence that Scherer et al (1994) proposed that a strategic 
behavior in setting tariffs and targeting markets needed to be developed, hi addition, “trade 
enhancing national policies” are proposed to cope with a world in which free trade is still 
assumed to be a dream. It is believed, under this view, that government intervention in 
international trade relations can be beneficial from the domestic standpoint Accordingly, 
twelve such policies are mentioned. These policies are commodity export subsidies, export 
financing, government favors tied to export performance, learning curve pricing, home 
market protection, coercive market-opening measures, cartel formation and dumping, 
coordination of industry investments, provision of cheap raw materials, subsidies to R&D, 
intellectual property protection, and subsidies to workers’ education.
Significance of NUT for Developing Countries
The expectations of developing countries regarding trade liberalization can be 
helpful to understand the significance of NUT for developing countries. Historically, 
developing countries have been unable to influence international trade negotiations, 
Therefore, until recently the role of developing countries in international trade negotiations
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has been limited. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that developing countries do not 
expect to be able to change their situation in international trade negotiations. So, it is 
reasonable to expect that developing countries will not enjoy free trade in the near future. 
Under this light, NUT could be appealing for developing countries.
Even if  NUT has appeal in developing countries, the pros and cons of the theory 
should be weighed in implementing trade policies according to NUT. Some aspects of 
NUT can be named as positive. For example, it is argued that NTTT is more realistic than 
orthodox theory of international trade (Krugman, 1986). In addition, it is common 
knowledge that national trade policy decisions usually respond to the influence of special 
interest groups and, therefore, NTTT could be appealing in shaping national policies 
(Krugman, 1986).
On the contrary, some aspects ofNITT can have a detrimental impact on the policy 
outcome of developing countries. Alam (1995) argued that developing countries could be 
unable to derive benefits from the use of strategic policies. First, an imperfect market 
structure is more pervasive in the industrial sectors of developing countries than in those 
of developed countries. This happens because ISI strategies and lack of antitrust laws lead 
to oligopolistic market structure. Secondly, the small size o f developing countries reduces 
their ability to use strategic trade policies. For example, a restriction from a small 
developing country against a large developed country could generate a small loss for the 
latter. However, if the large country retaliates, then losses could be great for the small 
developing country. Third, developing countries may not benefit from economies of scale 
for several reasons. NTTT indicates R&D expenditures are instrumental in generating 
economies of scale but most developing countries lack the ability to spend money on R&D.
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In addition, since the market size of most developing countries is small when taken 
individually, there is small room to exploit economies of scale because it requires, among 
other aspects, a large market size.
There are still some other strong arguments against using NTTT in trade policy in 
developing countries. Since it is widely accepted that trade policy decisions are strongly 
affected by interest groups, there is a risk regarding the possibility that interest groups may 
use NTTT concepts to gain at the expense of their own country (Grossman, 1986). On the 
other hand, it has been argued that great care should be taken when using strategic behavior 
to decide what productive sectors to promote. If the wrong sector is chosen, then, in the 
long run, the country’s welfare will be negatively affected (Krugman, 1986).
Finally, it is important to mention that policy makers of developing countries should 
be convinced of what international economic order will prevail before engaging in any sort 
of policy making process. If policy makers believe that free trade is a very long term goal, 
then NTTT could be the only alternative to propel national social-economic development 
in the short and middle term. However, it has been indicated that developing countries will 
be better off if they follow a free trade strategy (Alam, 1995). So, it seems that the only 
plausible outcome is a mix of both the free trade approach and the strategic trade policy 
making approach.
International Economic Integration
Consider why countries may want to get into international economic integration 
agreements. A probable answer to this question is that countries expect to get some benefits 
or gains by entering an international agreement Delener (1999) mentioned that countries 
may be encouraged to form international trading blocs as a result of the sense of
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community, strategic alliances, norms, and rules. These reasons can be termed non­
economic reasons. In addition, international trading blocs are usually formed to make up 
for shortcomings in international trade relationships. This reason can be termed the 
economic reason. Among the economic and political reasons, several factors can be 
mentioned as important in forming international trading blocs. First, members can perceive 
that economic benefits can be achieved from a more efficient production structure as a 
result of the new economic environment triggered by the economic integration agreement. 
Second, members may pursue non-economic objectives such as political ties, stabilization, 
etc. Third, an internationally integrated region may improve its bargaining power in 
multilateral trade negotiations. Moreover, small countries forming trading alliances may 
improve their position in securing market access. In addition, international economic 
integration opens a possibility to exploit economies of scale (Robson, 1984). From the 
previous discussion it can be inferred that member countries’ welfare improvement is one 
of the main objective of international economic integration agreements. International trade 
theory analyzes this improvement in welfare as gains from trade liberalization through 
international economic integration agreements (Krugman, 1997).
Gains From Trade
Gains from trade has been one the most important factors that influence trade flows 
and patterns of trade (Krugman, 1997). In general, trade liberalization through international 
economic integration agreements may lead to improvement in the welfare of member 
countries (Robson, 1984). In addition, it is assumed that trade increases the welfare of 
countries when the production of goods is increased by means of specialization induced by 
comparative advantage. Gains from trade can be explained in a very concise manner with
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the help of Figure 3.1. Suppose there is a two-country world. In addition, assume that there 
are only two commodities produced, namely, X  and Y. Let the curve PPFj, for i=l,2 
represent the production possibility frontier (PPF) of each country. Disregard inputs for the 
time being. The way both PPF are drawn indicates that production of X  is more intensive 
in country I than in country 2. By the same token Y is more intensive in production in 
country 2 than in country /.
Consider the situation without trade. Under autarky (no trade), equilibrium 
production and consumption in country 1 is given at point A. At this point, country I is 
consuming its own production. For example, production of X  (X,A) equal consumption 
(C„A). By the same token, production of Y (Y,A) equals consumption (C,yA). The 
community indifference curve (CIC) is given by U A. Relative prices are given by the line 
P,A. The same situation applies for country 2. Point B shows the point of production and 
consumption of country 2. PPF2 shows that production of Y is more intensive than in 
country I. The community indifference curve (CIC) is given by U2A. production ofX(X2K) 
equal consumption (C ^ ) and production of Y (Y2A) equals consumption (C2YA). Relative 
prices are given by P2A.
Now consider the situation when countries engage in trade. With the opportunity 
of increased demand for good given the presence o f a greater market, countries will 
increase production of the good in whose production they have comparative advantage. 
This may lead to either a complete or a partial specialization in the production of the good 
in whose production there is comparative advantage. Therefore, after countries open up 
their economies, terms of trade between countries changes and a common relative price line 
(PjF=P2̂  is obtained. In addition, trade leads to a high degree of specialization in the





















production of one good. However, there is not complete specialization. This is conditioned 
by the shape of the PPF curve in both countries and international prices.
Under these new relative world prices, total production of each good increases and 
welfare of countries improves. This improvement is shown by the shift of the CIC upward 
to UjF, for r=l,2. Thus, for country Ithe new point of production is F. At this point, country 
1 produces X,F and Y,F. However, consumption is at point C along U,F. This new CIC 
conveys a higher level of utility or welfare since it lies to the northeast of the CIC under 
autarky. This is possible because under free trade countries have a greater supply of goods 
X  and Y than under autarky. Moreover, this new higher level of consumption is possible 
because of export and import possibilities that countries obtained after engaged in trade.
Import and export of goods are crucial in increasing the welfare of countries. In 
Figure 3.1 this is shown explicitly. Under free trade, country 1 ended up producing X,F and 
Y,f and consuming CIXF and CIYF. Moreover, X,F < ClxF and Y,F > C,YF. This implies that 
country 1 imports X and exports Y. The opposite is true for country 2. Thus, M,XF shows 
how much X  is imported by country 1. By the same token, M2YF shows how much of Y is 
imported by country 2. On the contrary, EtYF shows how much of Y is exported by country 
1 and E2Xf shows how much of X  is exported by country 2.
In summary, countries gain by trading with each other. First, as countries open their 
economies, increased production possibilities are obtained. Second, increased levels of 
production and specialization lead to a greater supply of goods. Third, trade leads to a 
greater supply of goods and more favorable terms of trade which in turn allows countries 
to increase their welfare. Finally, import and export possibilities become new sources of 
increased consumption and, consequently, increased levels of welfare.
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Theoretical Considerations in International Economic Integration
International economic integration is generally used as a means for domestic 
economic development However, there must exist a set of conditions to secure a successful 
economic integration (Robson, 1984). First, if the trade barriers prior to implementation of 
the agreement are high, then there is an increased opportunity for a successful integration. 
Secondly, if in the post-economic integration scheme common external tariffs (CET) are 
lower than before economic integration takes place, it is less likely that trade diversion will 
be present Third, the larger the number and the area of the economic integration, the 
greater the scope for net trade creation since there is an increase in the likelihood that low- 
cost consumers and producers will join the agreement Fourth, trade creation is more likely 
to result as the competitiveness of the member countries increases. This is so because if 
economies are competitive, then there are increased opportunities for specialization and net 
trade creation. Finally, if  member countries are located geographically close, then welfare 
is more likely to increase because of lower transportation costs than those of countries 
located far from one another.
Given the previous discussion, it is worthwhile to assess what specific benefits may 
be obtained by member countries when entering an integration agreement. Static and 
dynamic benefits from international economic integration are usually mentioned in 
international trade literature (Robson, 1984). Several benefits can be mentioned as static 
benefits. First, benefits are derived from the elimination of customs and border officers. 
Secondly, terms of trade usually improve under an integration agreement Third, the new 
formed economic bloc may exert bargaining power in international negotiations in a more 
effective way than member countries did individually. Robson (1984) mentioned the effects
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of market enlargement on the efficiency of factor utilization and on output and its rate of 
growth through its impact on the location and rate of investment as sources of dynamic 
benefits. Thus, dynamic benefits of integration are more likely to be seen in the long run. 
Thus, economies of scale, investment stimulation, increased competition, and better 
utilization of economic resources encompass dynamic benefits expected from an integration 
agreement
International economic integration may take different forms and it depends on the 
intended degree of economic integration (Robson, 1984). Depending on the degree of 
integration there are free trade areas, custom unions, common markets and economic 
unions. A free trade area involves the free movement of product in the area, i.e, it involves 
elimination of trade barriers between the members of the free trade area. In addition, each 
member retains it own tariff with respect of the rest of the world. By contrast, a customs 
union involves not only the free movement of products in the area, but also a common 
external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world. A common market is a deeper form of 
integration. A common market contains the elements of a custom union and additionally 
allows for free labor and capital flow in the area. Thus, in a common market factor and 
product market are integrated. Presently, the deepest form of international integration is 
represented by an economic union. An economic union contains all the elements of a 
common market and a high degree of unification of monetary, fiscal and other policies, hi 
this case, depending on the degree of integration a wide spectrum of forms of integration 
can be seen. Finally, political integration refers to the formation of a single nation with one 
political authority. In this case, members are no longer sovereign states but part of a single 
country. The degree of integration mostly will depend on the degree of harmonization
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policies among the members. In general, most agreements on international integration are 
focused on the suppression of discrimination among members, the maintenance of 
discrimination against the rest of the world, and the lasting character of the agreements 
which limits the use o f certain instruments of economic policy.
Trade Diversion and Trade Creation in a Customs Union
Since the objective of Central American countries appears to be the creation of an 
adequate customs union for the area, it seems relevant for this research to pay special 
attention to the theory of customs union. According to Robson (1984) there are three 
features in a customs union. First, tariffs on imports from member countries are removed. 
Secondly, a common external tariff (CET) on imports from the rest of the world is imposed. 
Finally, member states divide customs revenue according to an agreed upon formula.
Robson (1984) argued that gains and losses arise from the impact of the customs 
union on several factors. First, a customs union has impact on resource allocation and 
international specialization. Secondly, economies of scale are likely to be present. Third, 
a customs union affects terms of trade. Fourth, productivity of factors is also affected by 
a customs union. Fifth, economic integration in the form of a customs union may affect 
economic growth of member countries. Sixth, economic stability may be one of the 
objectives of economic integration and it may be affected by a customs union. Finally, the 
formation of a customs union will surely affect the distribution of income in member 
countries.
As it was mentioned in the previous discussion, resource allocation is one of the 
most important aspects for assessing the success of a customs union creation. In general, 
the theory of customs union analyzes resource allocation in terms of trade creation and
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trade diversion (Robson, 1984). Accordingly, trade creation is represented by a shift from 
the consumption of higher-cost domestic production to lower-cost products of partner 
countries. There are two aspects o f this shift First, domestic production of goods that are 
identical with those produced abroad is reduced or eliminated. This effect is termed the 
saving effect Secondly, there is an increase in consumption of import of the goods that 
were previously purchased at higher prices. This second effect is referred to as the 
consumption effect On the other hand, trade diversion is a shift in the source of imports 
from lower-cost external sources to higher-cost partner sources. Trade diversion has two 
aspects. First there is an increase in the cost of goods previously imported from abroad. 
Secondly, because of the higher price of goods, there is a loss in consumer surplus. Finally, 
if a customs union is on balance trade creating, then it is assumed to be beneficial. A trade 
diverting customs union is assumed to be detrimental.
To get a clear idea about trade creation and trade diversion, the formation of a 
customs union is analyzed in Figure 3.2-3.4. For this purpose, consider a three-country 
world, hi addition, for purposes of the analysis, assume there is only one traded good. Also, 
for simplicity purposes, assume no terms of trade effects and constant returns to scale. 
According to Figure 3.2, countries I and 2 are exporters of the commodity and country 3 
is the importer. Therefore, Figure 3.2 shows the excess supply of country 1 and 2 (ES, and 
ES2) and excess demand for country 3 (ED3). If free trade (FT) is allowed, an equilibrium 
is obtained where the excess supply curve (E S ,^  and the excess demand curve (ED3) 
intersect Points shows the equilibrium price (Pj) and quantity (Q l+f).  However, suppose, 
as in many real world situations, that exporters face a tariff T from the importer (Figure 
33). Call this situation status quo (SQ). Under SQ the excess supply of country 1 and 2 is
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given by ES1+2T. Point B shows the equilibrium outcome under tariff with price PWT and 
quantity QI+2T. Now suppose that country 1 and 3 decide to form a customs union (Figure 
3.4). Then, country 1 will not longer face the tariff from country 3 since trade barriers 
between them will be removed. However, country 2 still faces this tariff. Under the customs 
union (CU) situation, the new excess supply is given by ES,̂ ™13. The new equilibrium 
point is C. the new price is Pw“  and quantity is Q^™13.
Consider the quantity supplied by each exporter under each situation. Under SQ 
country 1 export the amount corresponding to segment QtT and country 2 exports the 
segment Q /. If FT prevailed, then both exporters would have experience an increase in 
their exports. Thus, country /  would have exported the segment Q,F and country 2 would 
have supplied Q2F. Notice that under FT the quantity exported by each country is greater 
than under SQ and, consequently, the price is lower than under SQ. Under the CU 
situation, country 1 exports the segment Q,“ 13 and country 2 exports Q2CU|3. It is clear that 
the total quantity exported under CU is greater than under SQ (Q,̂ ™13 > Q[+2T). Thus, the 
customs union has caused overall trade to increase and price to decrease with respect to the 
SQ situation. The segment TC indicates how much trade was created by the customs union. 
However, it is clear that country 2 under CU is exporting less than under SQ since Q2T > 
Q2cu13. This reduction in exports is shown by the segment ID which is how much trade was 
diverted by country I from country 2 when the customs union was implemented. Thus, TD 
is trade diversion. Finally, the customs union benefits or losses are assessed. If trade 
creation is greater than trade diversion, then the customs union is said to be beneficial for 
member countries. On the other hand, as is was mentioned before, a customs union is said 
to be detrimental if trade diversion is greater than trade creation.











































Farther Considerations on the Theory of Customs Union
Since exploitation of economies of scale is often mentioned as one of the key 
objectives when developing countries enter economic integration schemes (Robson, 1984), 
it seems reasonable to analyze the possible effect of economies of scale on a customs union, 
hi analyzing economies of scale, orthodox theory is of little help since in its analysis it 
assumes constant returns to scale. Therefore, some modifications of the theory are in order 
to get some insight when economies of scale are present Markusen et al (1995) employ 
extensions to international trade of imperfect competitive models such as the Cournot and 
the Bertrand models to explain how economies of scale can lead to a strategic trade policy 
setting. Robson (1984) uses a case by case situation and a graphical approach without 
referring to any of the afore mentioned models to explain the effects of economies of scale 
on the welfare of countries entering an economic integration agreement This approach will 
be followed here.
The analysis of the effects of economies of scale is as follows. First, suppose there 
are two countries, namely, H and F entering a customs union, and a passive rest of the 
world (ROW). Second, suppose there is only one homogeneous product being traded. 
Third, assume that countries set a common external tariff (CET) to equate average costs to 
tariff-inclusive import price. In this case, there will be no tariff revenues and excess profits, 
and all gains or losses will accrue to consumers, hi addition, suppose that two situations are 
possible regarding production of the good. Either there is production in one country or in 
both countries. Let us consider each case in turn.
Assume initially that, in the pre-union situation, there is production in both 
countries. After the union is enforced it is likely that one of the countries, either HorF, will
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capture the entire market. For purposes of the analysis, suppose that i f  captures the whole 
market Since there are economies of scale, the average costs of country s producers will 
be less than their costs when they supplied only its home market. Moreover, country H 
production costs will be lower than cost in country P. Thus, the union domestic price will 
be less than the pre-union price. Therefore, the CET rate will be lower than the pre-union 
levels and consumers in both countries will gain from the implementation of the integration 
scheme, hi country P, there will be a trade creation effect due to replacement of dearer 
domestic production by cheaper imports from country H. hi addition, there will be an 
increase in consumption of the good induced by the reduced price, hi country H there are 
also gains in consumers’ surplus due to reduced prices. In addition, quantity supplied by 
domestic producers increases.
Let us now assume that in the pre-union situation, there is production only in one 
country, say, country H. If country H captures the whole market, this will be a result from 
country P  imposing a tariff and not from trade liberalization, otherwise country H would 
not have needed a tariff to compete in the market of country P. Under this situation, the 
domestic price in country P  will rise. Since price increased in country P, then quantity 
demanded will be lower than the pre-union level. Thus, there is a loss in consumer surplus 
due to higher prices. In addition, there is trade diversion since country P  shifted from a 
cheaper source of the good to a more expensive one.
From the previous analysis, several problems arise. First, if in the pre-union 
situation the good whose production is subject to economies of scale is produced in both 
countries, then, after the union is implemented, it is expected that one firm will take over 
the whole market. However, it is not clear which country it will be. The final result will
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depends on ‘dynamic’ factors such as the nature of oligopolistic competition, the reaction 
functions of the firms, and other factors (Robson, 1984). In this regard, it is argued that 
trade liberalization will not necessarily produce optimal specialization and, instead, it may 
lead to “perverse specialization”. Perverse specialization occurs when the firms with the 
highest average costs curve takes over the whole market because of oligopolistic 
competition. Moreover, it is argued that in the presence of economies of scale, 
specialization may fail to occur because the price mechanism may fail to promote 
specialization if equilibrium is stable in the pre-union situation. Thus, trade liberalization 
through economic integration is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to secure the 
benefits that can be derived from free trade (Robson, 1984).
In summary, the theory of customs union within the traditional or orthodox 
approach warns about the benefits and losses countries may incur when entering a customs 
union. Overall benefits are represented by net trade creation and losses by net trade 
diversion. In addition, the formation of a customs union may lead to the presence of 
economies of scale, hi this case, orthodox theory has to be modified to deal with this 
situation. A closer analysis of the effects o f economies o f scale on the welfare of countries 
entering a customs union is then made under a oligopolistic market competition structure. 
The analysis showed that when economies of scale are present, there is a real possibility of 
no specialization or ‘pervasive specialization' which negatively affect the welfare of 
member countries. Finally, this analysis is very relevant for Central American countries 
since one of the stated objectives o f economic integration is to exploit economies of scale. 
Nonetheless, the previous analysis indicates that to reap any possible benefits, countries 
will have to negotiate and reach agreements about country specialization through planning 
and supplementation of market forces through regional policies and compromises.
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Does a Customs Union Lead to Free Trade?
Several questions arise when countries form trading blocs. One of the most 
important questions is whether or not a customs union is an adequate path toward free 
trade. Experiences around the world have shown that economic integration has been used 
as a means to develop regional trade and to attain a more solid position in international 
trade relations when is not possible to achieve that as individual countries. Moreover, 
depending on the stage of development of countries, the formation of a customs union may 
impact trade relationships differently. For example, the formation of the EEC and the 
subsequent implementation of the protectionist common agricultural policy (CAP) made 
the EEC become a net exporter of wheat. This change in the pattern of trade of wheat 
affected international prices and quantities of wheat traded.
On the other hand, the Central American Common Market (CACM) never had the 
opportunity of implementing protective policies to develop domestic agricultural and 
industrial sectors of member countries. Thus, after the creation of the CACM there was not 
significant change in the terms of trade and trade patterns with the rest of the world. 
However, regional trade increased considerably under the CACM. Thus, a customs union 
is a move toward free trade because barriers to trade among member countries are removed. 
At the same time, the formation of a customs union is a move away from free trade because 
restrictions on trade with the rest o f the world are solidified. The theory of the second best 
warns analysts regarding this issue. Although the elimination of tariffs may increase total 
world welfare, the implementation ofpiecemeal tariff reductions may lower overall world 
welfare (McMillan, 1986).
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flame Theory In International Trade
This section analyzes the importance of game theory in international trade theory 
and in analyzing real life situations in international trade negotiations. A basic description 
of the game theory analytical framework is then introduced.
Importance of Game Theory in International Trade Issues
According to McMillan(1986), game theory has an important place in international 
trade. Every time there is a situation in which an agent’s utility depends not only on his own 
actions but also on the actions of other agents and all agents take these interdependence into 
account, game theory is a powerful tool of analysis. Therefore, many important trade issues 
can be modeled within a game theoretic framework. These include negotiations over mutual 
tariff reductions, indebtedness of less developed countries such as Brazil and Mexico, the 
formation and preservation of customs unions, and others, hi all the examples mentioned, 
there is strategic interdependence; one agent’s action depends on other agent’s action and 
vice versa. So, when there is strategic behavior involved, game theory is an appropriate 
framework o f analysis.
Basic Concepts of Game Theory
According to Rasmusen (1996), the paradigm of game theory is that the analyst 
assigns payoff functions and strategy sets to players, and considers what happens when 
players select strategies to maximize their payoffs. Accordingly, the essential elements of 
a game are players, actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes, and equilibria. 
Players are the individuals who make the decisions. Each player’s goal is to maximize his 
utility by choice o f action. In international trade, individual countries or blocs of countries 
are the players. An action or move by player /, denoted is a choice the player can make.
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By the same token, player i ’s action set, denoted is the entire set of actions
available to him or her. In addition, an action profile is an ordered set, denoted a-{aj} V 
r=l,...,n, of one action for each of n players in the game. The information set is formed by 
the knowledge at a particular time of the values of different variables, i.e., it is the different 
values the player thinks possible. If the information set has many elements, there are many 
values the player cannot rule out; if there is one element, the player knows the value 
exactly. Player i ’s strategy s{ is a rule that tells the player which action to choose at each 
instant of the game, given the player’s information set Player i ’s strategy set or strategy 
space Sj={Sj} is the set of strategies available to the player. By the same token, a strategy 
profile s={sj} V r=l,...,n, is an ordered set consisting of one strategy for each of the n 
players in the game. The player i ’s payoff p^s,,...^,,) is defined as the utility or expected 
utility player i receives after all players have picked their strategies and the game has been 
played out The outcome of the game is the set of interesting elements that the analyst picks 
from the values of the actions, payoffs, and other variables after the game is played out. 
Finally, an equilibrium s*={s*„...,s*n} is a strategy profile consisting of a best strategy for 
each of the n players of the game.
From the previous definitions, it is clear that a game or more formally a game in 
strategic form consists of a set of agents, a set of strategies for each agent, and a utility 
function for each agent Because it is a game, each agent’s utility, vt, depends on every 
agents’ strategy, i.e., u ^ 'C a ,,...^  (McMillan, 1986).
Since strategic behavior may take various forms, games may also vary. Therefore, 
games can be cooperative or non-cooperative, played in pure or mixed strategies, hi 
addition, there could be zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. Also, games may be static or
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dynamic (McMillan, 1986). If an agent randomizes his choice of strategy, he is said to be 
using a mixed strategy. On the contrary, if the choice is made non-stochastically, the player 
is said to be using a pure strategy. A zero-sum game is a game of pure conflict: what one 
agent wins, some other agents must lose. So, the sum of all agents’ utilities is always zero. 
A non-zero-sum game has elements of both conflict and cooperation. For example, 
oligopolistic firms have a common interest in keeping total output low and market price 
high. However, it is in the interest of each firm to have a large market share.
It has been stated that different games have different types of equilibria (McMillan, 
1986). For example, it is argued that the equilibrium of a cooperative game is Pareto 
optimal (McMillan, 1986). By contrast, non-cooperative games lead to non-Pareto optima. 
In this case, the concept of dominant strategies and dominant strategy equilibria become 
important Thus, the strategy s’; is a dominant strategy if it is a player’s strictly best 
response to any strategies the other players might choose. This means that whatever 
strategies the other players pick, player / ’s payoff is highest with s’;. The players inferior 
strategies are termed dominated strategies. A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy 
profile consistent o f each player’s dominant strategy. This equilibrium is called a Nash 
equilibrium.
After having defined all the terms involved in the stipulation of games to be played, 
some formal definitions are in order. For this purpose, assume that the games are played 
by two players.
Definition 3.1: the normal-form representation of a two-player game specifies the
player’s action spaces A1 and A1 and their payofffunctions P1, P2. 
This game is denoted by CNfA1, A2, P1, P2}.
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Definition 3.2: In the normal-form game G={A‘, A2, P \ P^let A1; and A‘j, V i *j,
be feasible strategies for player 1, i.e., A1: and A1j are members of 
A1. Action Alj is strictly dominated hv A1, if, for all actions available 
to the other player, player / 's payoff from playing A’j is strictly less 
than the payoff from playing A1;, such that: P'(A‘j, A2;) < P ‘(A‘i, A2j) 
V A2 e A2.
If a unique solution to a two-player normal-form game non-cooperative game is to 
be found, it must be self-enforcing. Since there are no appropriate authorities to enforce 
international agreements, this is clearly the situation in any international trade negotiation. 
Thus, each player’s predicted action must be that player’s best response to the predicted 
action of the other player. This is the Nash equilibrium definition given earlier (Kennedy, 
1996).
Definition 3 J :  In the two-player normal-form game G={Al, A2, P1, P2}, the actions
(A1*, A2*) are a Nash equilibrium if, for players /and 2, A1* is player 
/ ’s best response to the actions specified for the other player, 2, and 
vice versa, such that: Pl(A‘\  A2*) * Pl(A‘, A2*) V A‘j e A1.
Derivation of the Political Preference Function fPPFl 
The political preference function (PPF) is the tool used in this research to estimate 
the payoffs of the countries analyzed given their chosen actions. So, the description of the 
PPF follows as a logical sequence in the development of the theoretical framework used 
in this research. The framework underlying this analysis is based on Johnson et al. (1993) 
and Kennedy et al. (1996). hi this model, countries produce, consume and trade N number 
of commodities. The aggregate level o f production, consumption, and trade in country i is 
provided by vectors of supply, demand, and excess demand. Farmers in country i produce 
a subset of theN traded commodities in order to maximize profit, given prices, technology, 
and endowments. Aggregate supply is given by (3.1)
7(P/ ,Z/ ),...rn(P/ ,Z/ ) (3.1)
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where Pp.(Pfi, ..JV ) is the vector o f the producer prices o f the N  traded commodities, and 
2)- is a  vector o f exogenous factors, such as prices of inputs and factor endowments. 
Demand for agricultural commodities is given by the vector of demand functions (3.2) 
X(PctZc) = {X liPc\Zc\ .. .X NiPciZey^ (3 2)
the corresponding indirect utility function is given by (3.3)
U(Pe;Ze) (3.3)
where P=(Pc» Pc2> P«a» •••> is the vector of consumer prices for the N commodities, and
Zc is a vector of exogenous variables. Trade in N commodities is summarized by excess 
demand (3.4)
E(Pf,Pc\Zf ,Zc) = X(Pc,Zc)-Y{Pf -Zf ). (3.4)
Governments intervene in the domestic markets through price instruments and 
demand/supply shift instruments. Price instruments, denoted b y ^ ,  for producers (/) and 
Apcn for consumers (c) of commodity N, affect the farm and consumer prices directly or 
indirectly. Let us assume that P^, is the world price of commodity N. Then the following 
domestic price functions are defined (3.5a)
P fn  =  P f n ( A ^  f n ,  P w n)> (3.5a)
and (3.5b)
Pcn  =  Pc n ( A P c n ,P w n ) ,  V/i = 1....JV. (3.5b)
If world prices are functions of the actions of the two governments, then (3.6) 
Pw = Pw(Apf i , A Pci,AIf i ,A Sci,Apf2 ,APc2,Asf 2,ASc2;Zl,Z2,Z3). (3.6)
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where A*fc and A '^ are shift instruments that shift supply and demand functions, such as 
input subsidies and acreage reduction programs.
When governments choose agricultural policies, they consider the effects of their 
policies on the welfare of various groups, such as producers, consumers, and taxpayers. 
Since agricultural policies, like any other policies, can make some groups better off at 
others expense, governments must weigh the welfare gains of one group against the welfare 
losses of others. These trade-offs are represented by apolitical payoff function (PPF) which 
is a weighted additive function of producer quasi-rents, indirect utilities of consumers, and 
the cost of agricultural policies of the two governments. Let -i represent other country, let 
Aj= (A,,, A ^  (Apb, A*fi, Apd, A’*), and suppress Z„ Z* Zj. Producers are aggregated by 
commodity group. The welfare of each producer group is the profit obtained from the 
production and sale of the commodity. Thus, assuming differentiability, the welfare 
associated with the production of the nth commodity is the line integral (3.7)
n  „(/>„)= ] p » r „ ( p )  d p , (3.7)
o
as commodity N is a net output or net input, respectively. Let (3.8a) 
m P f \ Z f ) = (Ili(fy -;2 /)» —» n iv (f /;2 y )) , (3.8a)
be the vector of quasi-rents as a function of the policies of the government, then substitute 
for Pf by using equation (3.5a) and (3.5b), suppressing Zf and substitute for Pw by using 
equation (3.6) to obtain (3.8b)
n  = n  (3.8b)
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By the same token, substituting the domestic price function into equation (3.3), we can 
obtain indirect utility (3.9)
U M M - i )  = Ut{Pcl{APct,PwiAiyA_/) \ A sci). ' (3.9)
In order to define the government budget in the N agricultural commodities, let t 
denote a transpose. Then, aggregate consumer expenditures are Pc X*, producers receive 
PfY*, and excess demand is purchased at world markets at prices Pw for P^*. Thus, using 
equations (3.1) and (3.2) and substituting for E with equation (3.4), the budget is (3.10a)
B ( . P f , P c ,P w ',Z )  =  (P c - P w ) * X l (P c ; Z c ) - ( P f  -  ? „ ) * ¥ * (3.10a)
After making the proper substitutions for Pc, Pw, and Z as before, the budget of 
government i becomes a function of both governments agricultural policies as in (3.10b)
B i ( A i , A - i ) = B i ( P J } ( A p / } , P w ) , P c i ( A p c i , P w ) , P w ( A s / i , A c i ) .  (3.10b)
Finally, normalizing on the budget and using equations (3.8a), (3.9) and (3.10a), the PPF 
is shown as (3.11)
^ ( 4 ,- / )  = rU A ^ y X j t  + U ^ A ^ y X ' t  + Bt(AiH) (3.11)
whereAjy is an N by one strictly positive vector and xcj is a positive scalar. The
are the political weights of the respective commodity groups and the aggregate consumer 
in country i.
Equation (3.10a) explicitly links the policies of two governments with their 
objectives. However, the way either government chooses its agricultural policies also must 
be determined. An equilibrium point can be constructed such that in formulation of the
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polices, a government chooses policies to maximize its PPF given the policies of the other, 
hi this case, a best response correspondence is defined for each government. Then, the 
equilibrium is defined using the best response correspondence. For a given Â -, government 
i chooses Aj*, which is a best response to A4, such that (3.12)
r M ' . A - , ) *  Vl(A,,A_,')VAl e A , .  (3.12)
where Aj is the set of actions or policies available to government i. Therefore, every Aj 
A.; has a set of actions in Aj that satisfy equation (3.12). This set defines the best response 
correspondence of A.f. A pair of actions (A,*, Aj*) is an equilibrium if A,* is a best 
response to A f  and vice versa. Thus, (A,*, Aj*) satisfies equation 3.12 for all /. Now 
consider the differentiable case of the model. In this case, differentiating equation (3.11) 




\ d  n , d U al 1 ’ d B , '
d  Afi d  Afi \fi dA fl 0
= * + = (3.13)
d V t * 1 1 , d V al 4 d B t 0
Yd  Va\
<*>i d  Aa . . dA« .
For a given A^, if V( is concave in Aj, then any Aj* that solves equation (3.13) 
maximizes V;, so it is a best response to Aa. Thus, equation (3.13) implicitly defines the 
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strictly concave in Aj for all values of A4. (A,*, A^*) is a Nash equilibrium (Johnson et al., 
1993) if  (3.14)
Suppose the governments of two countries or trading blocs negotiate to improve their 
positions relative to the one period equilibrium that they currently pursue. If both 
governments are rational, then no treaty will be signed or complied with that does not 
make both governments at least as well off as prior to the agreement Also, if governments 
can delay agreement, a necessary condition for a treaty to be signed and complied with 
would be existence of actions (A,', A2' ) such that (3.15)
V, (A,', A,1) * V ,(V , A2*) and V2 (A,', A,*) * V^A,*, A,*). (3.15)
The set of actions that satisfy equation 3.15 are called the treaty action space and the 
elements of this space treaty actions.
Estimation of PPF Weights
In order to estimate the PPF weights, it is assumed that the observed policies are 
a single period Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game (Kennedy, 1996). The 
countries of Central America included in this research choose their policies such that they 
maximize their PPF given the action of other. Given differentiable indirect profit and 
utility functions, inference of dn/dAj and dU/dAj can be calculated from observable 
demand and supply functions (Johnson et al., 1993). Let Aj, for f=1,...,5 be the instruments 
set by the five Central American countries in the base year. The weights ^  are estimated 
using approximations ofpartial differentials ofprofits of producers and utility of consumers 
with respect to producer and consumer protection instruments. The approximation of the 
differentials is obtained by taking small changes in As and A,* in the MISS model. 
Considering the discrete approximation of equation (3.13), the weights can be calculated
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by rearranging equation (3.13), such that (3.16)
Ll C J





A n , A  B , A  B (
i t
>





The weights calculated according to the above formula represent the political 
influence of various producer groups and consumers as an aggregate in the agricultural 
policy formulation of Central American countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR - SUPPLY AND DEMAND ELASTICITIES
The empirical model used in this study requires estimates of elasticities of demand 
and supply. Since these elasticities are not readily available, it is necessary to estimate them 
through modeling tools, hi this chapter, elasticities o f supply and demand for eight 
commodities included in this study are estimated. The theoretical as well as empirical 
considerations are included prior to elasticity estimation. The first section of this chapter 
includes the estimation of supply elasticities. The second section includes the estimation 
of demand elasticities. Finally, an evaluation of the validity of the estimates is developed 
as a conclusion for this chapter.
It is important to mention that the empirical estimation of economic relationships 
is often a very difficult task. Lack of reliable data, limited number of observations, and 
incomplete data sets have been mentioned as serious limitations in dealing with modeling 
production in developing countries (Fischer et al, 1980). Therefore, the researcher is 
compelled to exercise a high degree of creativity when the research is focused on 
developing countries. On one hand, the researcher should keep in mind that the basic 
economic relationships are the basis for any model to be acceptable. On the other hand, 




A supply curve is based on the assumption that producers seek to maximize net 
returns (Tomek and Robinson, 1990). This is obtained by equating marginal costs to 
marginal revenue. Since the individual firm is assumed to be a price taker in a competitive
115
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industry, the firm's marginal revenue is the prevailing market price. Marginal cost is 
defined as the increment in total cost associated with producing one more unit of output. 
For an individual firm, the supply curve consists of the portion of the marginal cost curve
Marginal Costs
'Average Costs
Figure 4.1 Marginal and Average Costs
above the average cost curve as shown in figure 4.1. Economic theory suggests that in the 
long run the individual firm will produce at point /  where average and marginal costs are 
equal, because at this point all costs are covered. At point 2 the firm would be making a 
profit given by the distance between the average cost curve and the marginal cost curve. 
The firm would prefer to produce at this point instead of at point 1 but free market 
conditions would move production to point 1.
At this point, it is important to mention the factors affecting production and supply 
of goods, hi general, two kinds of factors affect supply. A change in the price of a product 
will cause a change in the quantity supplied, such that quantity supplied and price move in
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the same direction. On the other hand,, there are several factors that cause the supply curve 
to shift Changes in inputs or factor prices, changes in the returns of commodities that 
compete for the same resources, changes in technology, institutional constraints, and 
changes in the level of price and yield risk faced by producers are among the most 
important factors that shift the supply curve.
The supply elasticity is usually used to evaluate the effects of the factors mentioned 
above on the supply of goods and services through price signaling. The supply elasticity 
is defined as the percentage change in the quantity supplied of a given commodity or 
service given a percentage change in the price of the commodity or service. The own price 
elasticity refers to changes in the price of the commodity or service. The cross price refers 
to changes in prices of commodities that compete or complement the commodity under 
scrutiny. In general, the elasticity of supply is given by 4.1:
 -  <4»y %APj d\o%(pj)
where e*/y is the elasticity of supply (s) of commodity qt with respect to price py. The
elasticities can also be obtained as the derivative (d) of the natural logarithm (log) of
quantity with respect to the logarithm of price. The own price supply elasticity is obtained
if i=j, cross-price supply elasticities are obtained otherwise, hi general, the own-price
elasticity of supply is expected to be positive. The cross-price elasticities are positive if
commodities are complements and negative if commodities are substitutes in production.
Empirical Estimation of Supply Elasticities
A considerable amount of creativity must be exercised to estimate supply
elasticities of the commodities under analysis in the present research. The empirical
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estimation must adhere to the theoretical framework. However, as often happens, because 
of data problems or problems of other sorts, the direct empirical estimation of the 
theoretical model is not possible. Therefore, other means must be resorted to if we are to 
overcome such limitations.
In this study, after a literature review, the basic empirical considerations to estimate 
the supply elasticities of commodities were taken and simplified from the Linked Basic 
Model (LBM) modeling framework. Fischer and Frohberg (1980) and Fischer et al (1988) 
proposed the LBM as a tool of international food policy analysis. The LBM model is a 
national level model that includes a supply module, a demand module, and an exchange 
module. Accordingly, in the supply module, production is a function of labor, fertilizer and 
capital as in 4.2:
Q = f { L , F , K )  (4.2)
where Q is the quantity produced, L is labor, and K is capital. There is a representative 
producer who must allocate these scarce resources among the production of the 
commodities produced. To do so, the producer is assumed to maximize expected net 
returns. The net expected returns maximization problem can be expressed as in equation
(4.3) where NR, is net expected returns, for v= 1 ton-1 net revenues correspond to crops
and, for r=n, net revenue corresponds to cattle production (beef), A, is acreage for crop i, 
M  is quantity produced ofbee£ H is number of cattle stock or number of sacrificed heads 
and L, K, F, are the maximum quantities of labor, capital, and fertilizer, respectively.
In an initial step (figure 4.2), labor, capital, and fertilizer requirements had to be 
established in order to generate a production function for each commodity under analysis.
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Step 2: 
Random Generation o f 
Time Series o f L,F,K.
Step 3: S tep3.a:
Expected Total Revenne(ETR) 
ETR=Expected Price x  Yield
Param eter Estimation
Step 4 ^ : 
Expected N et Return (NR) 
NR=ETR-EC
Figure 4.2 Estimation Procedure o f Central American Countries Supply
Elasticities Based on Fischer et al (1980).
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Max *1 NR *A  + NR„ * M
L,F,Ki.0i=l
Subject to:
A  -  fiLttFfyKf)
(4.3)
I L < L
i = i l
i f L < K
/=t
I E < F
/=i *
This was done by using data from several Nicaraguan sources. The assumption made is that 
all Central American countries are similar in technology and, therefore, the use of the same 
technological requirement for each crop for all countries is acceptable. Thus, Table 4.1 
shows the technological structure and input requirements for all Central American 
countries. Once input requirements were established for each commodity under several 
technologies, a random data generating process was used to create time series of weighted 
average requirements of inputs for IS years. The normal distribution was used for that 
purpose (appendix D). This procedure made it possible to relate output to inputs, i.e., 
estimation of the production function for each commodity in each country. Step 4 dealt with 
the estimation of the production functions parameters to be used (Appendix D). For this 
purpose, Cobb-Douglas production function were assumed and the parameters estimates 
for fertilizer (f), labor (I), and capital (K) were estimated using ordinary least squares 
estimation (OLS). The tests for autocorrelation showed small autocorrelation coefficient 
(less than 0.3) and, therefore, no further corrections were deemed necessary (Table A2-A7).

















Table 4.1. Input Prices and Input Requirements for Eight Commodities in Five Central American Countries
Input Prices Rice
C S G H N Techno. 1 2 3 4 5
Yield 20 28 35 70 55
7.15 2.97 4.0 1.9 1.3 Labor 54 28 34.5 19.0 18.0
12.0 15.0 12.0 14.0 6.0 Animal 0 5 5 0 0
35.0 40.0 30.0 40.0 25.0 Machine 0 0 0 8 6
12.92 14.0 10.9 9.26 11.2 Fertilizer 1 1 2 4 4
Beans Com
Techno. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Yield 12 20 25 — — 20 70 80 — —
Labor 50 39 45 — — 47 54 5 — —
Animal 0 5 0 — — 4 12 0 — —
Machine 0 0 4 — — 0 0 10 — —
Fertilizer 0 1 1 — — 0 3 5 — —
Sorghum Coffee
Yield 50 50 — — — 22 20 15 5 —




















Technolo 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Animal 5 0 — — — 0 0 0 0 —
Machine 0 7 — — — 0 0 0 0 —
Fertilizer 2 4 — — — 9.0 8.0 6 0 —
Bananas Sugar Cane
Yield 72.1 — — — — 55 45 — — —
Labor 54 — — — — 19 18 — — —
Animal 0 — — — — 30 19 — — —
Machine .3 — — — — 10 8 — — —
Fertilizer 8 — — — — 2 2 — — —
Source: FNI, 1993; INTA, 1995; INTA 1997; INTA 1999; BND, 1997; BND, 1998; ECLAC-Mexico, 1999.
Note: Countries: C=Costa Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H=Honduras, N=Nicaragua
Yield: Rice, Beans, Corn, Sorghum, Coffee: cwt/manzana (mz); lcwt=100 Lbl,lmz=0.7 Ha. Bananas, Sugar Cane: TM/mz. 
Input Requirement: Labor=person-days, Animal force=animal-days, machinery=hours, fertilizersw t.
Input Prices: Local average 1995-97 in US$/unit of measurement.
K>NJ
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On the other hand, hi steps 2.a-4.a, expected net returns were estimated on the basis of total 
expected returns and expected per acre costs as described in Appendices B, B l, and C. 
Expected net returns were obtained for each commodity in each country and then used to 
maximize expected net returns (Table A l). These expected returns were obtained on the 
assumption that the producer has naive expectations, i.e., the producer expects that the 
price prevailing at the moment of production decisions (planting decisions, breeding 
decisions, and so forth) and the price at the moment of the sale of the producer’s 
production output in the future will be the same. This generates a series of lagged prices. 
For perennial crops, such as coffee, or cattle production, this lag could be several years. For 
other commodities, the lag is usually one year.
In the next step (step 3) the minimum and maximum output of each commodity 
under analysis were obtained from data from the Economic Commission for Latin America 
of the United Nations Organization (ECLAC) (Appendix E). In step five, the model in 
equation 4.3 was optimized using nonlinear programming because the production function 
is assumed to have a flexible form, i.e., a nonlinear form. A non-linear estimation 
procedure to estimate equation (4.3), as described in Appendix G., was used to estimate 
quantity-price relations in supply of the commodities included in this study. Finally, in step 
6, estimates of the supply elasticities are obtained using a procedure recommended by 
Seeley (1985, 1986). Initially, an optimum solution for the maximization problem is 
estimated. Then, the price of each commodity is changed by 10% one at a time and the 
model is optimized. Finally, the percentage change in output o f all commodities given a 
10% change in the price of only one commodity gives an estimate of own-price and cross­
price elasticities of supply. The elasticities estimated in this fashion are to be considered
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long-run supply elasticities because they reflect the full change in price without taking into 
account time and other factors.
To obtain the short-run elasticities the following assumptions were used. First, it 
is reasonable to expect that elasticities are smaller in short-run than in the long-run. This 
is so because long-run supply is more elastic, i.e., the supply curve has a smaller slope than 
in the short-run. Secondly, the estimation of the long-run elasticities is based on the 
assumption of the representative farmer, i.e., a farmer who produces all commodities at the 
same time. However, in real life, climatic, equipment limitations, and other conditions 
cause producers to focus on the production of a small number of commodities. So, in real 
life, cross-price responsiveness should be smaller than under the assumption of a 
representative farmer. Third, profit maximization was the only criterion used in the non­
linear procedure. Therefore, it is expected that responsiveness of supply to prices will be 
more sensitive when a sole criterion is used to estimate elasticities. Therefore, it was 
assumed that the long-run elasticity estimates are upper bound estimates of the true 
elasticities. Four, a review of elasticity estimates by other authors (Dargay et al, 2000; Lass 
et al, 1996; etc) indicate that short run elasticities are 40-80% lower than long-run 
estimates, hi conclusion, based on the facts mentioned above, it was determined that for 
purposes of this study, it would be reasonable to assume that short run elasticities are one 
third of the estimates obtained in the non-linear procedure estimates.
Empirical Results of Supply Elasticities Estimation
Although, technologically speaking, Central American countries are assumed to be 
very similar, the responsiveness to changes in commodity prices is different for all 
countries as it is shown in Tables 42-4.6. It seems reasonable to expect perennial crops
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(coffee and bananas) to be less responsive to changes in prices than annual crops, hi 
addition, export commodities have kept a fairly stable production despite strong 
oscillations in world prices of those commodities (coffee, sugar, beef, and bananas), hi 
most countries, bananas and coffee were not responsive to prices, hi those cases, the 
elasticity estimates for other countries or from other sources were used. In general, the 
estimates of the elasticities are close to those of Gardiner(1989) and Tyers et al (1986).
Table 4.2. Guatemala Supply Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Beans** -0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Com 1.09 1.10 1.46 -0.30 0.00 1.09 -0.34 -0.03
Sorghum -0.21 -021 -0.54 0.51 1.19 -0.21 -1.76 0.99
Bananas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coffee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *0.40 0.00 0.00
Sugar 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00
Beef -0.96 -0.95 -1.18 -1.7+3 0.00 -0.96 -2.02 0.92
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America. 
**: Elasticities for Honduras
Table 4.3. El Salvador Supply Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20
Beans 0.00 0.45 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00
Com 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Sorghum -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.60 -0.00 0.05 -0.00
Coffee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *0.40 0.00 0.00
Sugar 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.23 -0.00
Beef** 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.14
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America. 
**: Elasticities for Costa Rica
Table 4.4. Honduras Supply Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice 0.75 -0.20 0.01 -0.35 -0.20 0.61 -0.30 0.49
Beans -0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Com -0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
Sorghum 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.75 -0.15 0.76
Bananas 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 *0.40 -1.11 -0.04 -0.85
Coffee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *0.40 0.00 0.00
Sugar 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 0.11 0.08 0.09
Beef 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.14 -0.04 0.94 -0.15 129
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
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Table 4.5. Nicaragua Supply Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice 0.47 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Beans 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Com 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.13 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Sorghum 0 .0 1 0.03 -0.41 1.32 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 1 0 .0 1
Bananas -0.05 -0 .0 2 0 .0 2 -1.27 0.40 -0.14 -0 .0 2 -0.03
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.49 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Sugar 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.30 0 .0 0
Beef 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .1 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.05
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
Table 4.6. Costa Rica Supply Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice 0.24 0 .0 0 -0 .1 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.03 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
Beans 0 .0 0 0.29 -0.13 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.05 0.03 0 .0 0
Com -0 .0 0 -0 .0 0 0.56 -0 .0 0 -0 .0 0 0.07 -0.05 -0 .0 0
Sorghum 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.57 0.30 0 .0 0 -0.19 0.15 0 .0 0
Bananas 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 2.70 0 .0 0 *0.40 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 *0.40 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Sugar 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.34 0 .0 0
Beef 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.18 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.06 -0.05 0.14
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
Demand Elasticities
Theoretical Considerations
Economic theory assumes that consumers purchase goods and services to maximize 
their utility (Varian, 1992). At the same time, consumers maximize utility subject to an 
income constraint Thus, the consumer’s problem can be depicted as a constrained 
optimization problem. Mathematically, the problem can be specified as in 4.4:
Max w(x) s .  t. p x  < m (4 .4 )
j* 0
where u(x) is utility u as a function of the vector of goods x, p is the vector of prices, and 
m is consumer income. Economic theory indicates that u(x) in 4.4 should meet a set of
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mathematical properties to be an adequate representation o f utility. First, the function 
shouldbe continuous. Second, the economic axiom of non-satiation, i.e., "more is preferred 
to less", indicates that u(x) should have a positive first derivative. Third, since the 
consumer’s objective is to maximize utility, then u(x) should have a non-positive second 
derivative to reach a maximum, i.e., the function should be concave or quasi-concave.
Demand equations should be obtained from the optimization problem in order to 
estimate demand elasticities. Accordingly, non-linear programming is commonly used as 
a tool to estimate optimal demand functions when the utility function is non-linear, which 
is commonly the case. The Lagrangian function is used and from the first order conditions 
the optimal demands (x*) as a function of prices and income are derived as in 4.5:
As in the supply side, there are two types of factors that affect the quantity 
demanded of a good. A change in the price of a good will cause the quantity demanded to 
move in the opposite direction of, i.e., an opposite movement along the demand curve as 
shown in figure 4.3. On the other hand, changes in population, income, and tastes and 
preferences have been mentioned to cause a shift in the demand curve.
As in the supply side, the elasticity of demand is mainly used to evaluate the impact 
ofvarious factors on the quantity demanded and the demand curve through price signaling. 
Therefore, it is important to estimate these elasticities for many economic questions and 
decisions. The elasticity of demand is defined similar to the elasticity of supply, i.e., it is 
the percentage change in quantity demanded given a percentage change in prices as in 4.6:
X, *= (4.5)
r f_ % A < ? l o g (qt) 
e‘J %kpj d logCPy) *
V i tj  = (4.6)
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Figure 4.3 Effect of Price Changes on Quantity
Demanded
where d stand for demand and the definition of the remaining variables is the same as in 
equation 4.1. As it is shown in Figure 4.2, the slope of the demand curve is negative, so 
it is expected that the own-price demand elasticity will be negative, i.e., when i=j. For 
cross-price elasticities the sign will be positive for complements and negative for 
substitutes.
Empirical Estimation of Demand Elasticities
Although many models have been proposed to estimate demand relationships, in 
this study elasticities of demand were estimated with the Linear Approximate (LA) of the 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The 
AIDS model assumes a flexible utility function and non-separability. These assumptions 
are convenient in this study because agricultural commodities and, specifically, food are 
sensitive to own- and cross-relationships of commodities. The demand functions in budget 
form according to the AIDS model are specified as in equation 4.7:
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wi = ai+ Z  Ts *loSP/ + Pi * ’V *»■/ = lj- ’n (4/7)
where w{ is the budget share of commodity i, logpj is the logarithm of price of commodity 
/ ,  E is total expenditures on the group of commodities under analysis, P i s a price index, 
and Oj, Yjj, and ft are parameters to be estimated. The use of the Stone’s index (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980) makes the model linear as defined in 4.8:
n
l o g P = £  w i *  l ° g  P u  (4 -8 )
/=l
Therefore, the model which uses Stone’s price index is called the Linear Approximate 
AIDS (LA/AIDS) model. Thus, equation 4.7 implies that the budget shares of various 
commodities are linearly related to the logarithm of the real total expenditure and relative 
prices. In addition, the general demand restrictions of adding-up, homogeneity, and 
symmetry are satisfied by the following parametric restrictions on the AIDS model:
n n it
Adding-up: £ a/ = 1> Z Yij = °> Z A = 0i=i f=i i=i
V’ « (4 -9)Homogeneity: 2a Yij -
7=1
Symmetry. Yij = Yji
To estimate the elasticities of demand for all commodities in all countries included 
in this study, some preliminary data estimation were needed. First, individual consumption 
of all commodities for all countries were obtained from the FAO Food Balance Sheet 
(FAO, 1993,1995). However, there was not a time series for all the years under analysis 
(1985-1998). Therefore, a random number generating process was used to create the data
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sets (Fischeret al, 1980) (Appendix H). Secondly, once the data for personal consumption 
were estimated, the expenditure share o f each commodity was calculated by multiplying 
personal consumption by price and dividing this product by the sum o f the expenditures 
on all commodities. Third, since the data set only included IS observations, some strong 
assumptions had to be made for the sake of the statistical properties of the model. For 
example, it was assumed that there were no price relationships between basic staples (rice, 
beans, com, and sorghum) and three of the four export commodities (bananas, sugar, 
coffee). This assumption could be imposed for two reasons. First, since Central American 
agriculture is divided into domestic and export sectors, it could be safely assumed that 
there is a small cross-price relationship between those two groups of commodities (Alonso, 
1994). Secondly, the elimination of unimportant parameters in the econometric equations 
increases the number of degrees of freedom which is a convenient condition to improve the 
statistical properties of the results of the estimated model (Judge et al, 1988). Finally, based 
on tables A7-A11, elasticities were estimated as (4.10):
( — N
2 !l
\  W f J
(4.10)
where 8 = 1  for i=j, and 8 = 0  otherwise.
Empirical Results of Demand Elasticities Estimation
The estimation of the statistical model proposed above yielded encouraging results 
despite the limitations mentioned earlier. For most countries and commodities, own-price 
elasticities were negative, as economic theory would suggest. It is true that during the 
estimation process the level of significance of the parameter estimates was low (not shown) 
and therefore the results should be interpreted as a rough approximation of the true 
elasticities. Tables 4.7.- 4.11. reveal that the elasticities estimates are in the range of
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elasticities estimates for other countries by various authors (Gardiner, 1989; Tyers et al., 
1986; Mahe et al, 1988). In addition, to assure compliance with economic theory, in cases 
when the parameter estimates were different from those expected (positive sign for own- 
price elasticities, absolute magnitude too large, and so forth), elasticity estimates were 
replaced by those estimated for other Central American countries which were deemed to 
be more reliable, accurate, and more appropriate for each country and commodity case.
Table 4.7. Guatemala Demand Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Baiaanas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice* -0.27 -1.59 -0.41 1.65 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .1 0
Beans -0 .2 0 -0.93 -0.34 025 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.23
Com 0 .1 0 0.07 -1.14 -0.16 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2
Sorghum 0.29 -0 .1 1 -0.06 -0.80 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.42
Bananas 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.28 0.15 -1.26 0 .0 0
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.06 -0.41 -0.45
Sugar** 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.31 -0.27 -1.08 0 .0 0
Beef 0.47 -2 .0 2 -1.16 1.63 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.08
*: Elasticities for Honduras. **: Elasticities for Costa Rica. 
Table 4.8: El Salvador Demand Elasticities______
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice* -027 -1.59 -0.41 1.65 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .1 0
Beans -0.26 -0.09 -0.73 -0.14 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Com 0 .1 0 -0.39 -0.63 0.08 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.09
Sorghum 0.47 -0.42 -0.59 -0.90 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.30
Bananas 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.14 0.15 -1.08 0 .0 0
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.28 -0.38 -0 .2 1
Sugar 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.32 -0.42 -0.07 0 .0 0
Beef 0.05 -0.28 -0.53 0.29 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.42
*: Elasticities for Honduras
Table 4.9. Honduras Demand Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice -027 -1.59 -0.41 1.65 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .1 0
Beans -0.61 -2 .6 6 -0.47 3.03 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.19
Com 0 2 1 0.63 -0.89 -0.98 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.15
Sorghum 029 -0 .1 1 -0.06 -0.80 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.42
Bananas 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.34 -0.09 -0 .8 6 0 .0 0
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.67 0.15 -0.34
Sugar** 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.31 -0.27 -1.08 0 .0 0
Beef* -0.57 -039 -0.37 0.08 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -2.52
*: Elasticities for Nicaragua. **: Elasticities for Costa Rica.
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Table 4.10. Nicaragua Demand Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice -0.31 -037 -0 .0 1 -0.05 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 1.35
Beans -0.09 -0 .0 2 -0.53 0.08 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .0 1
Com -0 .2 2 -0 .1 0 -0.48 0.06 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.33
Sorghum 0.29 -0 .1 1 -0.06 -0.80 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.42
Bananas* 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.34 -0.13 -0.73 0 .0 0
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.62 2.60 3.83
Sugar* 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.31 -0.27 -1.08 0 .0 0
Beef -0.57 -0.39 -0.37 0.08 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -2.52
"^Elasticities for Costa Rica
Table 4.11. Costa Rica Demand Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice* -037 -1.59 -0.41 1.65 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .1 0
Beans -0.49 -0.17 -0 .1 2 -0.23 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .0 2
Com -3.27 0.41 -0.45 0.19 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.85
Sorghum -1.59 -0.09 -0.15 -0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.55
Bananas 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.34 -0.13 -0.73 0 .0 0
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.48 -0.58 -0.07
Sugar 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.31 -037 -1.08 0 .0 0
Beef 0.05 -038 -0.53 0.29 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.42
*: Elasticities for El Salvador
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter focused on the estimation of supply and demand elasticities of eight 
commodities for five Central American countries. The commodities included are rice, 
beans, com, sorghum, bananas, coffee, sugar and beef. The countries are Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The first sec tio n  focused on the 
estimation of supply elasticities. For this purpose, a theoretical model of supply was 
developed and the empirical estimation was based on the model proposed by Fischeret al 
(1980,1988). Since the adaptation of the LBM to the present research generated a model 
that allowed for the full adjustment to changes in prices, the elasticities were interpreted 
as long-run elasticities. An adjustment mechanism based on the strength and limitations 
of the model was used to obtain short-run elasticities. The resulting short-run elasticities 
are in agreement with estimates from other authors.
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Having estimated supply elasticities, the second section focused on the estimation of 
demand elasticities. For this purpose, a theoretical model o f demand was developed. Later, 
the linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand Model OLA/AIDS) was used as the 
empirical model to estimate the demand elasticities of the commodities under analysis. The 
estimation had to be done taking into account data limitations, statistical properties of the 
model, and economic theory. The results showed that the parameter estimates were in the 
range of estimates obtained by various authors.
Finally, it is important to mention that there have been few attempts to estimate 
supply and demand elasticities for Central America. The results showed that it is difficult 
to estimate these elasticities (Gabriele, 1994). So, this chapter is one of many attempts by 
serious researchers to deal with the difficulties of empirical work. The supply and demand 
elasticity estimates should be interpreted as an attempt to obtain approximations of rough 
quantity-price relationships in Central American countries. The resulting elasticities should 
be used with caution.
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CHAPTER FIVE-GAM ES SIMULATION RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the simulated games of various levels of 
agricultural trade liberalization in Central America. The first section includes a concise 
description of the MISS model. The second section gives the justification for the use of the 
nominal protection coefficient (NPC) as the main criterion to model trade liberalization in 
Central America. The third section deals with the data used. The fourth section describes 
the empirical results of several game simulations based on a set of government actions from 
each country perspective. Finally, the last section concludes the chapter with a summary 
and discussion of the results.
Description of the MISS Model 
hi order to examine the effects of agricultural trade liberalization for Central American 
countries and various trade policy strategies, the previously developed PPF theoretic 
framework will be used. Analysis of the effects of various scenarios is implemented using 
Modele International Simplifie de Simulation (MISS) (Mahe et al, 1988). MISS is a partial 
equilibrium trade model that simulates, in a comparative static framework, the effects of 
various policy decisions. The model operates on the principle of Walrasian equilibrium. 
The model takes a change of policy by a country and identifies the corresponding changes 
in world prices, production, and consumption.
The description of the model is as follows. Quantity supplied will equal quantity 
demanded plus initial stocks in the world markets. The initial equilibrium is given by (5.1)
Sik = A * Qik C51)
for all r= l, N, where i represents commodity and, k represents the country. Slkr Dtb Qik
represent production, derived demand, and total demand, respectively, for commodity i
134
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
in country k for the base year, Im represents initial stock of commodity i in country k. 
Change in supply is given by (5.2)
= £ • PJk +• Efj% • Pfi ) + 0^, (5.2)
for all i=l,...N, where E'IJk> (£” yt) represent the matrix of supply elasticities with respect 
to output (input) prices, FJk and P°jk represent the domestic price for production and 
derived demand i in country k, and<x* represents a quantity shifter for production.
Change in derived demand is given by (5.3)
(5.3)
while change in final demand is given by (5.4)
= <5-4>
for all r=l, ...N, where Gyk represents the matrix of final demand elasticities with respect 
to consumer prices, P® * represents the domestic price for final demand for commodity i in 
country k, represents a quantity shifter for final demand for commodity i in country k.
The domestic /world price linkage is shown by the equation (5.5)
or in logarithmic terms Wk is fixed so it disappears as in (5.6)
PjJ1 = In f*  + taC, + Inf£; V N = (S ,D ,Q ), (5.6)
where PWj represents world price of commodity i, Ck represents the currency exchange rate, 
and Wk are the margin coefficients representing transportation costs, freight, insurance, or
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other costs. The final equilibrium of the model, using previous equations is given by (5.7)
where P8^ represents the border price of commodity / in country k. The system in equation 
(5.2)-(5.7) can be viewed as an Ndimensional vector valued function of M  variables (5.8a):
when//independent relations are available, (M-N) arbitrary exogenous policy variables can 
be specified. There is no a priori rigidity that the price should be exogenous and taxes (or 
quantities) endogenous, hi addition, domestic prices, demand, and supply changes are 
derived endogenous variables as implied in the system in equations (5.2H5.7). Therefore, 
World prices are the only primary endogenous variables and the system reduces to (5.8b):
where I  is the number of commodities in country n. Equation (5.8b) indicates that world 
prices are mainly a function of the rates protection t. This outcome leads to a more efficient 
and faster solution of the system.
Solution Algorithm: The Tatonnement Process
The MISS model makes use of the tatonnement process to attain a solution for the 
system in equations (52)-{5.7). Therefore, it is worthwhile to describe how this algorithm
= I * Z V A D tt + I * a * - A 0 ; V i  =  l ,  ...N . (5.7)
Net budget costs for country k are shown as in (5.8)
b c , = l  (%  - p ’ y  s* - 1  ,(/>*)a ,  - 1  , ( / *  ■- p ‘ y  a ,  (5.8)
F y 0,  n=  1 N ; M i N
O rF N ( x x. . .xN |x Af+1. . .x A/) = 0
(5.8a)
(5.8b)
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works. Walras stated that a collection of interrelated markets can achieve a perfect balance 
of supply and demand (Cheng et al, 1995). The idea is that such equilibria could be realized 
through a price-adjustment process called "tatonnement", "groping", or "tentative 
proceedings" (Cheng et al, 1995). In this process, agents respond to price signals for the 
individual goods. The agents' interactions are thought to be coordinated by a central 
"auctioneer", who adjusts the general price levels toward a general balance, announcing 
interim prices to elicit responses from the agents. Competitive agents receive a price signal, 
and report their excess-demand at these prices to the central auctioneer. The auctioneer then 
adjusts the prices incrementally in proportion to the magnitude of excess demand, and 
announces the new incrementally adjusted price level. In each round, agents recalculate 
their excess demands upon receiving the newly adjusted prices signal, and report these to 
the central auctioneer. No trade is allowed until the equilibrium vector is found (Silberberg, 
1990). The process continues until the prices finally converge to an equilibrium and a price 
p* would be located (Cheng et al, 1995). The tatonnement process can be given in 
mathematical terms (Silberberg, 1990). Let excess demand be (5.9):
E(p) = D(p,M )-S(p) (5.9)
where E(p) is excess demand, D(p,M) is the quantity demanded as a function of price p and
income M, and S(p) is quantity supplied as function of its own price p. Now suppose that
the rate of change of prices move directly with excess demand (5.10)
/> -  | r  = gO X p, M ) -  S(p))  = g(E(p) )  (5.10)
where t is time, g  is the derivative of price with respect to time. Assuming that the
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tatonnement process is successful, at least in prices in the neighborhood of pe, the 
mechanism in (S. 10) generates a path of prices which will approach p* as t increases (5.11)
K m p ( t )  = p e (5.11)
relation in (5.11) is called stability. Ifp* is unique, the system is called globally stable. If 
there is more than one equilibrium price vector, the system is called system stable. A model 
is locally stable if (5.11) holds for all pricesp in some neighborhood oipe. At prices "close" 
to pe, the function g(E(p*)) can be represented by a Taylor series expansion. Neglecting 
terms of order 2 and above, (5.10) becomes (5.12)
g ( £ ( p ') ) +  g ' E ' ( p ' ) ( p -  p * )+ ... (512)
Since E(pe)=Q by definition of E(p), the adjustment mechanism becomes the differential 
equation (5.13):
^ = ( g ’£ ’) ( p - p ‘ ) (5*15)
The solution of this differential equation is giving by (5.14)
p{t)  = p* + (j>° -  p ' )e'g'Ey (5.14)
where the initial price p° is the arbitrary constant of integration, presumably the old 
equilibrium price. The assertion of stability requires that the exponential term approach 
zero as t -*«». This will occur if the exponent g ’E ’< 0. Since g ' > 0. Therefore, asserting 
Walrasian local stability is the assertion that (5.15) holds in some neighborhood of pe:
£ •=  Dp(p,M )-Sp(p) < 0  (5.15)
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Solution Procedure in MISS
MISS follows directly the description given earlier of the "tatonnement” process in 
order to reach an equilibrium solution. Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of the iteration 
procedure used by MISS to reach a solution. Initially, an initial equilibrium is given, i.e., 
a base equilibrium is specified in which quantities supplied and demanded are provided as 
well as world prices, transportation margin coefficients, initial protection levels, world 
stocks, supply and demand elasticities, and exchange rates. Then policies changes are 
specified. Changes in the level of protection are the only policies used in the present study 
(changes is protection rates). MISS estimates changes in quantities supplied and demanded 
of all commodities and in all countries upon the changes in the rates in protection using the 
"tatonnement" algorithm explained earlier. Thus, a new equilibrium vector of prices, 
quantities demanded and supplied, trade balances, and protection levels are obtained. In 
addition, MISS allows for the estimation of a large number of indicators such as budget 
costs of policies, changes in consumer and producer surplus, the values of the PPF function 
used as actions’ payoffs in the present study, changes in terms of trade, and others.
The Nominal Protection Coefficient fNPCl and Trade Liberalization
This research uses the NPC to analyze trade liberalization. A logical question is: 
Why use the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) to analyze trade liberalization instead 
o f another criteria? The use of the NPC in this research is based on the following reasoning. 
First, the NPC shows the relationship between domestic producer price and border price 
and this is a very concise way to see how distorting trade policies are in a country. The 
NPC is defined as in (5.10)















Figure 5.1. Iterations Structure for MISS Resolution 
Source: Mahe et al, 1988
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NPC, = | r  (5.10)
where NPCt is the nominal protection coefficient of commodity /, Pdi is the domestic price 
received by producers of commodity i, and P6, is the border price of commodity i. For an 
import commodity, the border price is the price at the border or port of departure plus the 
cost of freight and insurance, i.e., the CIF price in the importing country. For an export 
commodity the border price is the price on the domestic border or port of shipment or the 
FOB price (free on board), i.e, the O F price in the country of destination minus the cost of 
freight and insurance. Secondly, most policies directed to affect specific industries have to 
deal with mechanisms to change price relationships. For example, the government may 
have in effect target prices, procurement prices, loan rates, etc. Third, although the NPC 
may not show all the price distorting policies implemented in a given country, it usually 
shows at least the most important effect of such policies.
The practical meaning of the use of the NPC as the criterion to model trade 
liberalization is intuitive. For example, for a dis-protected sector (or taxed sector) a 
movement toward an NPC equal to one will indicate that not only taxes are reduced or 
eliminated but also that some policies are directed to improve production conditions in that 
sector. Those policies mayincludetransferoftechnology, reduction or elimination oftaxes, 
improvement in infrastructure (Roads, storage capacity, etc.) which would lead to lower 
transportation and other costs, policies directed to lower the cost of capital (interest rate, 
finance charges, etc.). The case of staple foods may illustrate how these changes may work. 
Central American countries are net importers of beans and rice, two main staples. On one
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hand, the lack of attention to these sectors from the respective or relevant institutions 
(Ministry of Agriculture, the Institute of Agricultural Technology, etc) has led these sectors 
to the use of inefficient production technologies. Therefore, these sectors have not been 
able to compete with foreign producers and their market share has been reduced. On the 
other hand, as economic theory would suggest, when sectors are taxed, smaller quantities 
are produced than without taxes (Krugman, 1998).
By contrast, for a “protected” sector, i.e., a commodity with an NPC larger than one, 
an NPC movement toward one should indicate that any price support policy is eliminated. 
However, in developing countries, for import commodities such as basic staples, and NPC 
movement towards one may imply the need for a movement along the average cost curve 
and a downward shift of the average cost curve as well. This movement and shift of the 
average cost curve implies an increase in the supply of staples at a lower per unit 
production cost until the point, assuming perfect competition in the international market, 
where average costs equal border price. This shift and movement along the average costs 
curve may be conditioned by the implementation of policies directed to technological 
change and to lower the costs of inputs and capital.
Data
The MISS model requires a considerable amount of data to estimate the PPF payoffs 
of various government actions. Initially, a base year was chosen. The base year chosen is 
the last year before any integration agreement is enforced. In our case, 1990 is the base 
year. Then, data on quantity demanded and supplied, domestic and international prices, and 
quantities o f imports and exports were obtained from the most reliable sources. These 
sources included the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the
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Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations (ECLAC-Mexico), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Transportation costs between 
countries were estimated accordingly as the difference between the value of exports 
declared in one country and the value of imports reported by the country of destination 
(IMF, 1998). Table S.l. shows the transportation margin coefficient between Central 
American countries. In general, Central American countries are considered to have very 
high transportation costs (Caceres, 1994) and this situation may influence the outcome of 
integration agreements. For example, the average transportation cost for Honduras is 42% 
of the value of exports whereas for Guatemala it is 5%. A transportation cost higher than 
10% is considered high (IMF, 1999)
Besides the data requirement mentioned above, the MISS model also requires 
estimates of the elasticities o f supply and demand for the eight commodities analyzed in 
this study. The literature review revealed that there were no estimates of these elasticities 
in other studies. Therefore, the required elasticities were estimated as described in Chapter 
four Protection levels were estimated as defined in the MISS model. Initially, the border 
Table S.l. Transportation Margin Coefficients of Five Central American Countries,
weights of the Value of Exports, 1990.
FromNTo Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Averag
e
Costa Rica 0.03 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.14
El Salvador 0.04 ------- 0 .2 1 0 .1 0 0.14 0 .1 2
Guatemala 0 .1 0 0 .0 1 ------- 0 .0 1 0 .1 0 0.05
Honduras 0 .6 6 038 0 .1 0 ------- 0.54 0.42
Nicaragua 0.25 0.07 0.39 0.18 ------- 0 .2 2
prices of the commodities were estimated and the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) was 
used to represent the level of price protection in each country for each commodity included
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in the analysis. The coefficients shown in Table 5.2 indicate that export products are less 
protected than commodities for domestic consumption. It is important to mention that in 
developing countries agricultural production is taxed and therefore there are not “protected 
commodities.” The nominal protection coefficients (NPC) shown in Table 5.2 indicate 
that imported commodities (com, rice, beans, sorghum) have a higher local price than 
world price but this is because importers have to pay for the high costs of transportation, 
import duties, and taxes. So, in the base period (1990) agricultural producers did not 
receive any support as is seen in many developed countries.
Table5.2. AverageNominal Protection Coefficients (NPC) For Five Central American 
___________ Countries, 1990-92.__________________________________________
Commodity Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Rice 1.05 0.67 1.09 0.59 0.64
Beans 1 .2 0 0.95 0.97 1.29 0.64
Com 1.71 2.05 1.77 1.05 1.09
Sorghum 1.04 1.63 1.37 2.09 1.81
Bananas 0.58 1 .0 0 0.43 1.42 0.57
Coffee 0 .6 6 0.71 0.70 0.97 1.19
Sugar 1.25 1 .2 0 0 .8 6 0.49 0.90
Beef 1.18 0.93 0.60 1.50 1 .2 0
Empirical Results of Game Simulations
This section consists of four games. Every game shows the dominant strategy and 
the Nash equilibrium from each country's perspective given a set of various governmental 
policy actions. Initially, each game includes a set of protection reductions: no reduction or 
status quo (SQ); 25% reduction in protection or dis-protection (25); 50% reduction in 
protection or dis-protection (50); 75% reduction in protection or dis-protection (75); and
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1 0 0 % reduction in protection or dis-protection which implies a free trade situation OFT).
The games were designed based on the following conditions. Based on the 
importance of each commodity group to the government, games are simulated using PPF 
weights equal to and different from one. In addition, since variations in the exchange rate 
may affect equilibrium outcomes, scenarios with PPF weights equal and different from one 
are simulated with a 5% depreciation of the exchange rate.
The exchange rate is an important tool in international trade. Schuh (1974) analyzed 
the role of the exchange rate on trade and the development of U.S. agriculture. He argued 
that an overvalued US dollar tended to depress the price of agricultural output domestically 
during the mid-seventies because it became more expensive for foreign countries to buy US 
agricultural commodities. Schuh (1974) argued that the exchange rate had a significant 
impact on the increase of agricultural prices during the mid-seventies. De Franco (1996) 
notes that the exchange rate should be managed appropriately without overvaluation or 
undervaluation to make agricultural production more competitive in the international 
market. De Franco observed that an overvalued real exchange rate tends to increase costs 
of production, in turn reducing the ability of commodities to compete in international 
markets.
The games are set as follows. Game one analyzes agricultural trade liberalization 
with PPF weights equal to one. Game two includes the results when PPF weights are 
different from one. Game three analyzes the effects of an exchange rate depreciation with 
PPF weights equal to one. Finally, game four analyzes the effects of an exchange rate 
depreciation with PPF weights different from one. In all games, the payoffs are given in 
millions of US dollars. A positive magnitude indicates a gain for the player and a negative
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magnitude indicates losses. The first number in the cell indicates the payoff of the country 
(row player) and the second number indicates the payoff of the rest of Central American 
countries (column player).
Game One: Simulations with PPF Weights equal to one
In game one, the commodity groups are assumed to have the same importance for 
the government, i.e., their weights in the PPF are identical, or in this case, equal to one. The 
results in Tables 5.3-5.7 includes the outcome of the game from the perspective of each 
country. The results, as indicated by the Nash equilibrium show that all countries with the 
exception of Guatemala will choose free trade when the rest of Central American countries 
choose 50% reduction in protection. The Nash equilibrium solution is shown in the 
darkened cells of the results tables. The results indicate that all countries have the incentive 
towards trade liberalization and that any country will choose free trade given that the rest 
of the other countries choose 50% reduction in protection. This outcome is in agreement 
with the fact that Central American countries have taken several steps toward trade 
agreements at this very moment.
Table 5.3. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, Costa Rica Versus Rest of Central 
America __________________
Rest of Central America
C Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
o
s SQ 0 ; 0 -16; 157 -34; 262 -51;-135 -61; -41
t
a 25 29; - 6 13; 150 -5 ; 255 -23; 141 -34; -47
R
50 48;-11 31; 144 13; 248 -5 ; -147 -16; -53
i 75 57; -16 41;138 22; 241 4;-152 -6 ; -59
c
a FT 58; -20 42; 133 ■ ■ 5;-157 -5;-64
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Table S.4. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, El Salvador Versus Rest of Central
America.




Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT





25 1 0 ; - 2 4 ; 159 -2; 257 -8 ; -137 -9;-72
50 19;-4 12; 223 6 ; 254 0 ; -147 -1; -75
a
d 75 26;-6 19; 155 13 ; 252 -6 ; -142 6 ;-77
0
r FT -9 ; - 8 24; 153 12; 144 11; -79
Table 5.5. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights equal to one, Guatemala Versus Rest of Central 
America.
Rest of Central America
G Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
u
a SQ 0 ; 0 -4; 157 -8 ; 266 -10;-134 -15; -40
t 25 153;-6 147; 150 142; 255 132;-141 131;-47
e
m 50 288;-11 281; 144 b b i 152; -146 261;-53
a
1 75 -83; -15 -89; 138 -94; 241 -98; -152 -140; -59
a FT -332; -20 -39; 133 -45; 236 -48; -156 -59; -64
Table 5.6. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights equal to one, Honduras Versus Rest of Central 
America. _______
Rest of Central America
H Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
n SQ 0 ; 0 -14; 168 -40; 278 -60; -89 -6 6 ; -30
d 25 18;-2 -2 ; 159 -23; 275 -44;-91 -49;-31
u
r 50 29;-5 9 ; 162 -12; 254 -33; -93 -39; -34
a
5 75 17;-2 -2; 164 -23; 275 -45; -14 -50; -32
FT 40; -10 -20; 164 HlBi -24; 103 -30; -79
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Table 5.7. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, Nicaragua Versus Rest of Central
America.
P  Rest of Central America
N Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
i
c SQ 0 ; 0 -2 ; 162 -4 ; 262 -6 ; -143
CNoo1• *
a 25 3 ; - l 1 ; 161 - 1 ; 261 -3; 144 -4;-82
r
a 50 4 ; - 1 2 ; 162 - 1 ; 260 -3;-144 -3; -82
S
u 75 2 ;- l 0 ; 161 -2 ; 261 -4;-144 -4;-83
a FT 2 1 ; 0 8 ; 172 15; -145 14;-83
Game Two: Simulation with PPF Weights not Equal to One
Game two makes the realistic assumption that the government assigns different 
degrees of importance to various agricultural commodity groups. Although the MISS model 
allows for the estimation of PPF weights as explained earlier, the weights used in this 
research were estimated in a different way. This is because the weights that can be 
estimated by the MISS model may not reflect the reality of the relationships between 
governments and various economic sectors and groups. In addition, there is an accepted 
view that because of political instability of developing countries, PPF weights estimated 
with the MISS program may also be wrong because the MISS model assumes political 
stability (Johnson, 1993).
For this reason, a procedure following the reasoning for collective action (Olson, 
196S) is developed to estimate such weights. Initially, a subjective set of criteria were 
chosen to measure the possible importance of each commodity group in the view of the 
government The criteria were chosen based on various factors of political relevance in 
Central America. Commodity groups were ranked based on four criteria. First, it is
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reasonable to expect that government will devote more attention to commodity groups with 
the highest generation of tax revenue. Secondly, the level of organization within a 
commodity group is a determinant factor to achieve a group goal (Olson, 1965). So, 
commodity groups are also ranked by level of organization.
Third, hard currency earnings are important for developing countries. Hard currency 
is important because developing countries rely greatly on imports to satisfy country needs 
in many goods. Developing countries, such as the Central American countries, have to 
purchase their imports not in local currency but in foreign currency, usually in United States 
dollars (De Alonso, 1994). Thus, for Central American countries hard currency earnings 
are crucial. It is reasonable to expect that governments will place more importance on 
commodity groups from which a higher percentage of the revenue generated is in hard 
currency than to commodity groups generating revenue mostly in local currency.
Since developing countries rely greatly on hard currency, it is reasonable to expect 
that governments will likely be influenced by commodity groups which actually generate 
hard currency earnings or have the potential for hard currency generation. So, from the 
government stand point, a commodity group with a potential of generating exchange rate 
earnings will be more important than other commodity groups which generate revenue in 
local currency. This can be the case even if the amount of revenue generated in local 
currency by the domestic market commodity group is higher than the amount generated by 
the export oriented commodity group. The justification for this behavior is the instability 
of the local currency and its tendency toward devaluations and inflation against a stable 
hard currency.
After the basis for ranking commodity groups has been established, the numerical 
rank of the groups was designed. Since the ranking of the groups is based on observation,
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the ranking is subject to bias. However, a careful design is used in order to reduce or avoid 
bias in the ranking procedure. First, in game one it was shown that if a commodity group 
has a PPF weight of one, it means that the government gives the same importance to the 
commodity group in question as to itself. On the contrary, a PPF greater than one means 
that the government values a commodity group higher than itself. The opposite applies to 
PPF weights lower than one. hi addition, the commodity group with the highest PPF weight 
is considered more important relative to the government but also relative to other 
commodity and consumer groups.
A consistent procedure was designed to increase or decrease a commodity group’s 
importance relative to the government In order to reduce bias, a normalized PPF weight 
of one is assigned to the government Table 5.8 shows the criteria for ranking, they are 
revenue generation, organization level, and the share of exports in revenue generated by 
each commodity. There is one more criterion, whether the sector is mainly oriented to 
exports (0.10) or to domestic consumption (-0.05). As Table 5.8 shows, government 
revenue generation is the most important criterion since it may add up to 0.4 to the 
importance of a given commodity group. Next is the level o f organization. Organization 
level is important because the more united a group is, the more effective in reaching its 
goals it is. Third is the share of revenue generated in hard currency. This criterion is 
important but it is less important than the total amount of revenue generated and the level 
of organization.
The sign of die values assigned to the criteria has an important meaning. First, all 
the values for revenue generation are positive but they can be negative for the other criteria, 
hi practice, this means that the government will not penalize any sector that generates 
revenue. By contrast, if  a sector has a low organizational level or has a small share of hard
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currency in the revenue generated, then the government may decrease the sector importance 
relative to the government by weighting the sector lower than itself.
Table 5.8. Ranking Criteria for PPF Weight Estimation for Central American
Countries
Government Revenue 




Share of Government 
Revenue Generated by 
Exports
Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value
Very High 0.33-0.40 Monopoly/sony 0.25 *75% 0.15
High 0.25-0.32 Strong Union 0.15 51-74% 0 .1 0
Moderate 0.17-0.24 Moderate 0 .0 25-50% 0 .0
Low 0.09-0.16 Weak -0.05 15-24% -0.05
Very Low 0.0-0.08 No Organization -0 .1 0 sl4% -0 . 1 0
After a careful implementation of the ranking procedure explained earlier, Table 5.9 
summarizes the resulting PPF weights by commodity and country. As it seems reasonable 
to expect, export commodities obtained the highest PPF weights for most countries. This 
is in agreement with the historical importance of export commodities in Central American 
countries (De Alonso, 1994). The weight used for consumers is the average value of the 
PPF weights for all commodity groups. Although consumers are poorly organized in 
Central American countries, a rough idea of their importance to the government may be 
drawn from the average value of the PPF for each country. This is so, because it is 
important to remember that producers are also consumers and by the way producers are 
treated an idea can be obtained about how important consumers are for the government 
This is achieved by pooling all producers together and seeing them as consumers. In 
addition, consumers are also taxpayers and vote to elect government officials. Therefore,
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although consumers are not organized in interest groups, their voice is heard at in election 
time and thus consumers become important for the government and their weight might be 
higher than that of the government itself as Table 5.9. shows.
Commodity Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Rice 0.91 1.09 0.91 0.82 1.03
Beans 0.81 0.93 0.75 0.84 0.77
Com 0.89 1.40 1 .0 1 0.99 1.50
Sorghum 0.75 0.85 0.80 0.84 0.85
Bananas 1.63 0.95 1.33 1.85 1.36
Coffee 1.70 1.63 1.80 1.55 1.43
Sugar 1.43 1.48 1.54 1.38 1.52
Beef 1.19 1.06 1.06 1.25 1.24
Consumers 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.19 1 .2 1
After the estimation of the PPF weights, the MISS model was used to obtain the 
payoffs for the set of government actions specified earlier. The results included in Table 
5.10-5.14 indicate that little changes occur from game one. The new equilibrium for 
Honduras is the only considerable change in game two with respect to game one. With PPF 
weights different from one, the new equilibrium for Honduras is status quo/50% (SQ/50) 
instead of free trade/50% (FT/50) of game one. hi general, the outcome of game two 
indicates that, from each country perspective, the political influence of commodity groups 
does not appear to be an obstacle to trade liberalization in Central America. This is an 
important result as it indicates the benefits for Central American countries to open trade 
among them even if government is under the pressure from producers of various 
commodity groups.
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Table 5.10. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One Costa Rica Versus Rest of
Central America
Rest of Central America
C Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
s SQ 0 ; 0 -2 2 ; 118 -47; 188 -71; -167 -84; -223
t
a 25 103; - 1 0 79; 107 32; 176 26;-178 12;-235
R
50 2 0 0 ; -18 174; 98 145; 165 117 ;-187 102 ;-245
i 75 291; -26 264 ; 89 234; 155 205;-196 188;-254
c
a FT 377; -33 349; 80
| _ _ 0 .
BBiBII 287; -204 270;-263
Table 5.11. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, El Salvador Versus Rest of 
Central America




Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT





25 17;-3 8 ; 179 -2; 299 -10; 17 -12;-13
50 3 5 ; - 6 24; 175 14; 296 5 ; 13 4;-18
a
d 75 51;-8 40; 172 30; 292 -1 ;43 18; - 2 2
0
r FT 5;-11 55; 166 msBSSBBm 34; 5 33; -25
Table 5.12. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, Guatemala Versus Rest of 
Central America _________
Rest of Central America
G Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
u
a SQ 0 ; 0 -5 ; 118 -1 0 ; 188 -12; 167 -19; -224
t 25 195; -10 188; 107 181; 176 170 ;-178 168 ;-235
e
m 50 391; -18 381; 98
u m k m m
BfflW W W 249 ;-187 355; -25
a
I 75 7;-26 -2 ; 89 -9; 155 -15; -196 -76; -254
a FT -182;-335 1 0 2 ; 80 92; 146 88;-204 73;-263
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Table 5.13. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, Honduras Versus Rest of Central
America
Rest of Central America
H Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
n SQ 0 ; 0 -34; 275
IHfliMH— Em -112; 195 -124; 391
d 25 -51; -3 -85; 272 -123; 495 -163; 192 -174; 389
u
r 50 -108; - 2 -143; 268 -181; 492 -222; 190 -234;385
a
s 75 -51; -3 -85; 272 -123; 495 -164; 206 -176; 388
FT 242;-12 -278; 261 -317; 483 -358; 183 -371; 378
Table 5.14. Political Payoff Function Values For Alternative Levels o f Reduction in 
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, Nicaragua Versus Rest of 
Central America
Rest of Central America
N Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
l
c SQ 0 ; 0 -3 ; 190 -1; 320 -9 ; 26 - 1 0 ; 6
a 25 1; -0.5 -335; 189 -6 ; 319 -9 ; 26 - 1 1 ; 6
r
a 50 -3 ; - l -1 ; 360 -9 ; 320 -12; 25 -13; 9
g
u 75 -8 ; - l -11; 189 -14; 682 -17; 25 -18; 5
a FT 1 2 ; -1 -7 ; 206 nUNi 3 ; 25 269; 5
Game Three: Simulation with PPF Weights Equal to One and a 5% Exchange Rate 
Depreciation
hi game three, PPF weights are equal to one, as in game one, but the exchange rate 
of each country is depreciated by five percent As was mentioned earlier, exchange rate 
variations can be used to promote exports when necessary. A depreciation of the exchange 
rate lowers die international price of export commodities. This price decrease may cause 
export growth and greater exchange rate earnings than prior to the exchange rate
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depreciation and improve the overall social gain. It was decided to decrease the exchange 
rate by five percent to examine the likelihood that countries will be more inclined to 
liberalize trade than with a higher exchange rate. The exchange depreciation did not 
adversely affect the outcome in game three relative to game one. The results included in 
Tables 5.15-5.19 indicate that a five percent depreciation in the exchange rate will affect 
the Nash equilibrium outcome of Costa Rica and the rest of Central America and 
Guatemala and the rest of Central America toward a greater trade liberalization than in 
game one but not that of the remaining countries.
Table 5.15. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation 
___________ of 5%, Costa Rica Versus Rest of Central America__________________
Rest of Central America
C Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
s SQ 0 ; 0 3 ;157 -16; 262 -33; -56 -44;-40
t
a 25 46;-6 30; 150 11; 254 -7 ; -140 -17; -46
R
50 62;-11 46; 144 27; 247 9 ; -146 -2 ; -52
i 75 69; -16 52; 138 16;-151 5;-58
c
a FT 67; - 2 0 51; 133 32; 235 14;-155 4;-63
Table 5.16. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation 
of 5%, El Salvador Versus Rest of Central America




Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT





25 13; -1 6 ; 161 1; 259 -5 ; -135 -6 ; -70
50 22;-3 15; 159 9 ; 256 4;-138 3;-73
a
d 75 29 ;-4 22; 157 17; 254 -3; -140 10; -75
0
r FT -9 ;-7 28; 155 mnhnh 16;-142 15; -77
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Table 5.17. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation
__________ of 5%, Guatemala Versus Rest of Central America________________




Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
SQ 0 ; 0 2 1 ; 61 17; 94 16; 82 11 ; 133
t 25 161; -27 156; 26 151; 59 141; 47 142; 99
e
m 50 280; -65 273; -13 245 ; 20 157; 9 256; 60
a
1
75 365;-106 358; -54 351;-22 348; -33 Q f l l H
a FT -296;-115 207; -65 199; -32 197; -43 185; 9
Table 5.18. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation 
___________ of 5%, Honduras Versus Rest of Central America___________________
Rest of Central America
H Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
n SQ 0 ; 0 -20; 165 -42; 275 -64; -91 -69;-31
d 25 17;-5 -4 ; 162 -27; 272 -49; -93 -53 ; -33
u
r 50 28 ;-7 7 ; 159 -16; 269 -39; -95 -45; -35
a
s 75 35; -62 14; 162 -9; 270 -28; -105 -55; 8
FT 40;-13 19; 153 HUH -28; - 1 0 0 -34; -41
Table 5.19. Political Payoff Function Values For Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation 
__________ of 5%, Nicaragua Vs. Rest of Central America_____________________
Rest of Central America
N Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
i
c SQ 0 ; 0 -3 ; 166 -5 ; 262 -7;-144 -7 ; -81
a 25 3 ; - l 1 ; 162 -2 ; 261 -3;-144 -4 ; 82
r
a 50 5 ;- l 3 ; 161 1 ; 261 -2 ; -145 -2 ; -83
g
u 75 6 ; - 2 3 ; 160 I ;  261 -1 ; -145 -2;-83
a FT 6 ; - 2 -8 ; 170 0 ; -145 -1 ; -83
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GameFour: Simulation with PPF Weights not Equal to One and a 5% Exchange Rate 
Depreciation
Game four is similar to game two in that both assign PPF weights different from 
one to commodity groups and to consumers but in game four an exchange rate depreciation 
of five percent is also modeled. As the results of the game simulation included in Tables 
5.20-5.24 indicate, small changes were obtained for Guatemala and Nicaragua relative to 
game two. For Guatemala and the rest of Central America, a five percent exchange 
depreciation leads to a Nash equilibrium with more trade liberalization than in game two 
(75/75). However, a five percent exchange rate depreciation adversely affect the results for 
Nicaragua relative to game two. hi game four, the Nash equilibrium for Nicaragua is 
reached at 25/50 versus FT/50 of game two. So, it seems that exchange rate depreciation 
reduces the likelihood of Nicaragua liberalizing its agricultural protection. For all other 
countries, the results are the same as in game two.
Table 5.20. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate 
Depreciation of 5%, Costa Rica Versus Rest of Central America_______w u w *
Rest of Central America
c Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
s SQ 0 ; 0 19; 118 -7 ; 187 -32; -165 -46; -222
t
a 25 148;-11 123; 107 96; 175 69;-176 54; 234
R 50 248; -19 222; 97
192; 164 164;-186 148;-243
i 75 343;-27 316; 88 285; 154 255;-195 238; -253
c
a FT 433; -35 405; 79 B B 340; 135 323;-261
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Table 5.21. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
Depreciation of 5%, El Salvador Versus Rest of Central America_____




Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT





25 3 0 ;-I 2 1 ; 18 1 2 ; 1 0 3 ; 20 2 ; - 1 0
50 49; -3 38; 178 29; 299 19; 16 18;-14
a
d 75 6 6 ; - 6 55; 175 45; 295 13; 12 33;-18
0
r FT 17;-8 71; 172 50; 9 49;-22
Table 5.22. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights no Equal to One and an Exchange Rate 
___________Depreciation of 5%, Guatemala Versus Rest of Central America_______




Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
SQ 0 ; 0 35; 70 31; 112 28; 247 2 2 ; 182
t 25 252;-43 255; 15 209; 56 198; 189 197; 123
e
m 50 303; -103 395; -47 353;-9 275; 125 371; 55
a
1 75 572;-169 561;-115 552;-78 476;-18
a FT -143;-185 451;-133 439;-96 435;35 418; -34
Table 5.23. Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in 
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate 
____________Depreciation of 5%, Honduras Versus Rest o f Central America________
Rest o f Central America
H Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
0
n SQ 0 ; 0 18; 272 — -65; 193 -78; 389
d 25 -4 ;-5 -40; 100 -81; 338 -123; 224 -134;386
u
r 50 -6 8 ; - 8 -104; 265 -145; 487 -188; 187 -201; 382
a
s 75 -137;5 -175; 268 -216; 492 -288; 170 -137; 386
FT -213;-15 -251; 257 -292; 478 -336; 180 -349; 374
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Table 5.24. Political Payoff Function Values For Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
Depreciation of 5%, Nicaragua Vs. Rest of Central America_________
Rest of Central America
N Actions SQ 25 50 75 FT
l
c SQ 0 ; 0 -1 ; 190 -4; 320 -7 ; 25 - 1 0 ; 6
a 25 3 ;- l -1 ; 360 -6 ; 25 -7 ; 5
r
a 50 i ; -1 -2 ; 190 -5; 319 -8 ; 25 -9 ;5
g
u 75 -2 ; - l -5 ; 189 -9 ; 319 -11; 25 -13; 5
a FT - 7 ;-I -27; 2 0 2 -13; 319 -15; 25 -17; 5
Summary and Discussion of the Results
This chapter dealt with the central issue of this research, which was agricultural 
trade liberalization. Initially, the MISS model was introduced as the technique to analyze 
trade liberalization in Central America. Secondly, the NPC, the criterion used to measure 
trade liberalization, was defined and described. Third, data and data sources were 
discussed. Fourth, trade liberalization scenarios and actions were defined and the results 
presented. Since this research focuses on the influence of various economic groups on the 
governmental decisions relative to trade liberalization, the importance of these groups was 
identified and used to model four simulated games. Four games were modeled. In game 
one, PPF weights were assumed to be one, i.e., there was not a difference in importance 
among economic groups in the view of government interests, hi game two, PPF weights 
were assumed to be different from one, i.e., government assigned different degrees of 
importance to some groups relative to other groups and to itself. In addition, game three 
included a 5% exchange rate depreciation when PPF weights were equal to one. Finally,
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game four included a 5% depreciation exchange rate when PPF weights were different from 
one. The variations in exchange rate were included to analyze possible advantages or 
disadvantages of exchange rate variations in Central American countries when entering 
agreements to liberalize agricultural trade.
The results of the games simulated in this study, summarized in Table 5.25, indicate 
that, in general, Central American countries will benefit from agricultural trade 
liberalization. Game one indicated that from each country’s perspective, a 50% reduction 
in protection in the rest of countries will be enough incentive it to choose free trade. This 
outcome indicates that there is enough incentive for Central American countries to 
liberalize agricultural trade among themselves. The results for game two indicated again 
that Central American countries will choose a considerable degree of trade liberalization 
(FT), as in game one, even if governments assign various level of importance to commodity 
groups. This outcome indicates that commodity group influence may be irrelevant in 
governmental decisions concerning trade liberalization. This is because assigning different 
values to the PPF weights led to very minor changes in the outcome of the simulated 
games. Some degree of agricultural trade liberalization appears to be the most reasonable 
choice for Central American countries despite the influence various commodity groups may 
exert on their governments. The results of game three indicated, as economic theory would 
suggest (Houck, 1994), that exchange rate depreciation may lead to a greater degree of 
agricultural trade liberalization, as the cases of Costa Rica and Guatemala show. However, 
as the results of game four indicated, exchange rate depreciation seems to be harmful for 
trade liberalization in Honduras and Nicaragua and beneficial for Costa Rica when PPF 
weights are different from one. This outcome is likely to occur because of adverse changes
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in welfare o f the latter countries when PPF and exchange rate depreciations. Exchange rate 
depreciations appear to lead to the worsening of trade balance.
Table S.2S. Nash Equilibrium Results o f Four Trade Liberalization Games Simulation
For Five Central American Countries.
Countries Game One Game Two Game Three Game Four
C/R FT/50 FT/50 75/50 FT/50
S/R FT/50 FT/50 FT/50 FT/50
G/R 50/50 50/50 75/FT 75/75
H/R FT/50 SQ/50 FT/50 SQ/50
N/R FT/50 FT/50 FT/50 25/50
Note: OCosta Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H=Honduras, N=Nicaragua, and R=Rest of Central 
American countries.
Changes in terms of trade may give some explanation for the case of Nicaragua. 
Terms of trade worsen when the exchange rate depreciates. Thus, for a country relying on 
imports, as is the case of Nicaragua, the reduction in terms of trade may lead to social 
losses greater than the exchange revenue gains generated by the increase of exports due to 
exchange rate depreciation. Therefore, although exchange rate depreciation is generally 
beneficial because it boosts exports and may generate large hard currency earnings, that 
may not be the case for Nicaragua.
Until this point, the analysis of country actions have been done from each country 
perspective and not from the regional standpoint However, it seems reasonable to expect 
countries to jointly decide the level of trade liberalization. Therefore, it is important to 
analyze what action countries will more likely choose when all countries face the same 
choices. For this purpose, the payoffs for joint actions, i.e., the outcome when all countries 
face SQ, 25,50,75, and 100% reductions in protection together served as the criterion for 
each country decision. The resulting selected action for each game for each country are
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included in Table 5.26. The results in Table 5.26 show that El Salvador andHonduras have 
a dominant strategy. However, in all games, El Salvador gain the most (loses the least) by 
choosing free trade whereas Honduras is better off if it chooses status quo (SQ).
The results are mixed for the rest o f countries. For example, changes in PPF weights 
seem to be more important in Costa Rica than variation in the exchange rate, hi both games 
one and three, the outcome is the same as for game two relative to game four, hi the case 
of Costa Rica, it seems interesting to observe that when government assigns various levels 
of importance to commodity groups, the outcome get closer to free trade, hi the case of 
Nicaragua, the results are not adversely affected by differences in the PPF weights assigned 
to commodity groups. However, exchange rate variations seem to adversely afreet trade 
liberalization. This is probably in connection with a worsening in terms of trade in games 
three and four with respect to the first two games. Finally, changes in PPF weights seem 
to be less important than variations in exchange rate in the case of Guatemala. According 
to the results in Table 5.26, Guatemala moves closer to free trade under an exchange rate 
depreciation than without it.
Table 5.26. Best Choices Given All Five Countries Simultaneous Protection
Reductions.
Country Game One Game Two Game Three Game Four
Costa Rica 25 FT 25 FT
El Salvador FT FT FT FT
Guatemala 50 50 75 75
Honduras SQ SQ SQ SQ
Nicaragua FT FT 25 SQ
An important question is by how much countries want and should liberalize trade. 
Results of Table 5.26 indicate that none of the five actions under analysis satisfies all
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
countries simultaneously. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect countries to negotiate the 
terms of trade liberalization. For example, Honduras, the country that loses the most when 
trade is liberalized, will probably require compensation from the remaining countries in 
order to participate in an agreement Nicaragua maybe another candidate for compensation. 
If all countries are to participate in any trade agreement, some kind of differentiated 
treatment should be given to countries not initially benefitting from the agreement. This 
outcome is in agreement with the results from the first integration agreement from 1960. 
Honduras was the loser then and it withdrew in 1969 from the agreement. Nicaragua 
followed to weaken the agreement in the mid-seventies. This happened because none of 
these countries was compensated for losses from trade liberalization by the rest of Central 
American countries.
Sensitivity Analysis of the Results
Since the estimates to the elasticities used to model trade liberalization in Central 
America presented limitations, it seems reasonable to develop a sensitivity analysis to test 
the stability of the results. For this purpose, the following procedure was implemented. 
First, the supply and demand elasticities were increased and reduced by 10,25 and 50%. 
Since own price elasticities of demand are expected to be negative and those of supply be 
positive, a movement in the same direction, as figure 5.2 shows, makes elasticities either 
more negative (less positive) or more positive (less negative). For example, a 10% increase 
in elasticities means that negative elasticities were made 1 0 % less negative and positive 
elasticities 10% more positive. The logic of this decision is, as in any given interval, to 
move all variables in the direction of the lower or upper bound simultaneously. Secondly, 
to make a comparisons with elasticities from other sources, a set of elasticities were






Figure 5.2. A Ten Percent Positive Change in Elasticities
obtained from Gardiner et al, (1989). The same set of supply and demand elasticities were 
used for all Central American countries because Gardiner et al (1989) estimated elasticities 
for the entire region and not for each country individually (Table A12-A13). Third, the 
sensitivity analysis was done for games one and two because they seem to be the most 
relevant scenarios in the present study. The results of the sensitivity analysis are included 
in tables 5.27-5.28. The results show that, in general, considerable changes in elasticity 
values do not affect adversely trade liberalization. Thus, when elasticities were shocked by 
1 0% in either direction, results changed in the direction of more trade liberalization in the 
region. Additional percentage changes in elasticities did not provide different results. The 
results from the inclusion of elasticities elicited from Gardiner et al, (1989) indicated that, 
using another set of elasticities, considerably different from those estimated in the present 
research, did not affect adversely the results obtained with the base set of elasticities.
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Moreover, the results indicated that using the same set o f elasticities for all countries does 
not affect the main outcome of the results obtained earlier. Finally, the results of the 
sensitivity analysis indicate that, although elasticities may be important in the estimation 
procedure of the games analyzed, the outcome of the games will not vary considerably
when elasticities are changed.
Table 5.27 Sensitivity analysis Results: Percentage change in Supply and Demand 
_______  Elasticities for Central American Countries, PPF Weight Equal One.
Games BASE TUB
Percentage Changes in Elasticities from Base
-50 -25 - 1 0 + 1 0 +25 +50
C/R FT/50 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75
S/R FT/50 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75
G/R 50/50 FT/FT FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 FT/75 50/FT
H/R SQ/50 SQ/FT SQ/FT SQ/FT SQ/FT SQ/FT SQ/FT SQ/FT
N7R FT/50 75/FT SQ/FT 50/75 50/75 50/75 50/75 50/75
Note: C=Costa Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H=Honduras, N=Nicaragua, and R=Rest of Central 
American countries; TLEB=Elasticities from the Trade liberalization Database by Gardiner et al, 1989.
Table 5.28 Sensitivity analysis Results: Percentage change in Supply and Demand 
_______  Elasticities for Central American Countries, PPF Weight Not Equal One.
Games BASE TUB
Percentage Changes in Elasticities from Base
-50 -25 - 1 0 + 1 0 +25 +50
C/R FT/50 75/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT
S/R FT/50 FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT
G/R 50/50 FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT 50/FT
H/R FT/50 FT/75 50/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT
N/R FT/50 FT/FT FT/75 FT/FT 75/FT FT/FT FT/FT FT/FT
Note: OCosta Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H-Honduras, N=Nicaragua, and R=Rest of Centra 
American countries; TLIB=Elasticities from the Trade liberalization Database by Gardiner et al, 1989.
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CHAPTER SIX - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section summarizes what was done 
in the research. The second section emphasizes the implications of the present study. The 
third section analyzes the limitations of the present study. The last section summarizes the 
most important conclusions to be drawn from this empirical research.
Summary
Will a second attempt of Central American countries to liberalize trade in the area 
and create a trading bloc with respect to the rest of the world, i.e., the formation of a 
customs union, be successful? An answer for this question is the main objective of this 
study. A first integration attempt, started in 1960, failed and this experience may help to 
secure a successful second integration attempt if the lessons from the past are taken into 
account There is a general agreement that the first attempt failed because of social-political 
problems within each country (Alonso, 1994; Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988; 
McClelland, 1972; Schmitter, 1972). These problems spilled over the whole regional 
integration process in such a way that the integration process was gradually weakened and, 
ultimately, virtually over. So, it seems relevant for Central American countries to assess the 
chances of a successful integration if the mistakes made in the past are taken into account
This research was developed with these ideas in mind. Initially, a thorough literature 
review was presented. Chapter two showed that Central American countries are prone to 
problems of various natures. Moreover, the literature revealed that the CACM, created in 
1960, faced many problems. These problems caused the CACM to disintegrate by the mid­
eighties. The analysis in chapter two also revealed that little of the first integration 
experience of 1960 has been taken into account when the second integration wave started
166
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in 1990. The export promotion policies strategy, as the strategy of the second integration 
attempt, can be thought of as the main change in the integration process of the nineties 
relative to I960. No information is available to support the idea that other lessons were 
learned from the past Thus, Central American countries continue to face the same obstacles 
toward integration they faced in the sixties and seventies. In this research, an attempt is 
made to show the influence of the most relevant factors for a successful trade liberalization 
in Central America. The assumption made here is that the political influence of various 
producer groups is the crucial factor in shaping national decisions regarding trade 
liberalization.
One of the objectives of the present research was to analyze, from a partial 
equilibrium perspective, how national decisions may be shaped by the interest of various 
economic groups and by the implementation of agricultural policies. To do so, the present 
research focused on national decisions when entering an international trade liberalization 
agreement Five Central American countries, eight important commodity groups, a 
consumer group, and the government perspective were included in the analysis. Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were the countries under analysis. Beans, 
rice, com, sorghum, bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef were the commodity groups included 
in this research.
Initially, it was hypothesized that government decisions are considerably affected 
by the influence of various important economic sectors. Various studies have shown this 
to be a realistic hypothesis (Rausser and Freebaim, 1974; Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Mahe 
etal, 1988; Abler and Sukhatme, 1998; Johnson etal, 1993; Kennedy, 1995). These studies 
have also shown that a game theoretic framework can represent, in an adequate manner, the
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relationships under analysis. In addition, most of these studies have used the political 
preference function to empirically analyze the influence of commodity groups on 
government decisions. Thus, chapter three presented the theoretical model under which 
trade liberalization in Central America was analyzed.
The model chosen is a game theoretic framework. As the various studies mentioned 
above have shown, a game theoretic framework was appropriate for the topic under 
analysis. The political preference function (PPF) was chosen to estimate the payoffs for the 
actions to be analyzed. The actions included five levels of reduction in level of protection: 
no reduction or status quo (SQ), 25% reduction in protection or dis-protection (25),50% 
reduction in protection or dis-protection (50), 75% reduction in protection or dis-protection 
(75), and 100% reduction in protection or dis-protection, which implies a free trade 
situation (FT). The empirical estimation of the payoff using the PPF was done using 
Modele International Simplifie de Simulation (MISS), a partial equilibrium trade model 
(Mahe et al, 1988).
In order to use MISS to estimate the payoffs of the government actions specified 
above, some preliminary data were needed. Data on quantity demanded and supplied, 
domestic and international prices, and quantities of imports and exports were obtained from 
the most reliable sources. These sources included the Food and Agricultural Organization 
o f the United Nations (FAO), the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United 
Nations (ECLAC-Mexico), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. 
The literature review revealed that there were no estimates of elasticities of supply and 
demand. Therefore, these elasticities were estimated as described in Chapter four. Finally, 
protection levels were defined and estimated in chapter five.
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The results o f the empirical model were presented and discussed in chapter five. In 
general, the results showed that there are good possibilities for trade liberalization in 
Central America but in doing so, several factors should be considered. First, the results 
showed that the political influence of the producer groups included in the analysis does not 
deter countries from trade liberalization. Second, exchange rate depreciations serve as even 
a greater stimulus for trade liberalization, with the exception of Nicaragua, hi the case of 
Nicaragua, exchange rate depreciation appears to worsen greatly the terms of trade and, 
therefore, at the present stage, it is not a desirable measure to boost exports. Third, if all 
countries are to choose the same level of reduction in protection, i.e., the same action, then 
Honduras and possibly Nicaragua should be compensated. This is because the analysis 
showed that Nicaragua and Honduras gain the least or lose the most when entering a trade 
liberalization agreement So, for the agreement to be successful, some compensatory 
measures should be implemented.
Implications
Several implications can be drawn from the present research. The main implication 
of the present research is that the political influences of various producer, and consumer 
groups on the government sector are not harmful to the process o f agricultural trade 
liberalization. The results of the present research imply that there is a potential for Central 
American agricultural trade liberalization. However, agricultural trade liberalization should 
be accompanied by corrective measures to secure a successful process. The results also 
imply that several agricultural policies at the domestic level should be implemented in order 
to ease the way toward trade liberalization. For example, the analysis showed that many 
commodities are considerably protected or dis-protected, as shown by the nominal
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protection coefficients. Better infrastructure, cheaper and wider access to credit and 
financial institutions, technological improvement, and education are needed in order to 
reduce the gap between world and domestic prices. These policies, however, may prove to 
be very costly and only achievable in the long run. The main implication is that countries 
should undertake long-term plans in order to secure a successful agricultural trade 
liberalization. In addition, if the costs of implementation of agricultural policies are higher 
than the benefits from trade liberalization, then countries may find themselves choosing a 
status quo (SQ) situation. There are many factors to be taken into account when 
governments decide to enter an international agreement. If some of those factors appear to 
be an obstacle to trade liberalization, governments should take into account long-run rather 
than short run gains when considering an agreement, hi addition, agreements among 
countries under the GATT and WTO negotiations indicate an overall movement toward 
free trade around the world. Central America may be ready to join the rest of the world in 
this effort
Limitations
As any other study, this research has several limitations that should be taken into 
account when used to address real world issues. A first limitation of the present study is 
that many strong assumptions had to be made in order to estimate the empirical model. Any 
time a researcher uses a partial equilibrium framework, the strong assumption of “other 
factors constant” has to be made. Economic processes are dynamic and interrelated in 
nature, so the “ceteris paribus” assumption is a strong one.
Secondly, data limitations are always a problem in research involving developing 
countries (Fischer et al, 1980), and the present study is not an exception. Data limitations
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were present mostly in the estimation of elasticities of supply and demand of the products 
analyzed. This situation may lead to undesirable consequences. On the other hand, the 
sensitivity analysis showed that large variations in the value of elasticities (-50%, +50%) 
did not change considerably the results obtained with the base set of elasticities. Moreover, 
the use of elasticities from other sources (Gardiner et al, 1989) did not result in large 
changes from the outcome obtained earlier. Thus, the sensitivity analysis showed that 
results are robust and insensitive to large variations in elasticities estimates. However, it 
is recommended to interpret the elasticities of supply and demand, estimated in this 
research, as an approximation to the true values of these elasticities. If the true values of 
the elasticities are very different from those used, results may vary substantially. Therefore, 
readers are advised to use the results of the present research with caution. In addition, it 
seems better to analyze the results under a “what-if' situation, i.e., this research indicates 
what the results would be if the elasticities presented here were the true ones. It is important 
to mention that in the preliminary stages of estimation, supply and demand elasticities were 
shocked by ten percent up and down and the results did not change significantly. So, if the 
true elasticities are in the range of ten percent interval, then the results are still very 
valuable.
Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the present research. First, this study 
showed that agricultural trade liberalization is a feasible and beneficial alternative for 
Central American countries. The results showed that Central America gains from trade 
liberalization. Secondly, the political influences o f producers of rice, beans, com, sorghum, 
bananas, coffee, sugar cane, and beef, are not a real obstacle toward agricultural trade 
liberalization in Central American countries. Third, the theoretical and empirical models
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used in the present research were appropriate to estimate the relationships under analysis. 
Four, the results o f the present research should be used with caution when addressing real 
life issues and questions regarding agricultural trade liberalization in Central American 
countries.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
REFERENCES
Balassa, B.(1967). Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market.
The Economic Journal. Vol 77. No. 305.
 (1974). Economic Integration Among Developing Countries. International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 186.
Ballance, R.H.(1982)fAe International Economy and Industrial Development: the Impact 
o f Trade and Investment on the Third World. Allanheld, Osmun Publishers. 
Totowa, N .J.
Banco Nacional de Desarrollo (BND) (1997). Costos de Produccidn-Caha de 
Azucar/Riego/Renovacion/ Ciclo 1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Crddito. Managua, 
Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Cafe Tecnificado.Ciclo Agricola 1996-97. Vice-
Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Cafe Semi-Tecnificado. Aho- Ciclo Agricola 1996-
97. Vice-Gerencia de Cr6dito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Cafe Tradicional. Aho- Ciclo Agricola 1996-97.
Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Platano Tecnificado Riego y  Secano. Aho- Ciclo
Agricola 1996-97. Vice-Gerencia de CrSdito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Maiz Tecnificado con Maquinaria. Aho- Ciclo
Agricola 1996-97. Vice-Gerencia de Cr6dito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Maiz Tradicional Espeque. Aho- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de CrSdito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Maiz Tecnificado con Bueyes- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Maiz Tradicional Espeque. Aho- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Frijol Tecnificado con Maquinaria. Aho- Ciclo
Agricola 1996-97. Vice-Gerenda de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Frijol Tecnificado con Bueyes- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerenda de Cr6dito. Managua, Nicaragua.
173
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Frijol Tradicional Al Voleo- Ciclo Agricola 1997-
98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Frijol Tradicional Espeque- Ciclo Agricola 1997-
98. Vice-Gerencia de Crddito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Frijol Tecnificado con Bueyes- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccidn-Arroz Tecnificado con Bueyes- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Frijol TradicionalEspequ - Ciclo Agricola 1997-
98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______(1997). Costos de Produccion-Sorgo Tecnificado con Riego- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Sorgo Tecnificado con Maquinaria- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
 (1997). Costos de Produccion-Sorgo Tradicional- Ciclo Agricola 1997-98. Vice-
Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
_______ (1997). Costos de Produccion-Sorgo Tecnificado con Bueyes- Ciclo Agricola
1997-98. Vice-Gerencia de Credito. Managua, Nicaragua.
Bhagwati, J. N. (1990). Export Promoting Trade Strategy: Issues and Evidence. Export 
Promotion Strategies: Theory and Evidence From developing Countries. Milner, 
C. (ed). New York University Press, pp: 11-39.
Bird F., W., (1995). Guia Tecnologica 2: Cultivo del Arroz. Institute Nicaraguense de 
Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA). Managua, Nicaragua.
Brada, J. C., Mendez, J.A. (1988). An Estimate of the Dynamic Effects of Economic 
Integration. The Review o f Economics and Statistics. Vol. 70. N o.l. pp:l63-168.
Brown, DJC, (1994). Properties of Applied General Equilibrium Trade Model with 
Monopolistic Competition and Foreign Direct Investment pp:124-148.
Bulmer-Thomas, V. (1994). The Economic History o f Latin America Since Independence. 
Cambridge University Press. UK.
Business International Corporation (1969). The Central American Common Market: 
Profits&Problems in an Integrating Economy. Published by Business International 
Corporation. USA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175
Cheng, J. Q., WeIlman,M. P. (1995). The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed 
Implementation o f General Equilibrium Outcomes. Electronic Publication from: 
http://netec.wustl.edu/WoPEc/data/Papers/wpawuwpco9508001.html
Caceres, L. R. (1994). Central American Integration: Its Costs and Benefits. CEPAL 
Review (54). December, 1994. Pp:l 11-128
Carter, C., Gardiner, W H. (1988). Elasticities in International Agriculture Trade. 
Westview Press, Inc. England.
Cochrane, J. D. (1964). US Attitudes Toward Central American Economic Integration. 
Inter-American Economic Affairs. 18, Volume 23, No. 2. Autumn, 1964.
Corden, W.M. (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
_______(1974). The Theory of International Trade. Economic Analysis and Multinational
Enterprise. Dunning, J.H. (Ed.). London. Allen and Unwin.
_______(1985). Protection Growth and Trade: Essays in International Economics.
Oxford. Basil Blackwell.
Cox, D J . (1994). Some Applied General Equilibrium Estimates of the Impact of a North 
American Free Trade Agreement on Canada.pp:100-123.
De Alonso, I. T. (1994). A macroeconomic assessment of Central America. Trade, 
Industrialization, and Integration in the Twentieth-Century Central America. De 
Alonso, I. T. (ed). Praeger Publishers. USA. pp: 15-37.
De Franco, Mario (1996). Evaluacion y Recomendaciones Sobre la Nueva Integracion 
Centroamericana: Un enfoque de Equilibrio General. Revista de la Integracion y  
el Desarrollo de Centroamerica No. 50 Pp: 27-156.
Deaton, A., Muellbauer, J. (1980). An Almost Ideal Demand System. American Economic 
Review. Vol. 70. No.3. pp: 312-326.
Economic Commission for Latin American Countries (ECLAC) (1999). Mormacidn 
B&sica del Sector Agropecuario: Sub-Regi6 n Norte de America Latina y el Caribe, 
1980-1998. Comisidn Econdmica Para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). 
Mdxico, D.F.
Falvey, R., Gemmell, N. (1990). Compensatory Financial and Fiscal Incentives to Exports. 
Export Promotion Strategies: Theory and Evidence From developing Countries. 
Milner, C. (ed). New York University Press, pp:109-129.
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnitedNations. (1986). National Methods 
o f Agricultural Price Data Collection. FAO Economic and Social Development 
Paper #58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
_______(1992). Agricultural Price Policy: Government and the Market. Teaming Material
for Agricultural Planning.
Fischer, G. and Frohberg, KJL(1980). Simplified National Models—The Condensed 
Version o f the Food and Agriculture Model System o f the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis. Working Paper. IIASA institute.
Fischer, G., Frohberg, K.K., Keyzer, M.A., Parikh, KS.(1988). Linked National Models: 
A Tool for International Food Polity Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London.
Flower, P.C., Wilford, W.T. (1994) the Central American Common Market: an Analysis 
of Welfare Effects from 1970 to 1984. Trade, Industrialization, and Integration in 
the Twentieth-Century Central America.De Alonso, L T. (ed). Praeger Publishers. 
USA. pp:183-208.
Gabriele, A. (1994) Price Elasticity of Central American Agricultural Exports. CEPAL 
Review. Vol. 52. pp: 105-113.
Garcia, R. (ed) (1988). Central America: Crisis and Possibilities. Institute of Latin 
American Studies. Monograph No. 16. Barkarby Grafiska Industri. Jarfalla. 
Stockholm, Sweden.
Gardiner, H.W., Roningen, V.O., Liu, K. (1989). Elasticities in the Trade Liberalization 
Database. USDA-ERS. Staff Report No. AGES 8920, New York.
Gardner, BX. (1983). Efficient Redistribution Through Commodity Markets. American 
Journal o f Agricultural Economics. Vol. 65. pp:225-234.
Grossman, G.M. (Eds) (1992). Imperfect Competition and International Trade. The MTT 
Press. England.
Houck, J.P.(1994) Elements o f agricultural trade policies. New Y ork: Macmillan.
Johnson, M A ., Roe, TX., and Mah6 , L.(1993). Trade Compromises Between the European 
Union and the U.S.: an Interest Group-game Theory Approach. Journal o f Policy 
Modelling, 15:199-222.
Jung, J., Won, W.K. (2000). An Econometric Analysis of Demand for Meat and Fish in 
Korea. Agricultural Economics Report. No. 439. Northern Plains Trade Research 
Center. North Dakota State University. Fargo, North Dakota.
Judge, G.J., Hill, R.R., Griffiths, W.E., Lutkepolhl, H., Lee, T.C. (1988). Introduction to 
the Theory and Practice o f Econometrics. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Yll
Kennedy, PX. (1995). Game Theory in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: An Application 
to the Uruguay Round. Wissenschaftverlag Vauk Kiel KG. Germany.
Kennedy, PX.JHughes, K.W. (1998). Welfare Effects of Agricultural Trading Blocs: The 
Simulation o f a North American Customs Union. Journal o f Agricultural and 
Resource Economics 23:99-109.
Kennedy, PX., Atici, C. (1998). A sectoral Analysis of Agricultural Trade Liberalization. 
Journal o f Agricultural and Applied Economics 30:277-284.
_______(1998). International Agriculture Policy Divergence: Implications for European
Integration. Current Politics and Economics o f Europe 8:95-108.
Krugman, P. R. (ed) (1986). Strategic Behavior and the New International Economics. The 
MIT Press. USA.
Krugman, P. R., Obstfeld (1997). International Economics: Theory and Policy. Addison 
Wesley Publishers. USA.
Levy, S., Wijbergen, S.V. (1994). Agriculture in the Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: 
a General Equilibrium Analysis. pp:15l-195.
Mahe, L., Tav&ra, C., and Trochet, C. (1988). An Analysis o f the Interactions Between EC 
and US Policies with a Simplified World Trade Model: MISS. Background Paper 
for the Report to the Commission of the European Communities on Disharmonies 
in EC and US Agricultural Policies.
McClelland, D. H. (1972) The Central American Common Market: Economic Policies, 
Economic Growth, and Choices for the Future. Praeger Publishers, USA.
McMillan, J. (1986). Game Theory in International Economics. Hardwood Academic 
Publishers. USA.
Mercado N., J.C., Monterroso, D., Staver, C., Lopez, H., Aguilar, A., Saavedra, M., 
Monterrey, J., Gutierrez, C., Jimenez, C., Membrefio, J.B., Padilla, K., Guzm&n, R., 
Mendoza, R., Blando, F. (1997). Guia Tecnologica 16: Musaceas. Institute 
Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA). Managua, Nicaragua.
Milner, C. (1990). The Role of Import Liberalization in Export Promotion. Export 
Promotion Strategies: Theory and Evidence From developing Countries. Milner, 
C. (ed). New York University Press. pp:81-98.
Mindscape U.S. Atlas MPC (1996). Mindscape hie. CD-ROM version 5.0.2.
Obando S., R., Urbina. A., R. (1995). Guia Tecnologica 4: Cultivo del Maiz. Institute 
Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA). Managua, Nicaragua.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
178
Oehmke, J J?., Xianbin, Y. (1990). A Policy Preference Function for the Government 
Intervention in the U.s. Wheat Market American Journal o f Agricultural 
Economics. Vol. 70. pp:631-652.
Olson, Mancur Jr., (1965). The Logic o f Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
o f Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Permanent Secretariat o f Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), 
(1999)(a)J*rotocolo De Tegucigalpa a La Carta De La Organizacion De 
Estados Centroamericanos (OdecaJ.August, 1999. Guatemala City, Guatemala. 
Electronic Version at http://www.sieca.org.gt/
______ (1999) (b). La Union Aduanera Centroamericana. August 1999. Guatemala City,
Guatemala. Electronic Version at http://www.sieca.org.gt/
_______(1999)(c). Situacion the Centroamerica, el Proceso de Integracion Econdmica
Centroamericana y sus Perspectives. August 1999. Guatemala City, Guatemala. 
Electronic Version at http://www.sieca.org.gt/
_______(1999)(d). Avarices De La Integracion Economica Centroamericana 1995-1998.
August 1999. Guatemala City, Guatemala. Electronic Version at 
http://www.sieca.org.gt/
_______(1999)(p)JEstado De Avance De La Agenda De Negodaciones, Mayo 1999.
August 1999. Guatemala City, Guatemala. Electronic Version at 
http://www.sieca.org.gt/
Pineda L., L. (1995). Guia Tecnologica 5: Cultivo del Sorgo. Instituto Nicaraguense de 
Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA). Managua, Nicaragua.
Quiros-Guardia, R. (1973). Agricultural Development and the Central American Common 
Market Wisconsin University Land Tenure Research Center Research Paper. No. 
50. pp: 47-53.
_______(1973). Agricultural Development in Central America: its Origin and Nature.
Wisconsin University Land Tenure Research Center Research Paper. No. 49. pp: 1- 
110.
Rasmusen, E. (1996). Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Blackwell 
Publishers Inc. Massachusetts.
Rausser, G., Freebaim, J.W. (1974). Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An 
Application to U.S. Beef Import Policy. Review o f Economics and Statistics. 
Vol.56. pp:437-449.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179
Robson, Peter (1984). The Economics oflntemational Integration. George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd.
Roland-Holst, D.W., Reinert, K.A., Shiells, C.R. (1994) a General Equilibrium Analysis 
of North American Economic Integration. pp:47-82.
Sandoval, H., Urbina A., L., Zamora, F., Cruz L., M., Pichardo, M., Pastora, J.D., Oporta, 
J.A. (1999). Guia Tecnologica 19: Ganado Doble Proposito. Instituto 
Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA). Managua, Nicaragua.
Scherer, F. M., Belous, R. S. (1994). Unfinished Tasks: The new International Trade 
Theory and Post-Uruguay Round Challenges. British-North American Committee. 
USA.
Schmitter, P.C. (1972). Autonomy or Dependence as Regional Integration Outcomes: 
Central America. Institute of International Studies. Published by University of 
California. USA.
Schuh, E. (1974) The Exchange Rate and U.S. Agriculture. American Journal o f 
Agricultural Economics.
Seeley, Ralph M. (1985). Price elasticities from the IIASA world agricultural model. 
USDA-ERS. International Economics Division. Washington, D.C.
______ (1986). Equilibrium Price Solution on Net Trade using elasticities. USDA-ERS.
International Economics Division. ERS staff Report NO. AGES 860610. 
Washington, D.C.
Silberberg, E.(1990). The Structure o f Economics: A mathematical Analysis. New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Co.
Sobarzo H.E., (1994). The Gains for Mexico from a North American Free Trade 
Agreement - An Applied General Equilibrium Assessment pp:83-99.
Stigler, G.J. (1970). The Theory of Economic Integration. Bell Journal ofEconomics and 
Management Science. 1-2.1970-71. pp:3-21.
Testas, A. (1997) Economic Gains horn Integration among Developing Countries: The 
Case of the North Africa Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Development Policy 
Review. Vol. 15. pp: 173-201.
The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, Inc. (1983). Central America in 
Crisis: A Program for Action. Task Force Report on Central America. USA.
Tomek, W.G., Robinson, KX. (1990). Agricultural Product Prices. Cornell University 
Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
Tyers, R., Anderson, K. (1986). "Distortions in World Food Markets: A quantitative 
Assessment,". Wold Development Report, 1986. World Bank, January, 1986.
Vanegas Ch., J. A., Llano G., A.(1995). Guia Tecnologica 3: Cultivo del Frijol. Institute 
Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA). Managua, Nicaragua.
Walter, I., Vitzthum, H.C. (1967). The Central American Common Market: A Case Study 
on Economic Integration In Developing Regions. New York University.
Wardlaw, A. B. (1966). The Operations o f the Central American Common Market. 
ROCAP. USA.
Wilford. W.T. (1970). Trade Creation in the Central American Common Market. Western 
Economic Journal. Vol. 8 . No.l. pp:61-69.
Warr, P. (1990) Export Processing Zones. Export Promotion Strategies: Theory and 
Evidence From developing Countries. Milner, C. (ed). New York University Press. 
pp:130-l6l.
World Bank (1999) at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/extemal/lac/lac.nsf.
1996 GrolierMultimediaEncyclopedia (1996). CD-ROM, version 8.01. Grolier Electronic 
Publishing, Inc, 1996.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDICES
181
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
APPENDIX A: EXPLANATION OF INCLUDED APPENDICES
Appendix A includes all tables which were cited in the main contents but not 
presented there. Appendix B deals with estimations of costs of production and net returns 
for all five Central American countries included in this study. Appendix C is a 
supplemental program of Appendix B. Appendices D, E, F, G, H, and I, include programs 
codes used to estimate supply and demand elasticities for each country. Only the codes and 
programs for Guatemala are included because similar programs were used for the rest of 
countries.

















Table A. 1. Costs of Production and Expected Net Returns Estimates in Central American Countries for the Years 1984-1998
for Rice, Beans, Com, Sorghum, Bananas, Coffee, Sugar Cane, and Beef.
Country
— »—— > 
Product T* Labor Machinery Animal F e r t i  
Force l iz e r




Guatemala Rice 0 217.08 0.00 0.00 10.86 227.94 -40.74
Guatemala Rice 1 112.56 0.00 60.00 10.86 183.42 78.66
Guatemala Rice 2 138.69 0.00 60.00 21.72 220.41 107.19
Guatemala Rice 3 76.38 240.00 0.00 43.44 359.82 295.38
Guatemala Rice 4 72.36 180.00 0.00 43.44 295.80 219.00.
Guatemala Beans 0 201.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 201.00 92.76
Guatemala Beans 1 156.78 0.00 60.00 10.86 227.64 261,96
Guatemala Beans 2 180.90 120.00 0.00 10.86 311.76 300.24
Guatemala Corn 0 188.94 0.00 48.00 0.00 236.94 -74.94
Guatemala Corn 1 217.08 0.00 144.00 32.58 393.66 173.34
Guatemala Corn 2 20.10 300.00 0.00 54.30 374.40 273.60
Guatemala Sorghum 0 245.22 0.00 60.00 21.72 326.94 73.56
Guatemala Sorghum 1 80.40 198.00 0.00 43.44 321.84 198.81
Guatemala Bananas 0 217.08 9.00 0.00 86.88 312.96 277.54
Guatemala coffee 0 703.50 0.00 0.00 92.53 796.03 2298.71
Guatemala coffee 1 458.28 0.00 0.00 65.16 523.44 1586.61



















Country Product T Labor Machinery Animal F e r t i -  
Force l i z e r




Guatemala coffee 3 534.66 0.00 0.00 88.62 623.28 2190.12
Guatemala sugarcane 0 120.60 300.00 0 .00 21.72 442.32 300.18
Guatemala sugarcane 1 76.38 240.00 0.00 21.72 338.10 269.40
El_Salvador Rice 0 160.38 0.00 0.00 13.98 174.36 0.24
EIJSalvador Rice 1 83.16 0.00 75.00 13.98 172.14 72.30
El_Salvador Rice 2 102.47 0.00 75.00 27.96 205.43 100.12
El_Salvador Rice 3 56.43 320.00 0.00 55.92 432.35 178.75
El__Salvador Rice 4 53.46 240.00 0.00 55.92 349.38 130.77
El_Salvador Beans 0 148.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 148.50 244.62
El_Salvador Beans 1 115.83 0.00 75.00 13.98 204.81 450.39
El_Salvador Beans 2 133.65 160.00 0.00 13.98 307.63 511.37
El_Salvador Corn 0 139.59 0.00 60.00 0.00 199.59 -24 .99
El_Salvador Corn 1 160.38 0.00 180.00 41.94 382.32 228.78
El_Salvador Corn 2 14.85 400.00 0.00 69.90 484.75 213.65
El_Salvador Sorghum 0 181.17 0.00 75.00 27.96 284.13 39.87
El_Salvador Sorghum 1 59.40 264.00 0.00 55.92 379.32 41.88
El_Salvador Bananas 0 160.38 12.00 0.00 111.84 284.22 -284.22



















Country Product T Labor Machinery Animal F e r t i -  T o ta l Net
Force l i z e r  Cost Return
El_Salvador coffee 1 338.58 0.00 0.00 83.88 422.46 1686.24
El_Salvador coffee 2 115.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 115.83 587.07
El_Salvador coffee 3 395.01 0.00 0.00 114.08 509.09 2302.51
El_Salvador sugarcane 0 89.10 400.00 0.00 27.96 517.06 423.44
El_Salvador sugarcane 1 56.43 320.00 0.00 27.96 404.39 365.11
Honduras Rice 0 102.06 0.00 0.00 9.26 111.32 57.88
Honduras Rice 1 52.92 0.00 70.00 9.26 132.18 104.70
Honduras Rice 2 65.20 0.00 70.00 18.52 153.72 142.38
Honduras Rice 3 35.91 320.00 0.00 37.04 392.95 199.25
Honduras Rice 4 34.02 240.00 0 .00 37.04 311.06 154.24
Honduras Beans 0 94.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.50 346.14
Honduras Beans 1 73.71 0.00 70.00 9.26 152.97 581.43
Honduras Beans 2 85.05 160.00 0.00 9.26 254.31 663.69
Honduras Corn 0 88.83 0.00 56.00 0.00 144.83 44.17
Honduras Corn 1 102.06 0.00 168.00 27.78 297.84 363.66
Honduras Corn 2 9.45 400.00 0.00 46.30 455.75 300.25
Honduras Sorghum 0 115.29 0.00 70.00 18.52 203.81 228.19
Honduras Sorghum 1 37.80 264.00 0.00 37.04 338.84 222.76


















Country Product T Labor Machinery Animal F e r t i- T o ta l Net
Force l iz e r CostReturn
Honduras Bananas 0 102.06 12.00 0.00 74.08 188.14 1304.33
Honduras coffee 0 330.75 0.00 0.00 78.90 409.65 2051.49
Honduras coffee 1 215.46 0.00 0.00 55.56 271.02 1407.03
Honduras coffee 2 73.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 73.71 485.64
Honduras coffee 3 251.37 0.00 0.00 75.56 326.93 1910.47
Honduras sugarcane 0 56.70 400.00 0.00 18.52 475.22 173.23
Honduras sugarcane 1 35.91 320.00 0.00 18.52 374.43 156.12
Nicaragua Rice 0 68.58 0.00 0.00 11.18 79.76 111.04
Nicaragua Rice 1 35.56 0.00 30.00 11.18 76.74 190.38
Nicaragua Rice 2 43.81 0.00 30.00 22.36 96.17 237.72
Nicaragua Rice 3 24.13 200.00 0.00 44.72 268.85 398.95
Nicaragua Rice 4 22.86 150.00 0.00 44.72 217.58 307.12
Nicaragua Beans 0 63.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 63.50 345.82
Nicaragua Beans 1 49.53 0.00 30.00 11.18 90.71 591.49
Nicaragua Beans 2 57.15 100.00 0.00 11.18 168.33 684.42
Nicaragua Corn 0 59.69 0.00 24.00 0.00 83.69 69.31
Nicaragua Corn 1 68.58 0.00 72.00 33.54 174.12 361.38



















Country Product T Labor Machinery Animal F e r t i - T o ta l Net
Force l i z e r CostReturn
Nicaragua Sorghum 0 77.47 0.00 30.00 22.36 129.83 198.67
Nicaragua Sorghum 1 25.40 165.00 0.00 44.72 235.12 191.93
Nicaragua Bananas 0 68.58 7.50 0.00 89.44 165.52 139.46
Nicaragua coffee 0 222.25 0.00 0.00 95.25 317.50 2587.16
Nicaragua coffee 1 144.78 0.00 0.00 67.08 211.86 1768.59
Nicaragua coffee 2 49.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.53 610.62
Nicaragua coffee 3 168.91 0.00 0 .00 91.23 260.14 2380.46
Nicaragua sugarcane 0 38.10 250.00 0.00 22.36 310.46 620.14
Nicaragua sugarcane 1 24.13 200.00 0.00 22.36 246.49 514.91
Costa_Rica Rice 0 386.10 * 0 .00 0.00 12.92 399.02 -157.82
Costa_Rica Rice 1 200.20 0.00 60.00 12.92 273.12 64.56
Costa_Rica Rice 2 246.68 0.00 60.00 25.84 332.51 89.59
Costa_Rica Rice 3 135.85 280.00 0.00 51.68 467.53 376.67
Costa_Rica Rice 4 128.70 210.00 0.00 51.68 390.38 272.92
Costa_Rica Beans 0 357.50 0.00 0.00 0 .00 357.50 -8 .6 6
Costa_Rica Beans 1 278.85 0.00 60.00 12.92 351.77 229.63
Costa_Rica Beans 2 321.75 140.00 0.00 12.92 474.67 252.08



















Country Product T Labor Machinery Animal F e r t i - T o ta l Net
Force l iz e r CostReturn
Costa_Rica Corn 0 336.05 0.00 48.00 0.00 384.05 -204.05
Costa_Rica Corn 1 386.10 0.00 144.00 38.76 568.86 61.14
C o sta jttca Corn 2 35.75 350.00 0.00 64.60 450.35 269.65
Costa_Rica Sorghum 0 436.15 0.00 60.00 25.84 521.99 -521.99
Costa_Rica Sorghum 1 143.00 231.00 0.00 51.68 425.68 -425.68
Costa_Rica Bananas 0 386.10 10.50 0.00 103.36 499.96 122.98
Costa_Rica coffee 0 1251.25 0.00 0.00 110.08 1361.33 1539.37
Costa_Rica coffee 1 815.10 0.00 0.00 77.52 892.62 1085.13
Costa_Rica coffee 2 278.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 278.85 380.40
Costa_Rica coffee 3 950.95 0.00 0.00 105.43 1056.38 1580.62
Costa_Rica sugarcane 0 214.50 350.00 0.00 25.84 590.34 444.21
Costa_Rica sugarcane 1 135.85 280.00 0.00 25.84 441.69 404.76
*Note: T=technology
189
Table A2. Production functions Parameter Estimates, Costa Rica, 1984- .998
Product/
Input
Estimate Std. Error P-Vahie Estimate Std. Error P-Value
Rice Beans
Capital 0.009 0.128 0.946 -0.049 0.054 0.383
Labor 0.471 0.108 0 .0 0 1 0.698 0.123 0 .0 0 0
Fertilizer 0.173 0.106 0.131 0.306 0.108 0.016
Constant -4.849 1.250 0.003 -9.043 1.493 0 .0 0 0
R-Square 0.832 0.891
Com Sorghum
Capital -0.150 0.099 0.159 0.169 0.152 0.316
Labor 0.617 0.173 0.004 0.219 0.116 0.119
Fertilizer 0.378 0.153 0.031 0.543 0.127 0.008
Constant -7.964 1.158 0 .0 0 0 -7.704 0.542 0 .0 0 0
R-Square 0.961 0.998
Bananas Coffee
Capital 0.453 0.106 0 .0 0 1 0.118' 0.072 0.132
Labor 0.068 0.089 0.460 0.135 0.084 0.134
Fertilizer 0 .2 1 0 0.095 0.049 0.143 0.084 0.114
Constant -6.288 1.098 0 .0 0 0 -0.996 2.219 0.662
R-Square 0.915 0.376
Sugar Cane Beef
Capital 0.340 0.073 0 .0 0 1 1.163 0.098 0 .0 0 0
Labor -0.098 0.091 0.305 0.213 0.188 0.280
Fertilizer 0.173 0.108 0.136 *-0.167 0.236 0.493
Constant -0.124 1.613 0.940 -12.907 3.586 0.004
R-Square 0.697 0.932
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)
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Table A3. Production Functions Parameter Estimates, El SalLvador, 1984-1998
Product/
Input
Estimate Std. Error P-Value Estimate Std. Error P-Value
Rice Beans
Capital 0.183 0.056 0.008 0.083 0.057 0.171
Labor 0.789 0.109 0 .0 0 0 0231 0.163 0.184
Fertilizer -0.034 0.152 0.826 0.171 0.147 0267
Constant -8.988 1.333 0 .0 0 0 -2.025 2.258 0.389
R-Square 0.911 0.521
Com Sorghum
Capital 0.444 0.075 0.565 -0.005 0.045 0.918
Labor 0.083 0 .1 0 2 0.436 0.038 0.119 0.753
Fertilizer 0.166 0.141 0.265 0 .1 2 1 0.085 0.183
Constant 1.508 2.737 0.593 2.721 2 .0 2 2 0.206
R-Square 0.183 0.167
Bananas Coffee
Capital — -- — -0.024 0.018 0.215
Labor — — — 0.116 0.039 0.014
Fertilizer — — — 0.035 0.044 0.447
Constant — — — 3.010 1.028 0.014
R-Square — 0.479
Sugar Cane Beef
Capital 0.192 0.105 0.095 0.788 0.091 0 .0 0 0
Labor 0.374 0.077 0 .0 0 1 -0.331 0.106 0 .0 1 0
Fertilizer 0.273 0.106 0.026 *-0.805 0.188 0 .0 0 1
Constant -6.310 0.854 0 .0 0 0 3.433 2.319 0.167
R-Square 0.940 0.911
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)
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Table A4. Production Functions Parameter Estimates, Guatemala, 1984-1998
Product/
Input
Estimate Std. Error P-Value Estimate Std. Error P-Value
Rice Beans
Capital 0.070 0.032 0.049 0.070 0.123 0.581
Labor 0.400 0.109 0.004 0.589 0.082 0 .0 0 0
Fertilizer 0.373 0.138 0 .0 2 1 0 .0 2 2 0.097 0.825
Constant -7.176 1.144 0 .0 0 0 -5.410 1.738 0 .0 1 0
R-Square 0.878 0.907
Com Sorghum
Capital -0.195 0.146 0.205 -0.105 0.151 0.500
Labor 0.193 0.129 0.162 0 .2 0 2 0.153 0 .2 1 2
Fertilizer 0.017 0 .1 1 0 0.872 0.647 0.180 0.004
Constant 5.541 3.729 0.165 -5.658 2 .2 1 0 0.027
R-Square 0.263 0.712
Bananas Coffee
Capital 0.357 0.107 0.006 0 .0 0 1 0.036 0.979
Labor 0.098 0.131 0.470 0.087 0.082 0.309
Fertilizer 0 .1 1 0 0 .1 0 2 0.305 0.131 0.089 0.170
Constant -4.634 1.146 0 .0 0 2 2.180 1.923 0.281
R-Square 0.850 0.269
Sugar Cane Beef
Capital 0.341 0.091 0.003 0.939 0.034 0 .0 0 0
Labor 0.176 0.097 0.097 0.036 0.081 0.660
Fertilizer 0.213 0.143 0.165 *0240 0.162 0.167
Constant -4.003 1.622 0.031 -9.223 1282 0 .0 0 0
R-Square 0.931 0.986
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)
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Table AS. Production Functions Parameter Estimates, Hone uras, 1984-1998
Product/
Input
Estimate Std. Error P-Value Estimate Std. Error P-Value
Rice Beans
Capital 0.023 0.080 0.782 -0 .0 1 1 0.131 0.934
Labor 0.726 0 .2 0 2 0.004 0.162 0.157 0.323
Fertilizer 0.064 0.191 0.743 0.127 0.140 0.384
Constant -7.57 0.904 0 .0 0 0 0.699 2.876 0.812
R-Square 0.9243 0.194
Com Sorghum
Capital 0.168 0.047 0.005 0.186 0.073 0.027
Labor -0.026 0.096 0.788 0.213 0 .0 1 0 0.55
Fertilizer 0.253 0.072 0.005 0.243 0.105 0.041
Constant 0.964 1.388 0.502 -3.793 1.466 0.025
R-Square 0.830 0.789
Bananas Coffee
Capital -0 .0 1 2 0.030 0.706 0.092 0.071 0.219
Labor 0.053 0.029 0.099 0.669 0.155 0 .0 0 1
Fertilizer -0.026 0.036 0.489 0.172 0.130 0.213
Constant 2.809 0.679 0 .0 0 2 -9.756 2.570 0.003
R-Square 0.273 0.779
SugarCane Beef
Capital 0.058 0.031 0.088 0.006 0.003 0 .0 0 0
Labor 0.124 0.040 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 0 1 0.004 0 .0 2 2
Fertilizer -0.018 0.083 0.835 *0.032 0 .0 2 1 0.147
Constant 1.716 1.025 0 .1 2 2 0.741 1.563 0.645
R-Square 0.523 0.995
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)
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Table A6. Production Functions Parameter Estimates, Nicaragua, 1984-1998
Product/
Input
Estimate Std. Error P-Value Estimate Std. Error P-Value
Rice Beans
Capital -0.031 0.050 0.554 -0.016 0.044 0.721
LaboiO.699 0.185 0.185 0.003 0.241 0.176 0.197
Fertilizer 0.213 0 .1 1 1 0.080 0.407 0.177 0.042
Constant -8.165 1.641 0 .0 0 0 -3.498 1.859 0.087
R-Square 0.864 0.694
Com Sorghum
Capital -0.069 0.051 0 .2 0 0 -0.025 0.065 0.711
Labor 0.187 0.231 0.435 0.601 0.165 0.004
Fertilizer 0.247 0.172 0.179 0.377 0.161 0.040
Constant -0.128 3.854 0.974 -9.063 1.139 0 .0 0 0
R-Square 0.291 0.925
Bananas Coffee
Capital 0 .1 0 1 0.089 0.280 0.107 0.047 0.042
Labor 0.103 0.060 0 .1 1 2 0 .1 2 2 0.091 0.206
Fertilizer 0.344 0.089 0.003 0.088 0.114 0.455
Constant -4.908 1.132 0 .0 0 1 -0.041 1.820 0.982
R-Square 0.818 0.557
Sugar Cane Beef
Capital 0.086 0.044 0.076 0.946 0.133 0 .0 0 1
Labor 0.356 0.090 0 .0 0 2 0.209 0.275 0.482
Fertilizer 0.078 0.056 0.193 *0.335 0.399 0.440
Constant -2.873 1.141 0.029 -12.163 5.684 0.085
R-Square 0.766 0.921
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)
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Table A.7. AIDS Parameter Estimates for Costa Rica, 1984-1998.
Product Estimate | Std. Error iP-value Product Estimate! Std. Error |P-value
Rice Beans
Rice 0.645 0.371 0.125 Rice -0.054 0310 0.805
Beans -0.105 0.097 0315 Beans 0.092 0.055 0.139
Com -0.115 0.234 0.638 Com -0.014 0.133 0.920
Sorghum -0.150 0.105 0.197 Sorghum -0.025 0.060 0.683
Beef -0.147 0.119 0.257 Beef -0.003 0.067 0.965
Expenditure 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 2 0.860 Expenditure -0 .0 0 1 0.007 0.911
Constant 0.470 0.279 0.136 Constant 0.030 0.158 0.856
R-Square 0.562 R-Square 0.496
Com Sorghum
Rice -0.209 0.085 0.043 Rice -0.008 0.009 0.397
Beans 0.026 0 .0 2 2 0.274 Beans -0.000 0 .0 0 2 0.874
Com 0.093 0.054 0.127 Com -0 .0 0 1 0.005 0.900
Sorghum 0 .0 1 2 0.024 0.622 Sorghum 0.005 0 .0 0 2 0.084
Beef 0.053 0.027 0.094 Beef 0.003 0.003 0.272
Expenditure -0 .0 0 1 0.003 0.643 Expenditure 0 .0 0 1 0.000 0.093
Constant -0.029 0.064 0.662 Constant -0.000 0.006 0.992
R-Square 0.562 R-Square 0.696
Beef Bananas
Rice -0.535 3.115 0 .8 6 8 Bananas 0.087 0.079 0.298
Beans -0.034 0.815 0.968 Coffee -0.017 0.019 0.378
Com -2.332 1.969 0.275 Sugar -0.097 0.090 0.307
Sorghum 1.115 0.885 0348 Expenditure -0 .0 0 2 0.007 0.772
Beef 1.599 0.999 0.153 Constant 0.178 0.031 0.000
Constant -0.075 0 .1 0 0 0.476 R-square 0.470
Expenditure -2.107 2.345 0.399 > < > < > <
R-Square 0.540 S x r
Coffee Sugar
Coffee 0.138 0.025 0.000 Bananas 0.089 0.173 0.621
Sugar -0.160 0.093 0.117 Coffee -0.082 0.041 0.076
Beef -0.028 0.069 0.691 Sugar -0.025 0.197 0.903
Expenditure -0.009 0.009 0.330 Expenditure 0 .0 0 1 0.015 0.974
Constant 0.119 0.159 0.471 Constant 0.449 0.069 0.000
R-square 0.772 R-square 0.453
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Table A.8. AIDS Parameter Estimates for El Salvador, 1984-1998.
Product Estimate | Std. Error |P-value Product Estimate jStd. Error |P-value
Rice Beans
Rice 0.058 0.028 0.075 Rice -0.051 0.082 0.556
Beans 0.005 0.016 0.781 Beans 0.170 0.046 0.008
Com -0.078 0.041 0.095 Com -0.148 0 .1 2 1 0.258
Sorghum -0.027 0.046 0.573 Sorghum -0.029 0.136 0.835
Beef 0.014 0.015 0.356 Beef -0.007 0.043 0.883
Expenditure -0 .0 2 1 0.014 0.177 Expenditure -0 .0 2 2 0.042 0.613
Constant 0.104 0.074 0.205 Constant 0.107 0 .2 2 1 0.643
R-Square 0.620 R-Square 0.730
Com Sorghum
Rice 0.046 0.085 0.606 Rice 0.039 0.040 0.360
Beans -0.140 0.048 0 .0 2 2 Beans -0.038 0.023 0.141
Com 0.185 0.125 0.183 Com -0.053 0.059 0.400
Sorghum 0.040 0.142 0.788 Sorghum 0.008 0.067 0.911
Beef -0.009 0.045 0.845 Beef 0.023 0 .0 2 1 0.313
Expenditure 0.091 0.044 0.076 Expenditure -0.008 0 .0 2 1 0.715
Constant 0.197 0.229 0.417 Constant 0 .1 2 0 0.109 0.307
R-Square 0.630 R-Square 0.515
Beef Bananas
Rice 0.018 0.128 0.890 Bananas 0 .1 2 0 0.089 0 .2 1 2
Beans -0.061 0.072 0.426 Coffee 0.019 0.050 0.711
Com -0 . 1 11 0.189 0.577 Sugar -0.159 0.136 0.272
Sorghum 0.090 0.214 0.687 Expenditure -0.025 0.031 0.440
Beef 0.188 0.068 0.028 Constant 0.099 0.204 0.640
Constant 0.093 0.066 0 .2 0 2 R-square 0.413
Expenditure -0.498 0.346 0.193 > < > < > < > <
R-Square 0.775 s < > <
Coffee Sugar
Coffee 0.069 0 .0 2 2 0.013 Bananas -0.058 0.082 0.497
Sugar -0.041 0.057 0.497 Coffee -0.074 0.046 0.142
Beef -0.026 0.026 0.340 Sugar 0.156 0.125 0.242
Expenditure -0.017 0.019 0.394 Expenditure 0 .0 1 2 0.028 0.687
Constant 0.063 0.125 0.624 Constant 0.326 0.187 0.114
R-square 0.810 R-square 0.488
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Table A.9. AIDS Parameter Estimates for Guatemala, 1984-1998.
Product Estimate | Std. Error |P-value Product Estimate! Std. Error P-value
Rice Beans
Rice 0.041 0.013 0.018 Rice -0.029 0 .0 2 2 0.228
Beans -0.007 0.054 0.902 Beans 0.008 0.089 0.935
Com -0.044 0.036 0.258 Com -0.055 0.060 0.387
Sorghum 0.008 0.061 0.894 Sorghum 0.035 0 .1 0 2 0.742
Beef -0 .0 0 2 0.018 0.918 Beef 0.031 0.029 0.328
Expenditure -0.003 0.024 0.900 Expenditure -0.013 0.039 0.745
Constant 0.052 0.144 0.727 Constant 0.148 0.239 0.557
R-Square 0.650 R-Square 0.470
Com Sorghum
Rice 0.062 0.048 0.232 Rice 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 0.684
Beans 0.054 0.195 0.788 Beans -0.003 0.005 0.611
Com -0.023 0.131 0.864 Com -0.004 0.003 0.308
Sorghum -0.092 0 .2 2 2 0.689 Sorghum 0.007 0.006 0.257
Beef 0.026 0.064 0.691 Beef -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 2 0.390
Expenditure 0.097 0.086 0294 Expenditure -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0.328
Constant -0.018 0.521 0.974 Constant 0.023 0.013 0.119
R-Square 0.430 R-Square 0.340
Beef Bananas
Rice 0.084 0.039 0.066 Bananas 0.015 0.007 0.063
Beans -0.372 0.158 0.051 Coffee 0.003 0.006 0.586
Com -0.233 0.106 0.064 Sugar -0.027 0.013 0.065
Sorghum 0.296 0.180 0.144 Expenditure -0 .0 0 1 0.008 0.856
Beef 0.159 0.052 0.018 Constant 0.016 0.045 0.732
Constant -0.039 0.069 0.588 R-square 0.520
Expenditure 0.501 0.422 0274 > <
R-Square 0.820 s <
Coffee Sugar
Coffee 0.060 0.015 0.003 Bananas -0.155 0.045 0.007
Sugar -0.032 0.031 0.325 Coffee -0.040 0.036 0292
Beef -0.034 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 1 Sugar 0.184 0.081 0.050
Expenditure -0.025 0 .0 2 2 0.290 Expenditure -0 .0 2 0 0.050 -0.694
Constant 0.097 0.134 0.489 Constant 0.434 0.288 0.166
R-square 0.850 R-square 0.620
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
197
Table A.10. AIDS Parameter Estimates for Honduras, 1984-1998.
Product Estimate! Std. Error | P-value Product Estimatel Std. Error |P-value
Rice Beans
Rice 0.026 0.012 0.063 Rice -0.018 0.009 0.075
Beans -0.058 0.034 0.136 Beans -0.047 0.025 0.109
Com -0.031 0.006 0.001 Com -0.030 0.004 0 .0 0 0
Sorghum 0.059 0.032 0.102 Sorghum 0.084 0.023 0.009
Beef -0.007 0.011 0.512 Beef 0.001 0.008 0.879
Expenditure -0.021 0.009 0.045 Expenditure -0.023 0.006 0.009
Constant 0.177 0.049 0.009 Constant 0.169 0.036 0.002
R-Square 0.944 R-Square 0.910
Com Sorghum
Rice 0.166 0.066 0.041 Rice -0.005 0.001 0.014
Beans 0.477 0.196 0.045 Beans -0.011 0.004 0.037
Com 0.176 0.032 0.001 Com -0.006 0.001 0 .0 0 0
Sorghum -0.736 0.180 0.005 Sorghum 0.019 0.004 0.002
Beef -0.088 0.060 0.187 Beef 0.002 0.001 0.226
Expenditure 0.129 0.050 0.036 Expenditure -0.005 0.001 0.004
Constant 0.139 0279 0.634 Constant 0.031 0.006 0.001
R-Square 0.917 R-Square 0.953
Beef Bananas
Rice 0.005 0.100 0.958 Bananas 0.364 0.125 0.017
Beans -0.176 0297 0.572 Coffee -0.009 0.109 0.934
Com -0.120 0.049 0.044 Sugar -0202 0.107 0.091
Sorghum 0.104 0272 0.713 Expenditure 0.151 0.161 0.374
Beef 0.191 0.091 0.073 Constant -0.728 0.639 0.284
Constant 0.013 0.076 0.872 R-square 0.594
Expenditure -0.224 0.422 0.612 > < > < > <
R-Square 0.757 > < s < *
Coffee Sugar
Coffee 0.029 0.037 0.448 Bananas -0.051 0.023 0.051
Sugar 0.014 0.053 0.806 Coffee -0.029 0.020 0.175
Beef -0.028 0.055 0.625 Sugar 0.096 0.019 0.001
Expenditure 0.008 0.047 0.866 Expenditure -0.029 0.029 0.352
Constant 0.057 0.302 0.855 Constant 0.340 0.117 0.017
R-square 0288 R-square 0.878
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Table A.ll. AIDS Parameter Estimates for Nicaragua, 1984-1998.
Product Estimate Std. Error | P-value Product Estimatel Std. Error | P-value
Rice Beans
Rice 0.179 0.042 0.004 Rice -0.023 0.029 0.450
Beans -0.093 0.034 0.030 Beans 0.193 0.024 0 .0 0 0
Com -0.001 0.049 0.981 Com -0.111 0.034 0.015
Sorghum -0.013 0.014 0.365 Sorghum 0.016 0.010 0.144
Beef 0.349 0.195 0.116 Beef -0.008 0.136 0.954
Expenditure 0.009 0.010 0.396 Expenditure -0.018 0.007 0.043
Constant -2.772 1.534 0.114 Constant -0.263 1.076 0.814
R-Square 0.816 R-Square 0.922
Com Sorghum
Rice -0.059 0.038 0.164 Rice 0.006 0.006 0.326
Beans -0.026 0.031 0.426 Beans -0.002 0.005 0.608
Com 0.137 0.044 0.018 Com -0.001 0.007 0.843
Sorghum 0.016 0.012 0.237 Sorghum 0.004 0.002 0.054
Beef -0.088 0.176 0.632 Beef 0.009 0.026 0.753
Expenditure 0 .0 0 0 0.009 0.974 Expenditure -0.001 0.001 0.668
Constant 0.612 1.387 0.672 Constant -0.075 0.209 0.731
R-Square 0.868 R-Square 0.675
Beef Bananas
Rice -0.168 0.091 0.106 Bananas 0.093 0.036 0.031
Beans -0.114 0.074 0.168 Coffee -0.028 0.020 0.196
Com -0.107 0.107 0.351 Sugar 0.045 0.034 0.224
Sorghum 0.023 0.030 0.460 Expenditure -0.004 0.004 0.296
Beef -0.457 0.424 0.316 Constant -0.467 0.248 0.093
Constant 0.020 0.022 0.391 R-square 0.551
Expenditure 5.878 3.340 0.122 > < > < > <
R-Square 0.862 > < > <
Coffee Sugar
Coffee 0200 0.075 0.025 Bananas 0.283 0.146 0.084
Sugar 0.324 0.191 0.124 Coffee -0.142 0.080 0 .1 1 1
Beef 0.473 0.294 0.142 Sugar 0255 0.138 0.098
Expenditure -0.041 0.017 0.041 Expenditure -0.013 0.016 0.444
Constant -6.493 3398 0.088 Constant -1.552 1 .0 0 0 0.155
R-square 0.534 R-square 0.400
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Table A. 12. Demand Elasticities, Central American and Caribbean Countries
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice -0.65 0.0G 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 O.OC
Beans 0 .0 0 -0.30 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0(
Com 0.05 0 .0 0 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0(
Sorghum 0.00 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oc
Bananas 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.0(
Coffee o © o 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.0(
Sugar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.0(
Beef 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.8(
Source: E aborated from Gardiner et al (1989)
Table A.13. Supply Elasticities, Central American and Caribbean Countries
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice 0.58 0 .0 0 -0.03 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 O.OC
Beans 0 .0 0 0.28 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 O.OC
Com -0.04 0 .0 0 0 .2 2 -0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 O.OC
Sorghum -0.05 0 .0 0 -0.04 028 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 O.OC
Bananas 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.40 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 O.OC
Coffee 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.40 0 .0 0 O.OC
Sugar 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.30 O.OC
Beef 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.4C
Source: E aborated from Gardiner et al (1989)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
200
APPENDIX B: C CODE TO ESTIMATE COSTS OF PRODUCTION AND
EXPECTED NET RETURNS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR 
THE YEARS 1984-1998 FOR RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, 
COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF.
ffinclude <stdio.h>
#include <math.h> 
ffdefine INPUTS 4 




double wl[51[71[5 ] ,wo[5][7][51 |Wm[5][71[5J ,wf[5 ] [7 } [5J; 
double wage[4 ][5 ]°
{{4 .02 ,2 .97 ,1 .89 ,1 .27 ,7 .15 },




{{1 0 .4 ,2 7 .2 ,9 .0 ,8 .9 ,9 .1 ,1 5 6 .3 ,1 5 },
{9 .7 ,3 6 .4 ,9 .7 ,7 .2 ,0 ,1 5 6 .2 ,1 9 .0 },
{9 .4 ,40 .8 ,10 .5 ,9 .6 ,2 3 .0 ,12 4 .3 ,1 3 .1 },
{1 0 .6 ,3 7 .9 ,8 .5 ,7 .3 ,4 .7 ,1 46 .7 ,18 .8 },
{13 .4 ,3 2 .3 ,1 0 .0 ,0 ,9 .6 ,14 6 .5 ,2 0 .9 }};
double rice_tech[5][5 ]“{{20 ,28 ,35,70,55},{54,28 ,34 .5 ,19,18},
{0 ,5 ^ 5 ,0 ,0 } ,{0 ,0 ,0 ,8 ,6 } ,{1 ,1 ,2 ,4 ,4 }} ;  
double b ean_tech [5 ][3 ]»{{12,20 ,25},{50 ,39 ,45},{0 ,5 ,0},{0 ,0 ,4 } ,{0 ,1 ,1 } } ;  
double corn_tech[5][31*{{20,7 0 ,8 0 } ,{4 7 ,5 4 ,5 } ,{4 ,1 2 ,0 } ,{0 ,0 ,1 0 } ,{0 ,3 ,5 }};  
double sorghum_tech[5 ] [2 ]* { {5 0 ,6 5 ,} ,{6 1 ,2 0 } ,{5 ,0 } ,{0 ,6 .6 } ,{2 ,4 } } ;  
double banana_tech[5 ]= {72 .1 ,54 ,0 ,0 .3 ,8 };
double co ffee~ tech [5 l[4 l» {{22 ,15 ,5 ,20 },{175 ,114 ,39 ,133},{0 ,0 ,0 ,0},{0 ,0 ,0 ,0 }, 
{8 .52 ,6 ,0 ,8 .16 }};  
double 8ugar_tech[5J[2J={{55,45},{30,1 9 } ,{0 ,0 } ,{1 0 ,8 } ,{2 ,2 }} ;  
double area[7 ][5]={{18.89 ,12.5 ,15.48 ,82 .22,91.87},{176.93,89 .6,112.04 ,206.9,
54.0},{836.38,355,634.74,325.18 ,24 .14},{60 .1 ,144.7 ,116.9 ,31.0 ,0}, {24.14, 
0,31 .81,2 .56,72.85},{387.7 ,232.7 ,284,126.38,150.2}, 
{116.4 ,115,63 .9 ,65 .3 ,69 .6}}; 
char countries[5][15l={'Guateaala*, ’ El_Salvador’ , ’ Honduras', ’ Nicaragua’ , 
*Costa_Rica’ };
char p ro d u c ts [7 I[l0 l= {’ Rice’ , ’ Beans’ , ’ C o rn *,’ Sorghum’ , ’ Bananas’ , 
•coffee• , • sugarcane’ };
in t  technology;
/•S tartin g  the loop fo r the set of countries * /  
in t  i*0 ;
fo r (i*0 ; i< 5 ;+ + i)
{
/•S tartin g  the loop fo r the set of products • /  
in t  J*0;
fo r (j*0 ; j< 7 ;+ + j)
{
/•S tartin g  the loop fo r  the set of technologies * /  
i f ( j » 0 )
technology=5;
else
i f ( i “ i )
technology=3;
else
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i f ( j= * 2 )
technology^;
else
i f f j “ 3)
technology^;
else
if ( j= * 4 )
technology^;
else







double cost=0, total_cost=0, oxen1=0, nach=0, fert=0 ,
labor1«0, net_return=0;
i f ( i - O )
{
in t  «=0;
for(«»0; «<INPUTS; ++■)
{
cost«wage[o][i]*rice_tech[«+1] [k ] ; 
total_cost=total_co8t+cost;
i f ( b==0)
{
labor!-cost;
wX[±][ j ] [k ]= labor1*area[j] [ i ] ;
}
else
if (a * = l )
{
oxen1»cost;
wo[ i 1131[ kJ*oxen1*area[j] [ i ] ;
>
else 
i f  (H“ 2)
{
nach«co8t;





« r f [ i] t31[k ]» fe r t*a re a [ j] t i l ;
>
> /‘ closing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /  
net_return*rice_tech[01[kl».9‘ p r ic e [ i] [ j l-to ta l_ c o s t;
f  pr in t f  (outp, ’%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f %9. 2f%9. 2f%11. 2f%11. 2f%11. 2f%11. 2 f \  n' ,  count 
r ie s [ i ] , products! j ] , k, labor! ,aach,
oxenl ,fe rt,to ta l_co s t,n e t_re tu rn ,w l[i] [ j  ] [k j ,wo[i] [11t*0 i*"»[i] [ j 1[k j ,w f [ i l  [ j 1 [k ] );





in t  r»o;
for(ii=0; n<INPUTS; ++■)
{
cost=wage[m][i]*bean_tech[n+11[k ] ; 
printf(*%8.2f%8. 2f%e72f\n *,
wage(n][ij,bean_tech[*+1] [ k ] ,co s t);
total_cost=total_cost+cost;
i f  (b= 0 )
{
labor1=cost;

















w f [ i l [ j l [ k ] « f e r t * a r e a [ j ] t i ] ;
>
} / ‘ closing the loop fo r  the set of inputs * /  
net_return=bean_tech(0 ] [k ] * .9 *p r ic e [ i] [ j ) -total_cost;
f  p rin tf (outp, *%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f%9. 2f %11. 2f %11. 2f %11. 2f %11 .2 f\n  * ,count 
r ie s [ i ] , products[ j ] , k , labor1,nach,
oxenl ,fe rt,to ta l_co s t,n e t_re tu rn Iw l[ i l  I j  J [k] ,wo[i] [ j  ] [k] ,wm[i) [ j  J [k] ,wf ( i l  [ j  ] [k ] );
>
else 





cost=wage[a][i]*corn_tech[B+1] [k ] ; 
total_cost=total_cost+cost;
i f  (« = 0 )
{
labor1»cost;
w l( i]  ( j 1(k l* lab o r1 *a rea [j] [ i ] ;
}
else
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if(« = *1 )
{
oxen1=cost;
w o[iI li l [k ]= o x e n 1 *a re a ( jI[ i l I
>
else 
if (« * *2 )
{
aach=cost;





w f [ i ] [ j j [ k ]» fe r t * a r e a [ j ] [ i ] ;
>
} / 'c losing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /
net_return=corn_tech[0 ][k ]* .9 *p r ic e [ i] [ j] - to ta l_ c o s t;
fp r in tf(o u tp , *%12s%10s%3d%8.2f%8. 2f%8.2f%8. 2f%9. 2f%9.2f%11 .2f%11 .2f%11 .2f%11 .2 f\n • , count 
r ie s [ i ] , products[ j ] ,  k, labor4,aach,
o x e n l,fe r t ,to ta l_ c o s t,n e t_ re tu rn ,w l[ i] [ j] tk ] ,w o [ iJ I j] [k ] ,« n [ i ] [ j] [k ] ,w f [ i) [ j] [k ]) ;
>
else 
i f  (J“ 3)
{
in t  b*0;
for(a»0j «<INPUTS; ++b )
{





w l [ i l t j ] [ k ] 3labor1 *area[ j ] [ i j ;
>
else
if (B “ 1)
{
oxen1»cost;
* o [ i ]  t j 1[kl»oxen1*area[j11i);
>
else
if (B “ 2)
{
nach>cost;




fe rt*co s t;
w f t i j t jJ [k l= fe r t * a r e a [ j ] t i l ;
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>
> /‘ closing the loop fo r  the set o f inputs * /  
net_return=>sorghu«_tech[0] [ kl •  .9*price [ i ]  [ j  1 -total_cost j
f  p rin tf (outp, ■%12s%10s%3<!%8.2f%8.2f%8.2f%8.2f%9.2f%9.2f%11.2f%11.2f%11,2f%11.2f\n*, count 
r ie s [ i ] , products[ j 1 ,k , la b o r l,each,
oxen1,fert,to ta l_costl net_return)w l[ i l [J ] [k ] ,w o [ i] [ j l [ k J >w » [ i l [ j l [ k l>w f [ i ] l j l [ k ] ) ;
>
else
if ( j * » 4 )
{
in t  a=0;
for(ra=0; ■<1NPUTS; ++m)
{
cost=wage[e] [ i ]  *banana_tech[B+1 ]; 
total_cost*total_cost+cost;
i f  (B“ 0)
{
laborl»cost;






w o [ i l I j ] (kl«oxen1*area(j] [ i ) ;
>
else
i f { « " 2 )
{
aach*cost;




fe rt*co s t;
w f [ i ] [ j ] [k ] * fe r t*a re a [ j] £±];
>
} / ‘ closing the loop fo r  the set of inputs * /
net_return»banana_tech[0]* .9 » p ric e [i] [ j ] -to ta ljco s t;
fp r in tf  (outp, *%12s%10s%3d%8.2f<W.2f%8.2fW.2f%9.2f%9.2f%11.2f%11.2f%11.2f%11.2f\n‘ .count 
r ie s [i ] , products[j] , k , la b o rl, each,
o x e n l,fe r t,to ta l_ c o s t,n e t_ re tu rn ,w l[ i][ ] ][k ] ,w o [i][ j][k ] ,« « [ ! ) [ j ] [ k ] ,w f [ i ] [ j ] [ k ] ) ;
}/*c los ing  i f  stateaent*/
else
i t ( i “ 5)
{
in t  a*0;
for(a=>0; «<INPUTS; ++a)








w l [ i ] [ j 1[k]= labor1*area[j] [ i l j
>
else 
i f  (b®»1)
{
oxen1=cost;











w f [ i ] [ j ] [k l« fe r t * a r e a [ j ) [ i l ;
>
} / ‘ closing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /
net_return«coffee_tech[01[kj*.9*price[i][ j 1-total_cost;
f  p rin tf (outp, *%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f% 
9 . 2 f%1 1 . 2 f%1 1 .2 f%1 1 .2 f%1 1 . 2 f \n , ,countries[i].p roducts!jJ ,k ,laborl,«ach ,oxen1 ,fert,to ta l_  
cost,net_re turn ,w l[il [ j H k l ,w o [il[ j l [ k l  ,wm[il [ j l [k] ,w f[ iH  j l [ k l ) ;

















w o [iJ [il[k ]= o xen l*area [jJ [iJ ;
}
else 
i f  (m»2)
{
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uch«cost;





w f ( i l l j l ( k j» f e r t * a r e a [ j ] [ i ] ;
}
} / ‘ closing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /
net_return»sugar_tech[0][k]*.9*price[il[ j ] -total_cost;
f  p r in tf ( OUtp t * %12S%10S%3<«8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f% 
9.2f%11.2f%t1.2f%11.2f%11.2fVn*(Countries[i],produets[j] , k ,labor1,nach,oxen1,fert,total_  
c o s t ,n e t_ r e tu r n ,w l[ i] [ j ] [k ] ,w o [ i lt j ] [k l ,w a ( i] [ j l [k ] ,w f [ i] [ j l (k ] ) ;
> / ‘ closing i f  stateaent * /
>/ ‘ closing loop of technologies*/
} / ‘ closing loop of products*/
> /‘ closing loop of countries*/ 
fclose(outp); 
in t  qu it;
p r in t f ( ‘ press any nunber and enter to f in is h \n ‘ );  
scanf(*%d*l q u it);  
return 0;
) / ‘ closing ra in * /
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APPENDIX C: C CODE TO ESTIMATE CHANGES IN EXPECTED NET
REVENUE IN THE BASE PERIOD AND WHEN PRICES ARE SHOCKED BY 




in t  nain()
{
FILE »outp;
outp«*f open( "ajwnr.out", *w*);  
double net_base{20]{51=
{{-19 .94, ~ 19.64, 76.68, 132.24, -131.02),
{107.78, 99.46, 131.02 ,220.06,102.08),
{143.59, 134.07, 175.28 , 274.82, 136.49),
{368.18 , 246.65 , 265.05 , 473.15 , 470.47),
{276.20, 184.12, 205.94, 365.42, 346.62),
{125.40, 288.30, 395.10, 391.30, 30.10),
{316.36 , 523.19 , 663.03 , 667.29 , 294.23),
{368.24 , 602.37, 765.69, 779.17, 332.83),
{-56.94, -5.59, 65.17, 86.31, -184.05),
{236.34 , 296.68, 437.16, 420.88, 131.14),
{345.60 , 291.25, 384.25 , 367.75 , 349.65),
{118.06, 75.87, 276 .19 ,235 .17 ,-521 .99),
{256.66 , 88.68 , 285.16, 239.38, -425.68),
{343.15, -284.22, 1470.16, 173.35,192.20),
{2642.57, 2797.54, 2324.95, 2909.90, 1861.67),
{1821.06, 1920.54, 1593.48, 1988.64, 1304.88),
{624.72 , 665.17, 547.79, 683.97, 453.65),
{2502.72, 2614.91, 2159.07, 2673.86, 1873.62),
{382.68, 527.94, 245.28, 723.54, 559.16),
{336.90 , 450.61, 215.07, 599.51, 498.81));
double net_10[20][5]*
{{-40 .74 , ~  0.24, 57.88, 111.04, -157.82),
{78.66, 72.30, 104.70, 190.38, 64.56),
{107.19, 100.12, 142.38, 237.72, 89.59),
{295.38, 178.75, 199.25, 398.95, 376.67),
{219.00, 130.77, 154.24, 307.12 , 272.92),
{92.76, 244.62, 346.14, 345.82, -8 .66 ),
{261.96 , 450.39 , 581.43 , 591.49 , 229.63),
{300.24 , 511.37, 663.69 , 684.42 , 252.08),
{-74.94, -24 .99 ,44 .17 , 69.31, -204.05),
{173.34 , 228.78, 363.66, 361.38, 61.14),
{273.60 , 213.65 , 300.25 , 299.75 , 269.65),
{73.56, 39.87 , 228.19, 198.67, -521.99),
{198.81, 41.88 , 222.76, 191.93, -425.68),
{277.54, -284.22, 1304.33, 139.46, 122.98),
{2298.71, 2453.90, 2051.49, 2587.16, 1539.37),
{1586.61, 1686.24, 1407.03, 1768.59, 1085.13),
{546.57, 587.07, 485.64, 610.62, 380.40),
{2190.12, 2302.51, 1910.47, 2380.46, 1580.62),
{300.18 , 423.44, 173.23, 620.14, 444.21),
{269.40, 365.11, 156.12, 514.91, 404.76}};
double area[7][5 ]>{ {18.89,12.5 ,15.48,82.22,91.87},
{176.93,89.6,112.04,206.9,54.0},
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{836.38,355,634.74,325.18,24.14},
{60.1 ,144 .7 ,116 .9 ,31 .0 ,0},
{24 .14 ,0 ,31 .81 ,2 .56,72.85}, 
{387.7,232.7,284,126.38,150.2}, 
{116 .4 ,115,63 .9 ,65 .3 ,69 .6}}; 
double w_ave_b[5)[7 ] ,w_ave_10[5l[7J; 
in t  i=0;
fo r(i= 0 ;i< 5 ;+ + i)
{
in t  j=0;
fo r(j= 0 ;j< 7 ;+ + j)
{
i f  ( j * * 0 ) /* r ic e * /
{







revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] *0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ] ; 





revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ]; 





revenueb=net_base[k] [ i ] * 0 .3*area[ j ] [ i ]; 
revenue10*net_l0 [k] [ i ] *0 .3*area( j ] [ i  J;
>
else 
i f  (k » 3 )
{
revenueb=net_base[kl{il*0 .3*area{jI{i); 










w_ave_b[i][j]=total_suab/area[j1[ i ] ; 
w_ave_10[i]{j]=total_suBlO/area[j J [i]; 
fprintf(outp,
■%10.2f%10.2f\n* ,w_ave_b[i] [ j ]  ,w_ave_10[il [J 1);
}
else
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if ( j= » 1 )  / *  beans*/
{
double total_sunb»0, total_su«10 *0 ,revenueb=0,
revenue10=0;





revenueb=net_base[k][i]*o.3*area[j] [ i ] ; 
revenue10«net_10[k][i]*o.3*area[j1[ i l ;
}
else 
if(k *= 6 )
{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 .2*area[ j ] [ i ];  




revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i 1*0.5*area[ j ] [ i ]; 





w_ave_b£i][ j]« to ta l_sueb /area[j] t i l ; 
w_ave_10[i][ j]>tota l_sun10/area[jl [ i l » 
fp rin tf(o u tp ,
■%10.2f%10.2f\n *,w _ave_b (i)[j] ,w_ave_10[il[ j ] ) ;
>
else




in t  k*8;
for(k*8;k<11;++k)
{
i f  (k“ 8)
{
revenueb=net_base[k][i]*0.3*area(j] [ i ] ; 
revenuel0=net_10 [k] [ i ] * 0 .3*area[ ] ] [ i ];
>
else 
if (k * *9 )
{
revenueb=net_base[k][i]*0.2*area[j] [ i l ; 





revenue10=net_10[k][i]*0.5*area{j1[ i l ;
>





w_ave_b[i][ j]*to ta l_s u ab /a re a [j] [ i ] ; 
w _ave_l0[il[ j]=total_sum 10/area[j1[ i l ; 
fp rin tf(ou tp ,
■%10.2f%10.2f \n ’ fw_ave_b[il[ j ] ,w _ave_l0[ij[ j 1);
>
else




in t k * l l ;
for(k»11;k<13;++k)
{





revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i 1*0.5*area[ j ] [ i ] ; 
revenue10=net_10 [k ] [ i ] *0 .5*area( j ] [ i ];
revenueb*net_base[k][ i ] ‘ 0 .5 ‘ a re a [j] [ i ] ; 





w_ave_10[i][j]>total_sun10/area[j] [ i l ; 
fprintf(outp,
■%10.2f%10.2f\n ',w _ av e_ b [i]tj1,w_ave_lO[il[ j ) ) ;
~>
else
i f ( j “ 4) / ‘ banana*/
{
w_ave_b[i][ jl*net_base[13][ i ] ; 
w _ a v e _ l0 [il[ j]-n e t_ l0 [ l3 ][ i] ;  
fp rin tf(ou tp ,
•%10.2f%10.2f\n‘ , w_ave_b ( i  1 ( j 1, w_a ve_10 [i ] [ j ) ) ;
>
else
i f  ( j “ 5) / ‘ coffee*/
{
double total_suBb>0, total_suml0*0, revenueb=0,
revenue10*0;
in t  k*l4;
for(k*14;k<l8;++k)
{
if (k **1 4 )
{
revenueb«net_base[k][i]*0.05*area[jI[i]; 
revenuel0=net_10(k)[il*0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ] ;
>
else
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i f  (k» 15 )
{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] *0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ]; 
revenue10»net_10[kj[i]‘ 0 .0 5 *a re a [ j ] [ i ] ;
>
else
i f ( k — 16)
{
revenueb«net_base[k][il*0.3*area[j] [ i ] ; 




revenueb*net_base[ k] [ i ] *0 .3*area[ j ] [ i ]; 





w_ave_b[ij[ jl*to tal_suab/area[ j ] [ i ] ; 
w_ave_10[ij[ jl*to ta l_ s u a l0 /a rea [ j I [ i l ; 
fp rin tf(o u tp ,




double total_sunb»0, total_sua10“0 , revenueb=0,
revenuel0*0;
in t  k«18;
for(k»18 ;k<20; ++k)
{
i f  (k“ 18)
{
reven ueb *n et_base[k j[il*0 .5 *a rea [jl[il; 




revenueb«net_base[k][i]*0.5*area[j] [ i ] ; 





a_ave_b[il[ jl« to ta l_su ab /area[j1[i l ; 
w_ave_10[il[ jl« to ta l_su aio /area[H  [ i l ; 
fp rin tf(o irtp ,
•%10.2f%10.2f\n *,w _a ve _b [il[J I,w _ av e_ l0 [il[jI);
) / ‘ closing la s t i f  (k)stateaent*/
} / •  closing product loop ( j ) * /
} / ‘ closing country loop ( i ) • /  
fclose(outp); 
return 0;
> / ‘ closing aain*/
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APPENDIX D: SAS PROGRAM FOR THE ESTIMATION OF LABOR, 
FERTILIZER, AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF 
RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND 







do i*1  to 15; 
do 1*1 to 60;
i f  }*1
then guate{i,j}*54*.75+54*.2*nor«al(seed{1}); 
else i f  J*2
then guate{i,1 }*1 *.75+1 * . 2*nornal(seed{2});  
else i f  j*3
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*nornal(seed{3}); 
else i f  j=4
then g u ate{i,J }*28 *.75+28*.2*normal(seed{4>); 
else i f  j=5
then guatefi,j}=1*.75+1 *0.2*norinal(seed{5}); 
else i f  j*6
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*nornal(seed{6}); 
else i f  j*7
then guate{i, j  }*34 .5*.75+34 .5*.2*nor«al(seed{7}); 
else i f  1-8
then guate{i,j> -2*.75+2*.2*noraal(seed{8>); 
else i f  j*9
then guate{i,l>*2.25+0.34*norm al(seed{9}); 
else i f  j*10
then g u a te { i , j} * l9 * .75+19*.2*nor«al(seed{10>); 
else i f  1*11
then guate{i,l}*4*.75+4*.2*noraal(seed{11}); 
else i f  1*12
then guate{i,l>*2.25+0.34*noraal(seed{l2}); 
else i f  1*13
then guatefi, 1>*18*.75+18*.2*noraal(seed{13»; 
else i f  1*14
then g u a te { i, i} *4 * .75+4*.2*nor«al(seed{14}); 
else i f  j*15
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then guate{i, j } * 2 .25+0.34*nonaal(seed{15 });  
else i f  j»16
then g u a te { i,j}s 5 0 *.75+50*.2*norm l(seed{16>);
else i f  j “17 
then guate{i,j>=0;
else i f  j»18
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*nopnal(seed{18}); 
else i f  j “19
then guate{i,j}*>39*.75+39*.2*nopaal(seed{l9}); 
else i f  j«20
then guate{i, j>=1*. 75+1 * .  2*nom al( seed{20>);  
else i f  j*21
then guate{i, j}=2.25+0.34*nor«al(seed{21>); 
else i f  j*22
then guate{i, j} * 4 5 * .75+45*.2*nomal(seed{22>); 
else i f  j=23
then guate{i,j>*1*.75+1*.2*nor»al(seed{23>); 
else i f  j*24
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*noraal(seed{24>); 
else i f  j»25
then g u a te { i,j}« 4 7 *.75+47*.2*noraal(seed{25>);
else i f  j=26 
then g u ate{i,j> *0;
else i f  j*27
then guate{i, j>«2 .25+0.34*nornal(seed{27}); 
else i f  ]«28
then guate{i, j} *5 4 * .75+54*.2*nor«al(seed{28}); 
else i f  j-29
then guate{i,j}»3*.75+3*.2*noraal(seed{29>); 
else i f  j*30
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*noraal(seed{30>); 
else i f  j*31
then guate{i,j>»5*.75+5*.2*nopaal(seed{31>); 
else i f  j*32
then guate{i,j}*5*.75+5*.2*norw al(seed{23}); 
else i f  j=33
then guate{i,j}»2.2S+0.34*nopaal(seed{33>); 
else i f  j=*34
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then g u a te {i,j}= 61 *.75+61*.2*noraal(seed{34>); 
else i f  j*35
then guate{i,j}=2*.75+2*.2*nor«al(seed{35}); 
else i f  j*36
then guate{i,j}=2.25+0.34*noraal(seed{36>); 
else i f  J=37
then guate{i, j >>20*.75+20*.2*nornal( seed{37}); 
else i f  j»38
then g u a te { i,j>=4*.75+4*.2*noraal(seed{38>);  
else i f  j«39
then g u a te {i,j}= 2 .25+0.34*noraal(seed{39});  
else i f  j=40
then g u a te { i,j}» 5 4 *.75+54*.2*noraal(seed{40>); 
else i f  j=41
then guate{i, j >*8*.75+8*.2*noraal( seed{41>); 
else i f  j*42
then guate{i,j}-2.25+0.34*nornal(seed{42 } ) ; 
else i f  j*43
then g u a te { i,j >*175*.75+175*.2*noraal(seed{43});  
else i f  j*44
then guate{i, j } * 8 .52*.75+8.52*.2*noraal(seed{44});  
else i f  j»45
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*noraal(seed{45>); 
else i f  j«46
then guate{i, j } * 1 14*.75+114*.2*nornal(seed{46});  
else i f  j*47
then guate{i,j}»6*.75+6*.2*noraal(seed{47>); 
else i f  j*48
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*noraal(seed{48>); 
else i f  j»49
then guate{i,]>>39*.75+39*.2*noraal(seed{49>);
else i f  j»50 
then guate{i,}>*0;
else i f  J-51
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*nor«al(seed{51} ) ;  
else i f  j-52
then guate{i,j>*133*.75+133*.2*nonsal(seed{52»; 
else i f  j»53
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then guate{i, j}=8.16*.75+8.16*.2*nor«al(seed{53}); 
else i f  j*54
then guate{i,j}*2.25+0.34*nornal(seed{54}); 
else i f  j “55
then guate{i, j} * 3 0 * .75+30*.2*noreal(seed{55>);  
else i f  j=56
then guate{i,j}=2*.75+2*.2*noraal(seed{56}); 
else i f  j=57
then g u a te { i,j}= 2 .25+0.34*noraal(seed{57}); 
else i f  j*58
then g u ate{i, j >*19*.75+19*.2*noraal(seed{40}); 
else i f  j«59





proc p rin t;
var guatel-guate900;
run;
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APPENDIX E: SHAZAM! PROGRAM FOR OUTPUT MAXIMA AND
MINIMA IN THE PRODUCTION OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, 
BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN 






genr max=h* 1.42* 125
format(2 f8 .2 )




print tmin tmax / format
stop
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APPENDIX F: SHAZAM! PROGRAM FOR PARAMETER ESTIMATION OF
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, 
BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES USING DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
set nocolor
file screen a:\guatema\guatema.out 
sample 1 IS
read(a:\guatema\guatlkf.txt) rll r lf  rlk  i21 r2f r2k r31 r3f & 
r3k r4l r4f r4k r51 r5f r5k &
b ll b lfb lk  b21 b2f b2k b31 b3f b3k e ll e lf  elk  c21 c2f c2k & 
c31 c3f c3k sll s lf  slk  s21 s2f s2k g ll g if  glk k ll k lf  klk  & 
k21 k2fk2k k31 k3f k3k k41 k4f k4k z ll z lf  zlk  z21 z2f z2k m il m lk
read(a:\guatema\guataqp.txt) ar ab ac as ag ak az qr qb qc qs & 
qg qk qz pr pb pc ps pg pk pz qm tm sm pm
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR RICE#
genr rtfl=ar^l.42^05M f*1000
genr 1*0 =3^  1.42^.05^r2f*1000
genr rtf3=ar* 1,42*.3*r3f* 1000
genr rtf4=ai* 1,42*.3*r4f* 1000
genr rtf5=ai*l.42#.3+r5f* 1000
genr rtfi=rtfl+rt£2+rtf3+rtf4+rtf5
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR BEANS^ 
genr btfl=abn.42+. 3^blf*1000 
genr bt£2=ab# 1.42^.2#b2f* 1000 
genr btf3=ab< 1.42^.5#b3f* 1000 
genr btf=btfl +btf2+btf3
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR CORN^ 
genr ctfl=acn.42+. 3^clf*1000 
genr ctf2=ac# 1.42+.2#c2f* 1000 
genr ctf3=ac#1.42#.5#c3f*1000 
genr ct£=ctfl+ct£2+ctf3
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR SORGHUM^ 
genr stfl=as^l.42^. 5^slP1000
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genr stf2=as* 1.42*.5*s2f* 1000 
genr stf=stfl+stf2
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR BANANAS* 
genr gtf=ag* 1.42*g 1 f* 1000
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR COFFEE*
genr ktfl=ak*l .42*.4*kl f*1000
genr kt£2=ak*1.42*.2*k2t*1000
genr ktf3=ak*1.42*.3*k3f* 1000
genr ktf4=ak* 1.42*.! *k4f*1000
genr ktf=ktfl+lct£2+ktf3+ktf4
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR SUGARCANE* 
genr ztfl =az* 1.42*.5*z I f* 1000 
genr ztf2=az* 1.42* 5*z2f* 1000 
genr ztf=ztfl+ztf2
♦♦♦TOTAL FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION****** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
genr tf=rtf+btf+ctf+stf+gtf+-ktf+ztf 
format(3x, 8fl3.2) 
print tf  / format
print rtf btf ctf stf gtf ktf ztf / format 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR RICE*






♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR BEANS* 
genr btl 1=ab* 1.42* .3 *b 11* 1000 
genr btl2=ab* 1.42* 2*b21* 1000 
genrbtl3=ab*l.42*.5*b31*l000 
genr btl=btl l+bt!2+btl3
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR CORN* 
genr ctll=ac*l.42*.3*cll*1000 
genr ctl2=ac* 1.42*. 2*c21* 1000 
genr ctl3=ac*1.42*.5*c31* 1000
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genr ctl=ctl 1 +ctl2+ctl3
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR SORGHUM^ 
genr stll=as>1.42#.5%slP1000 
genr stl2=as* 1,42^.5^s21*1000 
genr stl=stll+stl2
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR BANANAS^ 
genr gtl=ag# 1.42#g I !♦ 1000
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR CATTLE-BEEF# 
genr mtl=sm^mll# 1 0 0 0






♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR SUGARCANE^ 
genrztll=azM.42#.5#zll*1000 
genr ztl2=az^ 1.42*.5*221* 1000 
genr ztl=ztll+zt!2
♦♦♦TOTAL LABOR C O N S U M P T IO N ""^ ""
genr tl=rtl+btl+ctl+stl+gtl+ktl+ztl+mtl 
print tl / format
print rtl btl ctl stl gtl ktl ztl mtl / format 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *







♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR BEANS^ 
genr btkl=qb#.3^pb^blk 
genr btk2 =qb# .2 ,tpb%b2 k
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genr btk3=qb*.5*pb*b3k 
genr btk=btkl +btk2+btk3
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR CORN* 
genr ctkl=qc*.3*pc*clk 
genr ctk2 =qc*.2 *pc*c2 k 
genr ctk3=qc*.5*pc*c3k 
genr ctt=ctkl+ctk2+ctk3
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR SORGHUM^ 
genr stkl=qs#.5#ps#slk  
genr stk2=qs#.5*‘ps+s2k 
genr stk=stkl+stk2
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR BANANAS^ 
genr gtk=qg#pg#glk
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR CATTLE-BEEF* 
genr mtk=qm*pm*m 1K
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR COFFEE^
genr ktkl=qk*.4*pk*klk
genr ktk2 =qk*.2 *pk*k2 k
genr ktk3=qk*.3’*pkl,k3k
genr ktk4=qk*. 1 ♦pk#k3k
genr ktk=ktkl+ktk2+ktk3+ktk4
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR SUGARCANE^ 
genr ztkl=qz*.5*pz^zlk 
genr ztk2=qz* .5 *pz#z2k 
genr ztk=ztkl+ztk2
♦♦♦TOTAL CAPITAL C O N SU M PT IO N ""^" 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
genr tk=rtk+btk+ctk+stk+gtk+ktk+ztk+mtk 
print tk /  format
print rtk btk ctk stk gtk ktk ztk ratk / format
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
♦ ESTIMATING LEAST SQUARES ********************* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


















































format(2 x, 2 f8 .2 )
ols ar rtk rtl rtf
ols lnar lnrtk Inrtl lnrtf / predict=lnarhat 
print lnar lnarhat / format
olsab btkbtlbtf
ols Inab lnbtk Inbtl Inbtf / predict2  lnabhat 
print lnab lnabhat / format
ols ac ctk ctl ctf
ols lnac Inctk lnctl lnctf / predict2  Inachat 
print lnac lnachat / format
ols as stk stl stf
ols Inas lnstk Instl lnstf /  predict= Inashat 
print lnas Inashat / format
ols ag gtk gtl gtf
ols lnag lngtk lngtl Ingtf / predict2  lnaghat 
print lnag lnaghat / format
ols ak ktk ktl ktf
ols lnak lnktk lnktl Inktf / predict2  Inakhat 
print lnak Inakhat / format
ols az ztk ztl ztf
ols lnaz lnztk lnztl lnztf /  predict2  Inazhat 
print lnaz Inazhat / format
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
**beef estimation*******************************
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ols qm mtk mtl tm
ols Inqm lnmtk lnmtl lntm / predict^ lnqmhat 
print lnqm lnqmhat / format
ols qm mtk mtl sm
ols lnqm lnmtk lnmtl lnsm / predicts lnqmhat 1 
print lnqm lnqmhatl /  format
stop
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APPENDIX G: SAS PROGRAM FOR NON-LINEAR ESTIMATION 
PROCEDURE OF SUPPLY ELASTICITIES OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, 
SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES USING DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
data Guatema;
proc nip tech=QUANEW MAXITER=1000 MAXFUNC=1000; 
parms
ar ab ac as ag ak az av 
nr nb nc ns ng nk nz nv 
kr kb kc ks kg kk kz kv 
lr lb lc Is Ig lk Iz lv 
fr fb fc fe fg fk fe 



















0< = lr< =  388657.0,
0<= lb <=6359631.42,
0<= lc<=  17537624.48 
0 <= Is <= 1991181.89,
0<= lg< =  1215453.83,
0 < = lk < =  431291133,
0<= lz<=  4378645.54,
0 <= lv <= 13894713,
0 <=fr<= 43050.64,
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0 <= fz <= 313980.05,
0  <= nr nb nc ns ng nk nz nv; 
nlincon
nlcl-nlcl9 >= 0.,
0 <= nlc9 <=240.78,
0<=nlcl0<=  285.01,
















nlc9 = ar-((240.78-nr)/0.001); 
nlclO = ab-((285.01-nb)/0.0001); 
n lcll =ac-((172.80-nc)/0.000l2); 
nlcl2 = as-((12833-ns)/0.001); 
nlcl3 = ag-((343.15-ng)/0.001); 
nlcl4 = ak-((750.82-nk)/0.0001); 
nlcl5 = az-((168.45-nz)/0.0001); 
nlcl6  = av-(( 150. l-nv)/0 .0 0 1);
nlcl7 = 75000304.73-(lr**0.400)-(lb**0.589)-(Ic**(0.193))-(ls**0.202)- 
0g**0.098>(lk**0.087)-(Iz**0.i76)-(lv**0.036);
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APPENDIX H: SAS CODE TO ESTIMATE DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF 
RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND 
BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICA COUNTRIES FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
data Guatema;
array guate{15,8} guatel-guatel20;
array seed{8 } seedl-seed8 ;
do i=lto 8 ;
seed{i}=1 0+i;
end;
do i=l to 15; 
do j= l to 8 ;
ifj= l
then guate{i j } =4.6+4.6 *.2*normal(seed{1}); 
else if j= 2
then guate {i j }=8 .4+8.4*.2*normal(seed {2}); 
else if j=3
then guate{ij}=l 10.15+110.15 *.2*normal(seed {3}); 
else if j=4
then guate{ij}=l .25+1.25*.2*normal(seed{4}); 
else if j=5
then guate {i j  } =3.4+3.4*0.2*normal(seed {5}); 
else if j= 6
then guate{ij}=l. 1+ 1.1  *.2 *normal(seed{6 }); 
else if j=7
thenguate{ij}=42.2+42.2*.2*normaI(seed{7});





var guatel-guatel2 0 ; 
run;
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APPENDIX I: SHAZAM! PROGRAM TO ESTIMATE DEMAND
ELASTICITIES OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, 
SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES USING 
DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
set nocolor
file screen a:\honduras\hdemandout 
sample I IS
read(a:MiondurasMidernancLtxt) npr npb npc nps npg npk npz npm dr db dc ds & 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*********ESTIMATING ELASTICITIES FOR r ic e *"************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *














print err erb ere ers erm 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*********ESmiATING ELASTICITIES f o r  b e a n s*************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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print ebr ebb ebc ebs ebm
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
♦********ESTIMATING e l a st ic it ie s  FOR CORN*************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *














print ecr ecb ecc ecs ecm
ESTIMATING ELASTICITIES FOR SORGHUM'














print esresb esc ess esm
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*********ESTIMATING el a stic it ie s  f o r  BANANA************" 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ols wg tapg tapk tapz taexp / coef=guin 
matrix g=guin











* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*********ESTMATING ELASTICITIES f o r  c o f f e e ************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *










print ekk ekz ekm
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
*********ESTIMATING e l a s t ic it ie s  f o r  su g a r ***************







genl ezz=-1 +(bzz/wzbar)-bze 
genl ezg=(bzg/wzbar)-bze*(wgbar/wzbar) 
genl ezk=(bzk/wzbar)'bze*(wkbar/wzbar) 
print ezz ezg ezk
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*********ESTTMATING ELASTICmES FOR BEEF**************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ols wm lnpr lnpb lnpc Inps lnpm biexp / coef=meat















print emm emr emb emc ems
**********************************************************
•♦♦CREATING MATRIX OF ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND************** 




































































print eta / format 
stop
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Jorge Luis Icabalceta Mairena was bom in Matagalpa, Nicaragua. He received his 
High School diploma and a high school level degree in agriculture in 1984 from the 
Instituto Agropecuario “Santiago Baldovinos” of Matagalpa, Nicaragua.
In 1986 he was granted a scholarship and went to the USSR to study agricultural 
economics in the Agricultural Academy “Timiriazev” of Moscow. Jorge received a 
bachelor of science degree in agricultural economics in 1991.
After returning to Nicaragua, he worked from 1991 to 1993 as a coordinator of a 
environmental project and, from 1993 to 199S as an economic analyst for the coffee 
research station of the Nicaraguan Union of Coffee Producers (UNICAFE).
In 199S, he was granted a Fulbright program scholarship to attend graduate school 
at Louisiana State University. He graduated with a master of science degree in agricultural 
economics in December 1997. In August 1997, Jorge Icabalceta was awarded an 
assistantship to pursue a doctoral degree in agricultural economics at Louisiana State 
University. Presently, he is a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
agricultural economics.
234
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: Jorge Luis Icabalceta Mairena 
Major Field: Agricultural Economics
Title of Dissertation: The Influence of Agricultural Policy on Economic
Integration Among Central American Countries:







Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
